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In this dissertation I address the general research question “What are the conditions under which 
stakeholders will take action against an organization?”  I respond to this question by 
acknowledging that a stakeholder is likely to act when it is motivated to do so: accordingly I 
adopt two of the most well-established motivation theories, equity theory and expectancy theory, 
based on which I develop a framework for understanding when a stakeholder is likely to take 
action against the focal organization (FO).  I assert that stakeholders are most likely to take action 
against the FO when they perceive underreward inequity in their relationship with the FO and 
they have a high expectancy that they can successfully take action in order to remedy that 
inequity.  To test hypotheses derived from the framework I develop an experiment wherein 
subjects peruse two vignettes, each concerning a specific stakeholder-FO relationship, and 
respond to various questions concerning the likelihood that they would engage in various actions.  
Results provide support for the idea that both a stakeholder's perceptions of the degree of equity (or 
inequity) in its relationship with the FO and its expectancy that it can successfully 
engage in action that will result in valued outcomes affect its propensity to take 
action against the FO.  Other results indicate that overrewarded stakeholders may be more likely 
than others to engage in behaviors that help the FO.  Results concerning the impact of equity 
sensitivity on stakeholder propensities to engage in action either detrimental to or supportive of 
the FO were mixed.   
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PREFACE 
 
I would like to thank my mother and the members of my dissertation committee for their support 
of this enterprise. 
  
“But that wasn’t the worst: before me, posed with a sort of indolence, was a voluminous, insipid 
idea.  I did not see clearly what it was, but it sickened me so much I couldn’t look at it.” 
 -  Jean-Paul Sartre 
 
“Anyhow, it was quite likely that in a month’s time I would have entirely different opinions on 
any subject.  What more could have been expected of me?” 
- Françoise Sagan 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS BY STAKEHOLDERS 
In 2003, Planned Parenthood officials faced a problem concerning the construction of an 
abortion clinic associated with their offices in Austin, Texas: a wide variety of suppliers and 
subcontractors refused to contribute to the project, resulting in the builder abandoning the 
enterprise.  Contractors in lumber, cement supply, foundation building, plumbing, heating and 
air-conditioning, windows, flooring, roofing, insulation, and landscaping – hundreds of 
subcontractors altogether – agreed to participate in a boycott of Planned Parenthood’s 
construction project organized by a concrete contractor and anti-abortion activist.  Telephone and 
letter-writing campaigns organized by the activist urged more than 750 Austin- and San Antonio-
based businesses not to provide supplies or services for the construction of the clinic, and to join 
his organization, the Texas Contractors and Suppliers for Life Association.  Some members of 
the public joined the effort, as did the anti-abortion group, Texas Right to Life, and many 
churches, contacting relevant contractors and warning them not to participate in the project.  
The same year, in Miami, representatives of the Haitian American Foundation and the 
Cuban American National Foundation threatened to sue or boycott Rockstar Games, in whose 
videogame, “Grand Theft Auto: Vice City,” an ex-convict controlled by the player must, at 
certain points, “kill all Haitians” and “kill the Cubans.”  The same issue sparked protests outside 
New York’s city hall, and a denunciation of the game from the mayor, Michael Bloomberg.  
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Take-two Interactive Software, the parent company of Rockstar Games, responded by removing 
the offensive dialogue from future copies of the game.   
In Seattle, the local chapter of the National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum 
threatened to launch a negative media campaign targeting the Bonzai nightclub: Bonzai was 
charging its patrons $5 to eat sushi served on near-naked women.  The Women’s Forum found 
the practice dehumanizing, and claimed it promoted violence against women.  About the same 
time, leaders in the African-American community called for a boycott of Urban Outfitters, which 
was selling a board game, called “Ghettopoly,” that involves players acting like pimps and game 
cards emblazoned with statements such as, “You got yo whole neighborhood addicted to crack.  
Collect $50 from each playa.”  Meanwhile, in South Carolina, 70,000 grocery store workers from 
Albertsons, Vons, and Ralphs, went on strike after failing to come to an agreement with their 
employers and rejecting the latter’s most recent contract offer.  Officials of the United Food and 
Commercial Workers accused the employers of attempting to shift $1 billion of healthcare costs 
onto workers.      
These examples are employed as illustrations of a common circumstance in the 
environments of organizations: a disgruntled or dissatisfied stakeholder (or stakeholders) takes 
action against a “focal organization” (FO) in response to some action (or inaction) by that 
organization.  The potential for conflict is an underlying feature of firm-stakeholder 
relationships:  indeed, Frooman (1999) states that stakeholder theory is primarily concerned with 
managing the potential conflicts that come from divergences of interests, and Lampe (2001: 166) 
asserts, “ultimately, conflict, or at least the potential for conflict, give the stakeholder concept 
meaning and a reason for being.”  Others (e.g., Brenner & Cochran, 1991; Freeman, 1984) aver 
that one of the main purposes of the stakeholder approach is to help managers “manage” or “deal 
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with” their organization’s stakeholders in such way as to promote the interests of the FO, in part 
through avoidance of conflict.   
Combining these premises, it becomes apparent that a driving force underlying the 
stakeholder concept (at least from the perspective of the FO) is dealing with possibility of 
negative outcomes to the FO resulting from the conflict between it and its stakeholders: when 
there is conflict between the FO and one or more stakeholders, substantial damage to the 
organization’s well-being may ensue (Lampe, 2001; Ulmer, 2001).  Implicit in this position, and, 
indeed, in the stakeholder literature in general, is a supposition that if the needs or interests of 
stakeholders are not met, those stakeholders may impose sanctions upon (i.e., take action 
against) the FO.   
Stakeholder actions against organizations are commonplace.  Various strategies are 
employed by individuals, groups, or organizations – employees, community groups, 
environmentalists, and countless others – in order to influence the actions taken by firms.  Such 
sanctions may include tactics such as boycotts, divestitures, strikes, the withholding of resources, 
protests, letter writing campaigns, and innumerable other activities (Frooman, 1999).  These 
stakeholder actions represent a critical issue for managers, as stakeholders’ actions can have a 
severe impact on the performance of the FO: as Chen and Miller (1994: 90) posit, “the extent to 
which a firm’s actions will provoke retaliation will be negatively related to performance.”  
Because stakeholder actions against FO can have serious effects on organizational performance, 
it is vital that stakeholder researchers identify the conditions that are likely to precipitate 
stakeholder action.   
Unfortunately, though many (e.g., Rowley, 1997; Cordano, Frieze, & Ellis, 2004) 
acknowledge that advancements in stakeholder theory depend in part upon the development of a 
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greater understanding of how and why stakeholders respond to organizations, very little work in 
the stakeholder literature has investigated when stakeholders will be inclined to act against a FO: 
Cordano et al. (2004) state, “Managers have few tools to interpret and forecast the actions of 
stakeholders,” and Hendry (2003: 268) notes, “…few researchers have attempted to determine 
why (stakeholders) would exert pressure on a specific organization.”  Work by Frooman (1999) 
has addressed how stakeholders will try to influence a firm given that they have decided to act, 
and Rowley (1997) identified conditions that affect a FO’s ability to resist stakeholder activity; 
however, with the exception of work by Rowley & Berman (2000) and Rowley and Moldoveanu 
(2003), research in the stakeholder literature has not addressed variables influencing the 
likelihood of action against the FO by stakeholders.   
 
1.2  THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
A prominent question that remains to be addressed within the stakeholder literature, then, is: 
“What are the conditions under which stakeholders will take action against a FO?”  While 
Rowley and Berman (2000) address the subject of stakeholder action in describing their “logic of 
stakeholder action,” they do not provide a substantial theoretical basis for the relationships they 
suggest.  They hint at the importance of variables such as visibility and expectancies – 
“stakeholder groups must be cognizant of the firm’s behavior, be willing to take action to 
influence the firm, and have the capabilities to do so” (Rowley & Berman, 2000: 409) – but do 
not develop the idea further.   
In the words of Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003: 207), “…the stakeholder perspective 
includes the notions that stakeholders have interests (and) mobilize to protect or enhance those 
interests…”  However, while stating that most stakeholder action is indeed “interest-based,” they 
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differentiate between an “interest-based view” and one based on social identity.  They then focus 
on social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) as a determinant of stakeholder action, asserting that 
stakeholder action can occur as a result of social actors’ desires to express their social 
identification with a group or organization.  They do note that two key variables (other than the 
desire to enhance social identity) leading to stakeholder action are discontent with the FO and the 
ability to act against the FO, but do not pursue the idea further.  Thus, a void remains in the 
stakeholder literature: an explicit attempt to elaborate on the “interest-based view” of stakeholder 
action.  My goal in this dissertation is to more fully articulate a framework for understanding 
stakeholder activity that is based on stakeholder interests rather than on social identity.  In doing 
so, I invoke equity theory (which incorporates the concepts of discontent due to one’s interests 
not being met) and expectancy theory (which addresses the ability to act against the FO), two of 
the best developed theories of motivation. 
        
1.3  A RESPONSE TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
1.3.1  The Interest-based View of Stakeholder Action 
Despite the lack of explicit acknowledgement in most of the literature, Rowley and Moldoveanu 
(2003), as noted above, assert that an underlying assumption in stakeholder research is that 
stakeholder action, when it occurs, is interest-driven; that is, stakeholders act in order to promote 
or protect their interests (e.g., Frooman, 1999).  Indeed, they suggest that the stakeholder 
perspective in general may be based on this position.  Stakeholders tend to be defined in terms of 
their interests, or “stakes,” which are seen to be affected (and perhaps put at risk) by the actions 
of the FO (Carroll, 1993; Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003), and these interests are generally seen 
as providing the purpose behind stakeholder action.  Thus, stakeholders may attempt to influence 
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or “manage” the firm in order to forward their interests (Brouthers & Bamossy, 1997; Frooman, 
1999; Gibson, 2000; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; Waxenberger & Spence, 2003).  The 
potential for stakeholder action is therefore dependent, in part, on the degree to which the FO’s 
actions are related to the fulfillment of the stakeholder’s interests (Savage, Nix, Whitehead, & 
Blair, 1991).  From this point of view, stakeholders are quasi-rational actors (subject to “bounded 
rationality” (Simon, 1957)), whose responses to the behaviors of the FO are founded in 
assessments of the actions’ utilities in promoting or protecting their interests (Rowley & 
Moldoveanu, 2003): generally speaking, stakeholders will act when they perceive that actions 
taken (or not taken) by the FO impede their ability to have their interests met.    
1.3.2  Stakeholder Interests and Motivation   
The implication of the interest-based view is that stakeholder interests motivate stakeholder 
action; thus, one way of incorporating stakeholder interests into a model of stakeholder action is 
to employ motivation theories to describe the phenomenon.  It is my position that motivational 
forces underlie stakeholder activity: I make the (perhaps trivial) assumption, similar to 
motivation theorists’ assumption that motivation is a prerequisite to effort directed by individuals 
toward task performance (Steers & Porter, 1979), that a prerequisite to stakeholder action against 
an organization is the motivation to undertake that action.  Therefore, I assert that motivation 
theories are the best source for frameworks to help us understand such stakeholder behaviors.   
Stakeholders have, from the inception of stakeholder theory, been seen as entities that 
have motivations (Mitroff, 1983); however, underlying sources of stakeholder motivation have 
not been well-elaborated upon.  Therefore, integral to my approach will be addressing what it is 
that motivates a stakeholder to act against a FO (that is, to attempt to impose sanctions upon it).  
In particular, I will focus on stakeholder perceptions of the equity of the FO-stakeholder 
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relationship, as well as stakeholder expectancies concerning its ability to mount a successful 
action against the FO in order to have its interests met.   
I take the position that explanations derived from equity theory (Adams, 1963; 1965) and 
expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) can account for much of why stakeholders are (or are not) 
motivated to act against an organization.  A stakeholder’s motivation to take action against an 
organization is dependent on its perception of the fairness of its relationship with the 
organization, the importance of the outcomes (i.e., interests) at stake, its perception that it can 
successfully take action against the FO, and its perception that successful actions will lead to 
desired outcomes.  (In discussing stakeholder perceptions, in cases where the stakeholder is not 
an individual I am referring to the perceptions of key leaders, authority figures, or decision-
makers within the stakeholder group or organization).     
While equity theory and expectancy theory were initially developed to understand 
motivation at the individual level, their concepts seem to have great potential for understanding 
the motivation of stakeholders, despite the fact that “stakeholder” is a concept that crosses levels 
(a stakeholder can be anything from an individual, to a group, to an organization).  Chen and 
Miller’s (1994) successful application of expectancy theory to explain competitive motivation at 
the organizational level lends credence to this position.  Furthermore, a number of students of 
stakeholders (e.g., Cordano et al., 2004; Key, 1999; Winn, 2001) suggest that the effects of 
individual-level constructs on stakeholder behaviors have tended to be neglected by researchers 
in the field.  Use of equity and expectancy theories will allow me to add to the meager catalogue 
of work in stakeholder theory that addresses such individual-level variables. 
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1.4  THE RELATIONSHIP OF MY POSITION TO EXISTING WORK 
As noted earlier, the only works in the stakeholder literature that explicitly address the 
preconditions of stakeholder activity are those of Rowley and Berman (2000) and Rowley and 
Moldoveanu (2003).  Rowley and Berman (2000) suggest several features of the FO and its 
environment (firm characteristics, issue conditions, industry characteristics, stakeholder 
environment, and institutional context) that will have an impact on the likelihood of stakeholder 
action directed against the FO.  For example, with regard to the stakeholder environment, they 
propose that conditions such as past successful actions by stakeholders against an organization 
and existing infrastructures supporting action increase the likelihood of stakeholder action 
(Rowley & Berman, 2000).  Interpreting this proposition from an equity/expectancy point of 
view, successful past actions by stakeholders against the FO and infrastructures supporting 
action will both raise expectancies concerning the likelihood of successful action in the present – 
they will increase the perceptions that the action can be accomplished, and that accomplishing it 
will lead to desired outcomes – thus making stakeholder activity more likely.  I believe that the 
other propositions implied by Rowley and Berman (2000) in their “logic of stakeholder” action 
can likewise be subsumed under an equity/expectancy approach, which thus represents a theory-
based and more parsimonious explanation for their wide variety of postulations concerning 
stakeholder propensities to act. 
It is also my position that an interest-based approach to understanding stakeholder action, 
founded in equity theory and expectancy theory, can, in fact, subsume the social identity 
perspective advocated by Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003).  These authors assert that an interest-
based view of stakeholder action cannot explain, for example, why some stakeholders pursue lost 
causes.  I submit that Rowley and Moldoveanu’s (2003) position stems from an unnecessarily 
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narrow view of the definition of “stakeholder interests.”  This narrow definition of “interests” is 
implied when they state, “Despite the lack of material or pecuniary benefits, individuals may still 
participate in group action toward the focal organization.”  Material and pecuniary benefits, 
though, only represent “extrinsic” rewards – those administered by entities outside the individual 
and not associated with the activity itself – thus, their definition of “interest” ignores another 
type of reward that has been identified in the equity theory and expectancy theory literatures, 
namely “intrinsic” rewards – those rewards, such as psychological gratification, that result 
merely from undertaking a given activity.   
Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) suggest that when one pursues a lost cause “the 
expected rational benefits of the action are negligible or negative” (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 
2003: 208).  However, if stakeholder interests are seen to include intrinsic rewards, pursuit of a 
lost cause can be seen as interest-based: in short, it is in the stakeholder’s interest to feel a sense 
of gratification, and acting, even in pursuit of a lost cause, can be a source of gratification.  So, 
for example, the “feeling of solidarity” or “reinforcement of identity” with a group that Rowley 
and Moldoveanu (2003) argue can serve as bases for stakeholder action, if they are viewed as 
intrinsic rewards, become interests that the stakeholder might rationally pursue.  As Powers and 
Thompson (1994: 190) note, “…voluntary participation in community-approved activities is 
often intrinsically satisfying.”  If one views a stakeholder group as a “community,” participation 
in stakeholder action can easily be seen as providing valuable intrinsic rewards (as well as 
possible related or unrelated extrinsic rewards). 
From this perspective, then, all stakeholder action taken in order to emphasize a social 
identity is, in the end, interest-based.  Rowley and Moldoveanu’s (2003: 208) argument that “the 
rational pursuit of interests is not necessary for inciting (stakeholder) action” hinges on their lack 
 10
of acknowledgement that the bases for action they identify are, in fact, intrinsic rewards, and so 
represent interests.  They note that “interest-based action is driven by the expected values and 
payoffs associated with the consequences of that action” (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003: 209), 
but fail to acknowledge the expected values and payoffs of identity-reinforcing actions.         
A brief example may illuminate the argument.  Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003: 211) ask 
the question, “Why… do some stakeholder groups refuse to relent in their protest campaign 
against a corporation’s pollution practices, even after the firm improves environmental controls 
in an attempt to mollify their concerns?”  In answer to this question, they assert that continued 
protest 1) builds solidarity among group members, which facilitates a strong culture, which, in 
turn increases the salience of the group to the individual and further motivates them to 
participate, and 2) acts to confirm the individual identities of the people in the group, because 
one’s identity is, to an extent, formed through affiliation with various groups. 
A second answer to the question acknowledges the outcomes of continued protest attested 
to by Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003), but also identifies them as valuable to members of the 
protest group.  Put simply, individuals in the stakeholder group attach a positive value to feelings 
of solidarity and confirmations of their identities, both of which are provided by continued 
protest even though their initial demands have been met.  Feelings of solidarity and feelings of 
confirmation of one’s identity are intrinsic rewards – they are a type of interest – and so it is 
perfectly rational for members of the stakeholder group to continue their action as long as it 
continues to allow them to address these interests (provided that the interests are valued highly). 
Indeed, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003: 211) come close to explicitly acknowledging the 
importance of intrinsic rewards.  They state, “Group membership and the identity gained from 
this association are strongly related to value rationality – the pursuit of a cause or principle that 
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has intrinsic value independent of (and that may supersede) the related outcomes.”  There is a 
“symbolic utility… associated with pursuing an action merely for the purpose of being able to 
credibly say one has, in fact, pursued it.”  They further state, “groups who value the common 
identity and feeling of solidarity gained through participation in the group are motivated to 
act…”  (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003: 211).  It is clear that Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) are 
not blind to the fact that it is the value attached to the feelings of solidarity and common identity, 
and not the solidarity and common identity themselves, that motivates stakeholder action in lost 
causes or where the stakeholder’s material interests have been met.  As they themselves note, 
symbolic actions that confirm identity and promote group solidarity have their own utility.  I 
believe that the utility associated with such symbolic actions represents a valuable intrinsic 
reward, and this utility can easily be incorporated into an interest-based model of stakeholder 
action.  In short, stakeholders act to promote their interests, whether these interests are material 
or symbolic.  While Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003: 215) state that stakeholders “may forego a 
rational assessment of net benefits associated with collective action, because they are motivated 
to express and be recognized for a particular identity garnered to those participating as members 
of the stakeholder group,” I assert that because these “expressions” and “recognitions” have 
value, they are indeed likely to be included in any assessment of the benefits of action by any 
“rational” stakeholder.  
Based on the existing work in stakeholder theory, then, I assert that an elaboration of an 
interest-based model of stakeholder action incorporating motivation theories is warranted.  First, 
such a model has not been clearly articulated in the literature, though an interest-based approach 
appears to underlie much of the work in the field.  Second, I believe that the research concerned 
with stakeholder activity that does exist can be subsumed under an interest-based framework 
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employing equity theory and expectancy theory.  Therefore, in an effort to shed light on the 
conditions that encourage stakeholder action, in the remainder of this dissertation I: 1) review the 
literatures concerning stakeholder theory, expectancy theory, and equity theory; 2) develop an 
equity- and expectancy-based framework for explaining stakeholder action; 3) present 
hypotheses concerning conditions that promote the likelihood of stakeholder attempts to impose 
sanctions upon (i.e., take action against) the FO; and 4) present the results of an empirical study 
designed to test those hypotheses. 
 
1.5  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I introduced my research question and evidence concerning the desirability of its 
investigation.  In the next, I summarize the literature concerning stakeholder theory, as well as 
those concerning equity theory and expectancy theory, the two motivation theories I will be 
using to address the research question.   
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter I will review the literature concerning the theories relevant to my study.  First 
reviewed will be the stakeholder literature.  I begin with some background on the development of 
stakeholder approach and definitions of the term “stakeholder,” after which I review the work on 
stakeholders using the typology developed by Donaldson and Preston (1995) as a means of 
categorization.  I will then undertake to summarize the literatures concerning equity theory and 
expectancy theory: due to the vastness of these bodies of work I will focus on theoretical and 
empirical research relating to the development of the motivation models themselves.  Very brief 
summaries of equity theory and expectancy theory are presented on pages 140 and 150 
respectively. 
   
2.1  STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
2.1.1  Background 
In 1932, Merrick Dodd argued that the corporation is more than merely a profit-generating 
enterprise: it has a “social service” function as well.  Furthermore, its managers’ powers are held 
in trust for the entire community, not just for shareholders.  Later, Barnard (1938) argued that the 
interests of employees need to be considered in firm decisionmaking, Eells (1960) stated that the 
corporation was accountable to a variety of “sectors of society,” and Abrams (1951) identified 
employees, stockholders, customers, and the government as “corporate claimants.”  These works 
can be seen as very early manifestations of a “stakeholder approach” to thinking about the firm.   
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Decades later, Freeman (1984) developed a similar concept in his book “Strategic 
Management: A Stakeholder Approach,” and thereby popularized the both the term and the idea 
among management scholars.  In Freeman’s view, a firm is in relationships with a wide variety 
of constituents in its environment, and these “stakeholders” have claims on the firm that compete 
with the interests of stockholders.  The purpose of a firm is, from this view, to consider, 
coordinate, and balance the interests of its stakeholders (Evan & Freeman, 1983; Gibson, 2000).  
Thus, in stakeholder theory, managers are seen as having duties not just to shareholders, but to a 
wide variety of individuals, groups, or organizations, such as employees, customers, suppliers, 
and the community.  In order to be successful, managers must acknowledge and attend to the 
interests of this wide variety of constituents.  By arguing for the recognition of a broad variety of 
constituents, the stakeholder approach expands the commonly held conception of who has a 
stake in or claim on a firm (Langtry, 1994).   
In this view, corporations can thus be seen as existing for the purpose of facilitating the 
well-being of all stakeholders, not just that of owners (Evan & Freeman, 1983).  There are 
instrumental as well as moral reasons for this position: if a stakeholder perceives that the 
decisions made by managers of the FO consistently favor a certain stakeholder (or subset of all 
stakeholders) it may be unwilling to do business with the FO (Jones, 1995; Ogden & Watson, 
1999).  Therefore, “an economically successful firm will necessarily be one in which senior 
management adopts… strategies and policies that facilitate the maintenance of an appropriate 
balance between different stakeholder interests (Ogden & Watson, 1999: 527).  Moral arguments 
for a stakeholder approach to management, on the other hand, hinge on the idea that 
stakeholders’ interests have intrinsic value. 
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Stakeholder theory takes a systems view of organizations, accepting the premise that 
organizations must interact with their environments (Jonker & Foster, 2002).  Since various 
constituents (i.e., stakeholders) in the FO’s environment are seen as having an influence on and 
being influenced by the FO, the division between the business and its environment is less distinct 
from the stakeholder perspective (Bronn & Bronn, 2003).  For example, Mitroff (1983: 7) states, 
“… a change in strategy for an organization… changes one or more relationships among the 
stakeholders.  Hence every action is dependent on stakeholder properties and vice versa.”  The 
same author (1983: 38) goes so far as to define the organization in terms of its relationships with 
its stakeholders.  He asserts, “The state of an organization at a certain point in time will be the 
result of the interaction of the behavior of all the organization’s stakeholders from the beginning 
of its history up to a particular point in time.”   
In contemporary versions of stakeholder theory, the FO and/or its managers is usually 
seen as existing at the center of the relationships that exist between a firm and its various 
stakeholders (Driscoll & Starik, 2004).  A typical “stakeholder map” is presented in Figure 2.1, 
with the letters A, B, C, and D representing various stakeholders: this view, with a FO 
maintaining dyadic ties with its various stakeholders, has dominated the stakeholder literature for 
some time.  As noted by Waxenberger and Spence (2003), the lack of arrowheads in the 
depiction of the ties indicates that the stakes are “reciprocal” due to the fact that the FO and a 
given stakeholder are both capable of affecting one another: stakeholders have the potential to 
act in ways which influence the organization, and vice versa.  
Stakeholder “theories of the firm” have been developed (e.g., Brenner & Cochran, 1991).  
Such theories are generally presented as alternatives to the “neoclassical economics” view of the 
firm, wherein the maximization of shareholder wealth is the sole goal of the firm, and managerial 
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decisions must be directed toward furthering the interests of shareholders (Kaler, 2003; Key, 
1999).  Donaldson and Preston (1995), for example, contrasted the stakeholder model of the firm 
with the “traditional,” input-output model.  They assert that the traditional model implies that 
only advantaged contributors (e.g., shareholders) will receive rents, while other contributors 
(e.g., employees) will receive only “normal” rewards.  In contrast, stakeholder theory, in its most 
rudimentary form, suggests that there is no particularly compelling reason why any one 
constituent should be treated any better than the others (Freeman, 1994; Goodpaster, 1991).  
Kochan and Rubinstein (2000) argue that “stakeholder firms” exist along a continuum from 
those that adopt the “stockholder primacy” model exclusively to those that are designed to 
“pursue different objectives of two or more stakeholders.”  A stakeholder firm “is composed of, 
legitimates, and gives voice to the existence of multiple interests, each of which has goals that 
must be satisfied” (Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000: 377).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A Typical “Stakeholder Map” and a Generic Stakeholder Network  
(Adapted from Rowley, 1997) 
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D
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 According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), twelve books and more than a hundred 
articles emphasizing the stakeholder concept were published in the decade following Freeman’s 
(1984) book.  The stakeholder approach has become a commonly used tool in strategic 
management (Langtry, 1994), and is a critical research framework in fields such as corporate 
social responsibility, business and society, and business ethics (Key, 1999; Phillips, 1997; 
Waxenberger & Spence, 2003).  In the business world, the stakeholder approach is 
acknowledged by many as a key component in the management of the bottom line and the 
improvement of shareholder value (Waxenberger & Spence, 2003).   
2.1.2  Stakeholders and Stakeholder Groups  
There is considerable variation in the literature concerning who or what constitutes a stakeholder 
(Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000), and a wide variety of definitions have been presented over the 
years.  Stakeholders tend to be defined as such based on their “interests” (i.e., “shares” in an 
undertaking), “claims” (i.e., assertions of a title or right to something), or “power” or “influence” 
(i.e., the ability to have an effect on the FO) (Gibson, 2000).  Definitions of the term 
“stakeholder” range from the extremely broad and inclusive to the relatively narrow and 
exclusive (Driscoll & Starik, 2004; McLarney, 2002).  “Narrow” definitions of the term typically 
define stakeholders in terms of their relevance to the core economic interests of the firm or their 
moral claims, and acknowledge the fact that it is extraordinarily impractical to expect any 
organization to attend to all the claims various entities may make against it, while “broad” 
definitions acknowledge that firms can be substantially affected by or can have a substantial 
effect on nearly anybody (Mitchell et al., 1997): those defining the stakeholders of a FO must 
thus make a trade-off between inclusiveness and practicality.  Various definitions of the term are 
summarized below.   
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2.1.2.1  Broad Definitions.  Mitroff (1983: 4) states, “Stakeholders are all those parties who 
either affect or who are affected by a corporation’s actions, behavior, and policies.”  Freeman 
(1984), Freeman and Gilbert (1987), Freeman and Reed (1983), and Mellahi and Wood (2003) 
adopt very similar definitions to this one.  To Freeman (1984: 46), for example, a stakeholder is 
“any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s 
objectives,” while for Mellahi and Wood (2003: 183), stakeholders are “all that might be affected 
by the firm’s activities.” While Freeman’s definition is widely used in the stakeholder literature, 
all of these definitions are perhaps broad to the point of impracticability: “can affect” and “is 
affected by” can, if common sense is not applied, lead to a situation where nearly everybody is 
regarded as a stakeholder of nearly every business (Langtry, 1994; Winn, 2001).  Evan and 
Freeman (1983: 100) use this broad definition, but also present a narrower definition: 
stakeholders are “those groups who are vital to the survival and success of the corporation.”  
They also state that “stakeholders are those groups who have a stake in or claim on the firm.”   
Gibson (2000: 246) presents other broad definitions, referring to stakeholders as “those 
groups or individuals with whom the organization interacts or has interdependencies” and “any 
individual or group with power to be a threat or benefit.”  Mitroff (1983), too, acknowledges the 
importance of power in the definition of a stakeholder, asserting that stakeholders are all those 
interest groups, parties, actors, claimants, and institutions – both internal and external to the 
corporation – that exert a hold on it.   
Mason & Mitroff (1981: 43) state that “stakeholders are all those claimants inside and 
outside the firm who have a vested interest in (a) problem and its solution”.  Carroll (1993: 22) 
likewise uses a claim-based definition (though he uses the term “stake” rather than “claim”), 
describing stakeholders as “individuals or groups with which business interacts who have a 
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stake, or vested interest, in the firm.”  Langtry (1994: 433) presents a rather complicated 
definition, stating “Stakeholders are groups or individuals who either are such that the firm’s 
decisions to act, or decisions not to act, have been or will be to a significant extent causally 
responsible for their level of well being, or else have some independently identifiable moral or 
legal claim on the firm which the firm’s actions violate or respect.”  However, the author 
acknowledges that this definition requires substantial amounts of empirical information and 
moral reasoning to actually identify stakeholders.  
2.1.2.2  Narrow Definitions.  Narrow definitions of stakeholders also abound.  Such definitions 
tend to be based on a stakeholder’s importance for the survival of the firm, or on the existence of 
a contractual relationship between the stakeholder and the FO.  Freeman and Reed (1983: 91) 
present a narrow definition of a stakeholder as a group “on which the organization is dependent 
for its continued survival.”  Bowie (1988: 112) refers to stakeholders as those “without whose 
support the organization would cease to exist.”  Nasi (1995: 19) states that stakeholders “interact 
with the firm and thus make its operation possible.”  Cornell and Shapiro (1987: 5) refer to 
stakeholders as “claimants” who have “contracts” with the FO.  Freeman and Evan (1990) also 
view stakeholders as contract-holders.  Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) view Clarkson’s (1995) 
definition of a stakeholder as a “voluntary or involuntary risk-bearer” as a narrow definition, 
though it appears that the inclusion of involuntary risk-bearers makes the definition fairly 
expansive.  Clarkson (1995) also states that stakeholders “have, or claim, ownership, rights, or 
interest in a corporation and its activities.”   
2.1.2.3  Ambiguous Definitions.  A number of researchers have presented definitions the 
breadth of which appear to be dependent on one’s interpretation of the terms included in the 
definition.  For example, Alkhafaji (1989: 36) states that stakeholders are “groups to whom the 
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corporation is responsible,” Wicks, Gilbert, and Freeman (1994: 483) state that stakeholders 
“interact with and give meaning and definition to the corporation,” while Thompson, Wartick, 
and Smith (1991: 209) assert that stakeholders are those in a “relationship with an organization.”   
2.1.2.4  Primary and Secondary Stakeholders.  Some theorists distinguish between “primary” 
and “secondary” stakeholders (Carroll, 1993; Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984; McLarney, 2002).  
To Freeman (1984), primary stakeholders are those whose continuing participation is necessary 
for the survival of the corporation, while secondary stakeholders are not necessary for firm 
survival (but may be able to inflict substantial harm on the firm nonetheless).  Clarkson (1995) 
considers primary stakeholders to be those with whom the firm has a formal, official, or 
contractual relationship: all other stakeholders are secondary.  This distinction is roughly the 
same as Freeman’s (1984) distinction between “direct” and “indirect” stakeholders.  Some assert 
that managers need to consider the interests of both primary and secondary stakeholders, since 
either type can have substantial effects on the well-being of the firm (Gibson, 2000; McLarney, 
2002).  Others, however, argue for the application of a “restricted” form of stakeholder theory, 
wherein the firm should focus on meeting the needs of primary stakeholders (Mellahi & Wood, 
2003). 
2.1.2.5  Stakeholder Groups.  Stakeholder “groups” are generally defined based on shared 
objectives and interests, “claims,” or “stakes” (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Key, 1999; 
Welcomer, 2002; Winn, 2001).  To Hill and Jones (1992: 133), stakeholders are “groups of 
constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm,” and include stockholders, creditors, 
managers, employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, and the general public.  These 
can be seen as representing many of the “generic” stakeholder groups that are often assumed in 
work concerning stakeholders.  However, Winn (2001) argues that stakeholder groups are 
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socially constructed, their names and groupings being founded in culture and history, and argues 
that the assumption of the internal homogeneity of these generic stakeholders is inappropriate: in 
her opinion, treating generic stakeholders as if they are homogeneous is risky, since it is likely 
that there is substantial heterogeneity within groups, which can lead to wide variability in 
behaviors.  This risk is exacerbated by the fact that many individual stakeholders have a 
multiplicity of interests and roles: they “wear many different hats,” and thus may not fit neatly 
into any single stakeholder group (McLarney, 2002; Winn, 2001).  Winn (2001) asserts that 
definitions of stakeholder groups should be seen as “social working definitions,” “issue-specific” 
and “transient,” rather than “general” and “immutable.”  Mark Starik, in Clarkson et al. (1994), 
takes an even more extreme position by stating that the definition of a stakeholder is itself 
inherently subjective, and is determined by the user of the concept.   
 Given that this dissertation is concerned with the behavior of all those entities that can 
take action against a FO and thereby influence or affect it, I employ a broad definition of the 
term “stakeholder” throughout in order to be as inclusive as possible.  I resort, therefore, to 
Freeman’s (1984) definition of a stakeholder as any individual, group, or organization that can 
affect or is affected by the ongoing operations of the FO, and I take the position that both 
primary and secondary stakeholders are relevant for my discussion.     
2.1.3  Donaldson’s and Preston’s Typology 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) assessed the stakeholder literature and distilled from it general 
categories into which the various “justifications” for the stakeholder approach fall.  The result 
was their identification of stakeholder theory as “descriptive,” “instrumental,” and “normative.”  
Donaldson and Preston’s (1995: 75) “descriptive justification” is rooted in the idea that 
“managers believe themselves, or are believed by others, to be practicing stakeholder 
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management.”  They note that some empirical studies suggest that managers do, in fact, refer to 
certain practices as “stakeholder management.”  Furthermore, they point out that U.S. legislation 
and courts now frequently recognize that the interests of various non-shareholder stakeholders 
can legitimately be taken into account in managerial decisionmaking.  Donaldson and Preston’s 
“instrumental justification” for stakeholder theory relies on the idea that stakeholder 
management is related to organizational performance.  They note that the idea that “good” 
stakeholder management is positively related to organizational performance has become 
pervasive.  Lastly, Donaldson and Preston (1995) assert that the “core” justification of 
stakeholder theory is normative: it requires one to accept the premise that stakeholders should be 
identified according to their interests (or identify themselves according to their interests), and, 
more importantly, that those interests are, morally speaking, intrinsically valuable.  This 
approach is derived from the fact that firms can have vast effects on the interests of its 
stakeholders (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999).   
Recently, Donaldson and Preston’s (1995) three justifications of stakeholder theory have 
tended to be used as a typology for categorizing research in stakeholder theory rather than as 
justifications for the stakeholder approach to management.  As a descriptive theory, stakeholder 
theory is a model that describes the nature of the organization and its relationships with its 
stakeholders, and is concerned with whether managers actually do take the interests of 
stakeholder into account (Gibson, 2000).  Of interest are the organization as a “constellation” of 
cooperative and competitive interests – which contrasts with the “traditional, input-output” 
model of the firm (Donaldson & Preston, 1995) – and the management of those interests   
As an instrumental theory, stakeholder theory develops a framework for assessing the 
relationships between stakeholder management and the goals of the business.  This approach 
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hinges on the fact that stakeholders can have a great impact on whether or not a firm achieves its 
objectives (Berman et al., 1999).  Generally speaking, this area of inquiry attempts to specify the 
types of outcomes that will be obtained if certain behaviors are taken with respect to the firm’s 
stakeholders (Jones & Wicks, 1999).  Typically, however, this work addresses a more specific 
topic: the performance implications of effective or ineffective stakeholder management (Gibson, 
2000), and the usual premise adopted is that “good” stakeholder management leads to improved 
firm performance (Jones, 1995; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002).   
As a normative theory, stakeholder theory identifies ethical guidelines for how a firm 
ought to be run (Waxenberger & Spence, 2003), usually by identifying stakeholders and/or the 
ways in which they ought to be treated based on moral grounds.  The underlying position is that 
stakeholders have legitimate interests in corporate activity which managers ought to take into 
account in their decisions (Donaldson, 1999), and the interests of shareholders need not take 
precedence over the interests of other stakeholders.  
The following sections summarize key works in the stakeholder literature using 
Donaldson and Preston’s (1995) typology as a means of organizing the literature.   
2.1.4  Descriptive Stakeholder Theory 
Descriptive stakeholder theory focuses on describing how firms and stakeholders interact in the 
world (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Mellahi & Wood, 2003).  Researchers in this area often 
adapt existing theories from organizational studies, such as agency theory, network theory, 
resource dependence theory, institutional theory, and others, to investigate firm-stakeholder 
relationships.    
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2.1.4.1  Stakeholder Theories of the Firm.  Brenner & Cochran’s (1991) stated goal was to 
describe how organizations operate by developing a “stakeholder theory of the firm.” They thus 
see a “stakeholder approach” to firm operation as an accurate description.  Brenner and Cochran 
(1991) develop several propositions describing the way firms operate.  First, they assert that 
meeting the needs of at least some stakeholders is a necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) 
condition for firm survival.  Furthermore, firms make choices that balance the interests of their 
various stakeholders.  Brenner and Cochran (1991) assert that all firms are aware of these 
propositions to some degree; thus, all firms employ a stakeholder approach to their operations, 
though they may take drastically different approaches to the ways in which they prioritize 
stakeholders and balance their interests.  Under this view, the neoclassical theory of the firm (i.e., 
a “stockholder primacy” approach to management) becomes one of an infinitely many possible 
approaches to stakeholder theory (Brenner & cochran, 1991).   
Hill and Jones (1992) developed what they call “stakeholder-agency theory” as a means 
of describing firm-stakeholder relationships.  They view the firm as a “nexus of contracts” – both 
explicit and implicit, though primarily implicit – between managers and the firm’s stakeholders.  
Heugens and van Oosterhout (2002) likewise argue that firm-stakeholder relations should be 
seen in “contractualist terms.”  For example, employees and suppliers likely have explicit 
contracts with the FO, while relationships with communities and customers are governed by 
legal standards such as tort law or regulation: the latter can be seen as social (and implicit) 
contracts (Key, 1999).  Managers, as parties to contracts with all other stakeholders, and 
decisionmakers who must allocate resources among those stakeholders, can be seen as agents.   
While they note that most stakeholders are not strictly “principals” in agency theory 
terms, Hill and Jones (1992) assert that there are substantial parallels between stakeholder-agent 
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relationships and the principal-agent relationships of agency theory, and view principal-agent 
relationships as a subset of stakeholder-agent relationships.  Stakeholders provide the FO with 
various resources with the tacit understanding that the FO will protect its interests.  According to 
stakeholder-agency theory, though, differences exist between management’s and stakeholders’ 
views of how the firm’s resources should be allocated, which results in “utility loss” to the 
stakeholders when management fails to act in their interests.  Stakeholders can use incentives, 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in an attempt to align managers’ interests with their 
own and thereby reduce utility loss.  The costs associated with incentives, monitoring, and 
enforcement that must be borne by the stakeholder, plus any residual utility loss, are referred to 
as “contracting costs” by Hill and Jones (1992), and are analogous to “agency costs” in agency 
theory.  Stakeholders may require that managers bear “ex-ante bonding costs” to show 
commitment to their interests and demonstrate the managers’ obligations.   For example, Hill and 
Jones (1992) submit that introduction of an ex-ante warranty into a consumer’s purchase of a 
product from a firm represents such a situation.    
Hill and Jones (1992) note that a variety of institutional structures have been developed to 
facilitate stakeholders’ monitoring of the FO.  Some, such as the requirement for public 
companies to publish annual financial data, are legislated, while others, such as Consumer 
Reports, exist due to the potential profitability of finding, gathering, and analyzing data and 
reselling it to stakeholders.  Still others, such as labor unions, are non-profit organizations that 
have been created in part to monitor the degree to which the FO is living up to its obligations 
with respect to specific stakeholders.  All these approaches can result in a reduction in the utility 
loss to stakeholders.  
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2.1.4.2  Stakeholder Identification and Salience.  Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) use the 
concepts of “power,” “legitimacy,” and “urgency” to develop a theory of stakeholder 
identification and salience that addresses questions concerning who a manager should consider a 
stakeholder and which stakeholders receive managerial attention.  They submit that a stakeholder 
has power to the extent that it can use coercive, utilitarian, or normative power to influence the 
firm.  Mitchell et al. (1997)  define legitimacy using Suchman’s (1995: 574) point of view: it is 
“a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”  
Urgency is defined as “the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention” 
(Mitchell et al., 1997: 869).  Stakeholders possess from zero to three of these aforementioned 
attributes, and the presence or absence of the attributes determines the salience that the 
stakeholder will have to managers of the FO: the more attributes the stakeholder possesses, the 
more salient it will be (however, Driscoll and Starik (2004), argue that power, legitimacy, and 
urgency need to be viewed on continua rather than as either present or absent).  All three 
attributes are “perceptual phenomena” and may be perceived differently by stakeholders, 
managers, or other entities in the environment of the FO.  Mitchell et al. (1997) define seven 
types of stakeholder based on the various potential combinations of power, legitimacy, and 
urgency.   
Aside from the identification of power, legitimacy, and urgency as important attributes in 
stakeholder identification and prioritization, the work of Mitchell et al. (1997) is noteworthy for 
capturing a dynamic aspect of stakeholder relations: power, legitimacy, and urgency are seen as 
varying over time, with the result that stakeholder management efforts by the FO may also vary. 
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Some researchers (e.g., Jonker & Foster, 2002) have noted shortcomings to the scheme of 
Mitchell et al. (1997).  First, the attributes identified exist with respect to the stakeholder, the 
claim, and/or the relationship between the stakeholder and the FO, when, ideally, they should all 
be identifiable features of the stakeholder itself.  Legitimacy can be seen as relating to the 
stakeholder itself or, alternately, to the claim made by that stakeholder, while urgency appears to 
refer only to a stakeholder’s claim (rather than the stakeholder) and power can be seen as relating 
to the relationship between the stakeholder and the FO.  Second, Mitchell et al. (1997) they 
appear to use the term “salience” to refer to both the degree to which the stakeholder is 
“noticeable” to managers of the FO and to the priority that managers of the FO grant in 
addressing the needs of the stakeholder.  Third, the legitimacy attribute of Mitchell et al. (1997) 
has been the subject of criticism from some sources.  Frooman (1999) argues that it may not 
matter if a stakeholder or its claim is legitimate: if the stakeholder is able to influence the FO, 
managers would do well to pay attention to it.  This latter point leads Jonker and Foster (2002) to 
conclude that using legitimacy as a criterion that may exclude potential stakeholders is self-
defeating.  They furthermore state that the use of the legitimacy criterion is in fact an “exercise in 
power,” since legitimacy is defined by powerful social actors and is usually based in economic 
rationalism.   
The various issues associated with the model of Mitchell et al. (1997) can lead to some 
confusion in its interpretation and application.  Nonetheless, Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld 
(1999) found empirical support for the attributes identified by Mitchell et al. (1997) in their test 
of a model based on power, legitimacy, and urgency.  Their results supported the hypotheses that 
power, legitimacy, urgency, and the combination of the three attributes were all positively related 
to the managerial salience of various stakeholders, including employees, customers, 
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shareholders, government, and communities.  Power was positively related to the salience of all 
these stakeholders except shareholders.  Legitimacy was significant or marginally significant in 
its positive relationships with the salience of all stakeholders except government.  Urgency was 
significantly and positively related to the salience of shareholders and governments, while the 
positive relationship between urgency and communities was marginally significant.  In general, 
then, the results of Agle et al. (1999) appear to provide fairly substantial support for the 
importance of the attributes of Mitchell et al. (1997) in determining a stakeholder’s salience to 
managers.   
Further empirical evidence supporting Mitchell et al. (1997) comes from Winn (2001), 
who found evidence of the influence of urgency on decisions concerning the phasing-out of 
clear-cut logging by a forestry company.  She reports that urgency also interrelated with changes 
in stakeholder legitimacy and power.  Variations in the perceived legitimacy of 
environmentalists also appeared to influence how the FO dealt with the issue.   
Driscoll and Starik (2004) extend Mitchell et al.’s (1997) concepts of power, legitimacy, 
and urgency, and, based on this extension, argue that the natural environment is a stakeholder.  
They submit (2004: 66) that “the lack of managerial salience attributed to the non-human natural 
environment can be partially explained by the way the stakeholder attributes of power, 
legitimacy, and urgency have been defined and operationalized.”  They argue that Mitchell et 
al.’s (1997) conception of power should be extended to include the concept of “pervasiveness,” 
that is, the degree to which the impact of a stakeholder is dispersed over space and time.  
Regarding legitimacy, they suggest that the concept of “ecological” legitimacy should be 
included with in the definition of legitimacy presented by Mitchell et al. (1997).  Lastly, they 
suggest that “likelihood of interaction” be included in the determination of urgency, in addition 
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to the factors suggested by Mitchell et al. (1997): time sensitivity and criticality.  Based on their 
extensions of the concepts of power, legitimacy and urgency, they assert that the natural 
environment possesses power (e.g., resource limitations, natural disasters), legitimacy (e.g., in 
that it provides resources to the firm), and urgency in its claims, and therefore should be 
considered a stakeholder.  
Jonker and Foster (2002), like Driscoll and Starik (2004), use the term “criticality,” but 
use it basically as a slightly broader version of Mitchell et al.’s (1997) “urgency.”  These authors 
refer to an issue as critical if it is significant or momentous, or is a “defining moment.”  They 
note that a particular issue may suddenly become very critical in the minds of some groups or 
individuals, at which point they may become involved in stakeholder relationships with the FO.  
They suggest that a “criticality threshold” must be met before a stakeholder is willing to expend 
the resources to get involved in any particular issue.   
2.1.4.3  Stakeholder Influence on the FO.  Stakeholders may exert various types of power in 
order to influence the FO.  Freeman and Reed (1983) identified three types of stakeholder power: 
formal, or voting power; economic power; and political power.  Formal power is possessed only 
by those stakeholders who have an official corporate governance position with respect to the FO.  
For example, many shareholders are allowed to cast votes on corporate issues: likewise, boards 
of directors, on which some stakeholders may be represented, possess formal power.  
Stakeholders who can “affect the company’s cost and revenue structure” have economic power 
(Wartick & Wood, 1998).  Typical stakeholders with economic power therefore include 
customers, creditors, suppliers, and employees.  Political power is held by stakeholders who have 
access to the public policy process, and can thereby influence the FO by influencing public 
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policy.  The type of power possessed by a stakeholder can have a substantial influence on how 
that stakeholder can best by dealt with by the FO.   
Frooman (1999) developed a typology of influence strategies that stakeholders might use 
to affect the behavior of the FO.  He asserts that the type of influence strategy a stakeholder will 
use is determined by the degree of resource dependence the FO exhibits with respect to that 
stakeholder (and vice versa).  Resource dependence occurs when either the FO or the stakeholder 
supplies the other with essential, non-substitutable, or rare resources.  Frooman (1999) identifies 
“withholding strategies” as those in which a stakeholder attempts to influence the FO by 
discontinuing the provision of such a resource.  “Usage strategies,” on the other hand, involve 
the stakeholder influencing the ways in which the FO is able to use the resource: typically, this 
involves attaching conditions to the use of the resource.  Both of these strategies can be “direct” 
or “indirect.”  In a direct strategy, the stakeholder itself manipulates the provision or usage of the 
resource, whereas in an indirect strategy the stakeholder influences the FO through another 
stakeholder, an ally that manipulates the resource flow or usage.  Frooman (1999) asserts that 
indirect strategies require a great deal of communication and coordination, and so are difficult to 
sustain.  Frooman’s (1999) typology suggests that when the FO is dependent upon the 
stakeholder, but the reverse is not true, the stakeholder will use a direct/withholding strategy.  
When the stakeholder is dependent upon the FO, but not vice versa, an indirect/usage strategy 
will be employed.  When neither the FO nor the stakeholder is dependent upon the other, an 
indirect/withholding strategy will be used, while when the stakeholder and the FO are mutually 
dependent, the stakeholder will resort to a direct/usage strategy. 
Frooman (2002) tested hypotheses related to his typology.  Results indicated that the 
degree of firm dependence on the stakeholder was not, in fact, related to the pathway of the 
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influence strategy employed by the latter: almost without exception, an indirect strategy was 
preferred, regardless of the nature of the firm-stakeholder relationship.  Regarding the 
stakeholder’s resource dependence on the firm, Frooman (2002) found that stakeholder 
dependence was, for three of four measures, related to the subjects’ preferences for manipulation 
strategies (i.e., usage versus withholding strategy): subjects preferred a withholding strategy 
when the stakeholder’s resource dependence on the firm was low, and preferred a usage strategy 
when the stakeholder’s resource dependence was high.         
Frooman and Murrell (2005) employed Frooman’s (1999) typology in an experimental 
setting to assess the roles of structure and demographic variables in the determination of 
stakeholder influence strategies.  Their results led them to suggest that demographic variables 
define the repertoire of influence strategies available to the stakeholder, while structural choices 
refine the choice of influence strategy within that repertoire.   
Brouthers and Bamossy (1997), using case studies, also investigated approaches that 
stakeholders use to influence the FO, specifically during joint venture negotiations.  They 
suggest that stakeholders have both direct and indirect influences on joint venture negotiations, 
and key stakeholders tend to undertake different influence strategies at different stages of the 
negotiation process.  They also assert that key stakeholders in different industries may differ in 
terms of the extent and frequency with which they attempt to influence the FO. 
Luoma and Goodstein (1999) applied concepts from institutional theory to investigate 
stakeholder representation on corporate boards, a critical means of stakeholder influence.  
Stakeholder representation on boards represents way to formalize the acknowledgement of non-
economic considerations in the decisionmaking process, and a means to facilitate procedural 
fairness by guaranteeing representation of stakeholders’ concerns (Freeman & Evan, 1990).  
 32
Stakeholder representation may also represent a means for a stakeholder to achieve legitimacy in 
the eyes of corporate representatives and the public, or a manifestation of an existing perception 
of legitimacy.  Luoma and Goodstein (1999) suggested that stakeholder representation on boards 
should vary with the state of incorporation, since some states have adopted “other-constituency” 
statutes that allow boards to consider the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders in their 
decisionmaking, while others have not.  They also suggested that non-shareholder board 
representation is more likely in highly regulated industries and in large corporations.  Using a 
sample of 224 companies, they found support for six of nine hypotheses related to these 
propositions, indicating, generally, that institutional context indeed has an influence on the 
degree of non-shareholder stakeholder board representation.     
Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) tested hypotheses concerning the relationship between 
stakeholder pressures and the likelihood of environmental litigation.  Their results indicated that 
stakeholder pressures were a weak deterrent of poor environmental performance (as measured by 
environmental litigation).  This result appears to suggest that stakeholder attempts to influence 
the FO are not necessarily effective in getting the FO to sufficiently address its interests.  
However, they note that this result may have been due to measurement problems. 
Clarkson (1995) asserted that different organizations will have different “postures” in 
terms of how they respond to stakeholder attempts to influence the FO.  Postures were 
characterized as “reactive,” wherein the FO will deny its responsibilities to stakeholders, 
“defensive,” wherein it will admit responsibility, but fight to avoid them, “accommodative,” 
wherein the FO accepts its responsibilities and addresses them willingly, and “proactive,” 
wherein it will attempt to anticipate its responsibilities to its stakeholders.   
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2.1.4.4  Stakeholder Networks and Stakeholder Influence.  In the stereotypical stakeholder 
map (e.g., Figure 2.1), it is not usual to depict links between the various stakeholders of the FO 
(Waxenberger & Spence, 2003), though early work in stakeholder theory identified the fact that 
there is a network of interdependencies among stakeholders.  For example, Mitroff (1983: 43) 
stated,  
“In a complex social system, each stakeholder is tied to or dependent upon at least one 
other important social system stakeholder for its existence and/or functioning…We are 
truly dealing with a network or a system of behavior.” 
 
However, subsequent work did not initially develop the idea of stakeholder networks further.  
Rowley (1997) saw this as a major shortcoming in stakeholder theory, and so employed network 
theory to increase the accuracy of descriptions of stakeholder-FO interactions.  He eschewed 
Freeman’s (1984) “hub-and-spoke” conception of stakeholder-FO relationships, wherein the FO 
is seen as having a dyadic relationship with each stakeholder.  Instead, he reasserted the notion 
that firms and stakeholders exist in networks, and proposed that the nature of this network has 
implications for the FO’s ability to resist stakeholder pressures.   
Rowley (1997) employs two key concepts from network theory: “density” and 
“centrality.”  Density refers to the number of ties in the network that link actors (i.e., 
stakeholders) together.  It is usually calculated as a ratio of the number of relationships that exist 
in the network compared with the total number of possible relationships.  Rowley (1997) asserts 
that as the density of a stakeholder network increases, communication across the network is 
enhanced, and the ability for norms of behavior to be communicated among stakeholders is 
increased.  Thus, as density increases, stakeholder behaviors become similar within the network 
and stakeholders are more likely to have similar expectations regarding the behavior of the FO.  
Enhanced communication across the network also facilitates the monitoring of the FO’s behavior 
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by stakeholders.  He suggests that these features of dense stakeholder networks imply that 
increases in stakeholder network density increase the ability of stakeholders to constrain the 
actions of a FO. 
 Rowley (1997) also focuses on the centrality of the FO in the stakeholder network, which 
refers to the FO’s position in the network relative to other actors.  He relies on “betweenness” 
centrality, which is “the extent to which (the FO) acts as an intermediary between its 
stakeholders (Rowley, 1997: 900).  A highly central FO has substantial control over information 
flows between stakeholders due to its position in the network.  Rowley (1997) therefore states 
that a high degree of centrality increases the FO’s ability to resist stakeholder pressures. 
 By combining his propositions concerning density and centrality, Rowley (1997) 
develops a typology of firm responses to stakeholder expectations: compromiser (the FO 
negotiates with its stakeholders), commander (the FO controls stakeholder expectations), 
subordinate (the FO complies with stakeholder expectations), and solitarian (the FO attempts to 
avoid stakeholder pressures).  Rowley (2000) tested various hypotheses related to Rowley (1997) 
using a sample of strategic alliances in the semiconductor industry.  Findings indicated that 
density and centrality were indeed related to a FO’s resistance to stakeholder pressures.  
Rowley (1997) did not address the impact of the strength of stakeholder network ties on 
stakeholder influence on the FO.  Welcomer (2002), however, in a single-industry case study of 
the forest products industry in Maine, investigated tie strength between FOs and their 
stakeholders and found that tie strength was positively related to the potential of the stakeholder 
to positively influence the FOs practices or access to resources.  Tie strength was also positively 
related to the potential of the stakeholder to have a negative influence on the FO.  Welcomer 
(2002) also found evidence that the FO’s degree of corporate social responsiveness was related 
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to tie strength between FO and stakeholder: the presence of strong ties increased with increases 
in corporate social responsiveness regarding a particular stakeholder.   
2.1.5  Normative Stakeholder Theory 
Much of the literature in stakeholder theory concerns its normative perspective.  Donaldson and 
Preston (1995: 87) state that, rather than taking an instrumental approach in addressing (or not 
addressing) stakeholders’ interests, managers “should acknowledge the validity of diverse 
stakeholder interests and should attempt to respond to them within a mutually supportive 
framework, because that is a moral requirement for the legitimacy of the management function.”  
Jones and Wicks (1999) identify the idea that stakeholders should be treated as “ends” rather 
than “means” as a theme underlying the work in normative stakeholder theory.  In the normative 
view, then, stakeholders and their interests are intrinsically valuable, and so should be 
acknowledged in the firm’s activities.   
In providing a normative justification for stakeholder theory, the stakeholder approach is 
often pitted against the neoclassical economic, or shareholder-centered model of the firm, in 
which the role of managers is to maximize shareholder wealth (Friedman, 1962; Ruf, 
Muralidhar, Brown, Janney, and Paul, 2001; Rowley, 1998; Wijnberg, 2000), and is argued to be 
the morally superior position.  The normative justification for stakeholder theory therefore also 
relies on philosophical concepts (Mellahi & Wood, 2003): ideas such as fairness, social contract 
theory and the works of Immanuel Kant and John Rawls have been applied to the stakeholder 
approach to provide its moral foundations (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Evan & Freeman, 1983; 
Freeman, 1994; Phillips, 1997).  Work in this area typically attempts to answer questions 
regarding who should be considered a stakeholder, and on what bases (e.g., Phillips, 1997), as 
well as how stakeholders should be treated, especially relative to shareholders (e.g., Freeman & 
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Evan, 1990; Freeman, 1994; Goodpaster, 1991; Jones & Wicks, 1999).  I address work 
concerning these questions in the following sections. 
2.1.5.1  Who Should Be Considered a Stakeholder?  Freeman (1984) and others specifically 
identify suppliers, customers, employees, stockholders, management, and the local community as 
stakeholders of the firm.  Others have argued that this list is incomplete: for example, Driscoll 
and Starik (2004) argue for consideration of the natural environment as a stakeholder of all 
organizations.  Various researchers have applied principles such as “fairness” and “claims” or 
“rights” to address the parameters for who or what should be considered a stakeholder. 
2.1.5.2  Principles of Fairness.  Phillips (1997; 2004) focuses on fairness obligations to 
determine who should be considered a stakeholder.  He proposes the “Principle of Fairness” as a 
means of differentiating between stakeholders and non-stakeholders and justifying stakeholders’ 
claims.  The Principle of Fairness states that:  
“Whenever persons or groups of persons voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutually 
beneficial scheme of cooperation requiring sacrifice or contribution on the parts of the 
participants and there exists the possibility of free riding, there exist obligations of 
fairness on the part of these persons or groups to cooperate in proportion to the benefits 
accepted.”   
 
Phillips asserts that the Principle of Fairness provides a normative justification for 
stakeholder theory (and the claims of stakeholders).  In this view, the FO and its stakeholders are 
seen as persons or groups involved in a cooperative scheme that involves the voluntary receipt of 
benefits (at least on the part of the FO).  This voluntary acceptance of benefits by the firm 
implies that the FO has an obligation to the cooperative scheme itself and to the other 
participants in that scheme (i.e., the firm’s stakeholders).   
In terms of stakeholder identification, Phillips (1997) argues that only voluntary members 
of a cooperative scheme for mutual benefit are stakeholders.  Thus, for example, terrorists are not 
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stakeholders, despite the fact that they fit the “broad” definition of a stakeholder as an entity that 
can affect or is affected by the firm.  Another implication of Phillips’ (1997) position is that 
stakeholders who cannot affect the firm, but who are affected by it, can be considered 
stakeholders.  
2.1.5.3  Stakeholder Claims and Rights.  Waxenberger and Spence (2003) identify 
stakeholders based on the presence of legitimate “claims,” which they argue are a source of 
stakeholder “rights.”  They differentiate between the term “stakeholder,” which they use to 
suggest a strategic implication, and “claimholder,” which they use when the focus is 
“legitimacy.”  In their view, the rights of claimholders should be distributed based on the 
legitimacy of their claims, not based on power, and corporations should listen to and address the 
needs of those entities that possess legitimate claims.  Thus, their approach appears to focus on 
the legitimacy criterion noted by Mitchell et al. (1997), while downplaying the power and 
urgency criteria.  To Waxenberger and Spence, (2003: 244), stakeholder management, as it 
stands, is strictly instrumentalist; that is, dealing with stakeholders is viewed by managers as a 
means to an end.  It therefore “degrade(s) the single claimholder who is a human being with a 
legitimate claim…” and aims merely to keep a potential opponent quiet rather than to address the 
implications of that legitimate claim.   “Claimholder management,” on the other hand, is 
concerned not with reducing the risk of potential conflict, but with upholding and protecting 
legitimate rights, a position that Waxenberger and Spence (2003) submit is easily defended using 
ethical theories.  In addressing the question of how the legitimacy of claims is to be determined, 
they assert that we rely on the public to make such determinations.  Waxenberger and Spence 
(2003) argue that their approach is in accordance with Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which 
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asserts that people must be treated as ends unto themselves, not merely as means to another’s 
end.   
Waxenberger and Spence (2003), however, suggest that while legitimacy is the critical 
criterion for stakeholder identification, a firm may, for practical reasons, be limited to addressing 
the interests of a few key stakeholders, though the authors stipulate that the firm must keep 
suitable structures in place to identify the important legitimate claims of other stakeholders.  
They suggest three criteria for identification of key stakeholders: the severity of the effect that 
the firm’s operations have on the stakeholder, the “moral preferences” of the firm, and the 
influence the stakeholder has on the firm. 
2.1.5.4  Harm-Based Identification.  Donaldson and Preston (1995), use their normative 
justification of stakeholder theory to make assertions concerning the identification of 
stakeholders.  They assert that, given their normative approach, management needs to identify 
stakeholders beyond those implied by the traditional input-output or “firm-as-contract” models 
of organizations (i.e., those that have identifiable legal contracts with the firm).  Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) state that such conceptions of the firm do not go far enough in identifying 
stakeholders.  Some interactions with entities in the business environment are too ambiguous to 
be expressed as contracts but, they assert, are no less real.  They suggest that stakeholders should 
be identified by the “actual or potential harms and benefits that they experience or anticipate 
experiencing as a result of the firm’s actions or inactions” (Donaldson & Preston, 1985).   
2.1.5.5  The Environment as a Stakeholder.  Starik (1995) argued that the non-human 
environment should be considered one or more stakeholders.  The environmental principle that 
humans should be stewards of natural resources suggests that organizations have obligations with 
respect to the environment; therefore, the natural environment warrants stakeholder status.  
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Furthermore, human proxies for the natural environment, such as environmental groups, are seen 
by Starik (1995) as necessary but not sufficient for its well-being.   
Phillips and Reichart (2000) use Phillips’ (1997) Principle of Fairness to address the 
question of whether or not the natural environment should be considered a stakeholder.  They 
conclude that, using a fairness-based approach, only humans can be stakeholders, since only 
humans are able to create the obligations that are required for the establishment of stakeholder 
status through the acceptance of the benefits of a mutually beneficial cooperative scheme.  They 
suggest, however, that there are various non-stakeholder-related reasons for consideration of the 
natural environment by organizations: that is, even if the environment is not a stakeholder, firms 
should act to conserve and preserve the natural environment.  Furthermore, many organizational 
stakeholders have legitimate concern for the natural environment: preservation of the natural 
environment is in accordance with the interests of such stakeholders.  Therefore, in considering 
the interests of these stakeholders, organizations will consider its impacts on the natural 
environment in its decisions.  For example, in considering the interests of the community in 
which it operates (a key stakeholder), an organization must obviously consider that community’s 
natural environment.     
 Driscoll and Starik (2004) counter Phillips and Reichart (2000), suggesting that the 
fairness-based approach to identification of stakeholders is inappropriately narrow, and assert 
that other criteria may also be relevant to determining whether or not an entity is a stakeholder.  
Specifically, they suggest that spatial and cultural “proximity” are relevant criteria, since as 
proximity increases, interactions between the FO and the other entity become more and more 
unavoidable; that is, the likelihood of “stakeholderness” increases.  As noted earlier, Driscoll and 
 40
Starik (2004) extended the criteria developed by Mitchell et al. (1997), and argued that doing so 
allows one to regard the natural environment as a stakeholder. 
2.1.5.6  How Should Stakeholders be Treated?  The moral underpinning of the obligations 
concerning how a FO should treat its stakeholder is usually presented in deontological terms, 
employing ideas like respect for persons, fairness, obligations to others, and/or rights (Gibson, 
2000).  Jones and Wicks (1999), aver that the variability of “narrative interpretation” in 
normative stakeholder theory implies that it is actually concerned with the development of 
various stakeholder theories, each with a distinct “normative core.”  This echoes the position of 
Freeman (1994), who, suggests that stakeholder theorists should avoid over-specification of the 
normative content of the area, and likewise asserted that stakeholder theory can be “unpacked” 
into a number of stakeholder theories, each of which has its own normative core linked to the 
way managers should behave and firms should be run.  Such an approach Freeman (1994: 414) 
refers to as “reasonable pluralism.”  Any approach to stakeholder theory that attempts to 
prescribe only one normative core is, to Freeman (1994: 415), “at best a disguised attempt to 
smuggle a normative core past the unsophisticated noses of other unsuspecting academics…”  
Each normative core is, according to Freeman (1994), a set of propositions that include: 
1) “Corporations ought to be governed…” 
2) “Managers ought to act…” 
The ends of these sentences comprise “business and moral terms” (Freeman, 1994: 414), and will 
vary across normative cores.  Various normative foundations for stakeholder relations are 
discussed below.  
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2.1.5.7  Limited Property Rights.  Donaldson and Preston (1995) drew on the concept of 
limitations of property rights for their normative justification of the stakeholder approach.  They 
assert that property rights are embedded in human rights, and are therefore restricted: for 
example, there are restrictions on harmful uses of property.   They assert that property rights 
“must be based on more fundamental ideas of distributive justice… utilitarianism… 
libertarianism… social contract theory” and argue that since the concept of private property does 
not give unlimited rights of use to owners of property, it does not support the idea that the sole 
responsibility of managers is the act as agents of shareholders (and, presumably, attempt to 
increase shareholder wealth).  If one accepts their view, they assert, the interests of non-
shareholder stakeholders must be taken into account in managerial decisionmaking.  This is 
similar to the view of Berle and Means (1932), who argue that because shareholders could not 
adequately undertake, with respect to the firm, all the responsibilities that ownership of other 
types of property implies, they should not be given all the rights normally associated with 
ownership.  This, they state, clears the way for acknowledging and addressing of the claims of 
various non-shareholder constituents in the business environment.   
2.1.5.8  Principles of Fairness.  Phillips (1997) also applies his Principle of Fairness to address 
obligations of the FO with respect to its treatment of stakeholders, stating that it facilitates 
prioritization of their various interests by identifying the degree of obligation a firm has to a 
given stakeholder.  According to the Principle of Fairness, firms should “cooperate” with 
stakeholders in proportion to the benefits accepted from them in the firm-stakeholder “mutually 
beneficial scheme of cooperation.”  Therefore, a firm should take more care to safeguared the 
interests of a stakeholder from whom it receives substantial benefits than those of one from 
whom it receives little or no benefit.   
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2.1.5.9  Kantian Capitalism.  Evan and Freeman (1983) developed what they call “Kantian 
Capitalism.  They view the “stockholder view” of the firm as “incoherent,” and so present two 
normative principles concerning stakeholder management.  The “Principle of Corporate 
Legitimacy” states that “The corporation should be managed for the benefit of its 
stakeholders…” and advocates the protection of stakeholder rights and the inclusion of 
stakeholders in decisions that have a significant impact on them.  Their “Stakeholder Fiduciary 
Principle” states that managers have a fiduciary relationship with all their stakeholders as well as 
with the corporation itself.  Therefore, managers must act in the interests of stakeholders, and act 
to ensure the survival of the firm.   
2.1.5.10  Fair Contracts.  Freeman (1994) and Freeman and Evan (1990) attempted to craft a 
normative core based on the political liberalism of John Rawls (1971), wherein autonomy, 
solidarity, equality and fairness are emphasized.  They assert that both managers and scholars 
still tend to adhere to the premise that stockholders have a special relationship with the firm and 
its managers – to the premise of stockholder primacy.  However, the pursuit of stockholder 
interests is constrained by law, which indicates that non-shareholder stakeholders have at least 
some rights with respect to the firm.  Freeman (1994), therefore, argues that, just as stockholders 
have the right to make certain claims on a firm, so, too, do other stakeholders (defined 
“narrowly” in this case) have the right to make claims.  Freeman’s (1994) position is that 
managers have a fiduciary duty to non-shareholder stakeholders, and no one stakeholder has 
primacy over others.  All stakeholders, which he views as “contractors” with the FO, are 
presumed to be equal in terms of the moral obligations the FO has toward them (though the 
specific obligations will, of course, vary widely across stakeholders).  In line with the position of 
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Rawls, though, inequalities among stakeholders can be justified if they improve the lot of the 
least well-off stakeholders. 
Freeman and Evan (1990) and Freeman (1994) use Rawls’ (1971) “veil of ignorance” to 
develop basic rules for contracting between firms and stakeholders, based on the assumption that 
rationally self-interested stakeholders deliberating behind a veil of ignorance (i.e., in ignorance 
of their own actual stakes) would adopt principles of fair contracting that would require 
stakeholder-focused management and stakeholder representation on boards of directors.  The 
principles, which are referred to as the “Doctrine of Fair Contracts,” are presented in Table 2.1, 
as are three additional principles which Freeman (1994) argued should guide legal reform. 
Child and Marcoux (1999) reject the position of Freeman and Evan (1990) and Freeman 
(1994).  Their rejection hinges on, among other things, what they perceive as a misuse of the 
work of Rawls (1971).  Child and Marcoux (1999) argue that the stakeholders in Freeman and 
Evan’s (1990) work are very knowledgeable about their own circumstances (for example, they 
must have knowledge of the nature of firms, markets, private property, and contracts in order to 
understand what a “stake” in a corporation represents), a fact which makes them much more 
knowledgeable than the individuals deliberating behind the veil of ignorance in Rawls’ work.   
Child and Marcoux (1999) also state that the degree and kind of knowledge possessed by 
stakeholders behind the veil of ignorance is completely arbitrary and incoherent.  They 
furthermore argue that, even if stakeholders were subjected to the veil of ignorance, they would 
not necessarily choose the principles developed by Freeman and Evan (1990).  By way of 
example, they use a “Hawaiian shirt” scenario to counter Freeman and Evan’s (1990) Principle 
of Externalities.  They assert that simply because someone who finds Hawaiian shirts abhorrent 
bears the negative externality associated with walking past the Hawaiian shirt shop that Person B  
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Table 2.1: The Doctrine of Fair Contracts (Freeman & Evan, 1990; Freeman, 1994) 
Principle Explanation 
 
The Principle of Entry and Exit 
Any contract must have clearly defined 
entry, exit, and renegotiation conditions, or 
methods or processes for defining these 
conditions. 
 
The Principle of Governance 
The procedure for changing the rules of the 
game must be agreed upon by unanimous 
consent. 
 
The Principle of Externalities 
If a contract between A and B imposes a 
cost on C, then C has the option to become 
a party to the contract. 
 
The Principle of Contracting Costs 
All parties to the contract must share in the 
costs of contracting. 
 
The Agency Principle 
Any agent must serve the interests of all 
stakeholders. 
 
The Principle of Limited Immortality 
 
The corporation shall be managed as if it 
can continue to serve the interest of 
stakeholders through time. 
  
Additional Principles (Freeman, 1994)  
 
The Stakeholder Enabling Principle  
 
Corporations shall be managed in the 
interests of their stakeholders, defined as 
employees, financiers, customers, 
employees, and communities.   
 
The Principle of Director Responsibility 
Directors of corporations shall have a duty 
of care to use reasonable judgment to 
define and direct the affairs of the 
corporation in accordance with the 
stakeholder enabling principle. 
 
The Principle of Stakeholder Recourse 
 
Stakeholders may bring action against the 
directors for failure to perform the required 
duty of care. 
 
runs in a space rented from Person A does not mean that the first person should have the option 
of becoming a party to the contract, as this would lead to contracting becoming very risky, which 
would have severe economic consequences.  Therefore, rationally self-interested stakeholders 
behind the veil of ignorance would not choose the Principle of Externalities.  Furthermore, they 
assert that stakeholders would not want such involvement in the contracts of others, since a given 
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person is likely to be a stakeholder in dozens of firms.  Child and Marcoux (1999) use similar 
examples to argue against other of the principles of Freeman and Evan (1990).  Another 
argument made by Child and Marcoux (1999) against Freeman and Evan’s (1990) position 
concerns the practical implication of the principles they advocate: board representation for 
stakeholders.  Such representation is supposed to represent a safeguard for a given stakeholder 
against detrimental actions by groups of other stakeholders.  Child and Marcoux (1999) note that 
Freeman and Evan (1990) do not present an argument as to why board representation is a 
necessary condition for the protection of stakeholders.  Furthermore, they assert, in many cases 
stakeholders would not want board representation were it a possibility, since the costs of 
participation may be high (especially if one is a stakeholder in many organizations), and some 
enterprises beneficial to stakeholders would, in fact, be harmed if all those affected had a voice 
in key decisions.  In the words of Child and Marcoux (1999: 219) “… many classes of 
stakeholder would simply tune out and they would be rational to do so.” 
2.1.5.11  Fiduciary Duties and the Stakeholder Paradox.  Goodpaster (1991), too, opposes the 
position of Evan and Freeman (1983) and Freeman (1994), especially the idea that managers 
have a fiduciary duty to non-shareholder stakeholders.  He differentiates between “strategic” and 
“multi-fiduciary” interpretations of “stakeholder analysis.”  The strategic interpretation is 
essentially an instrumentalist approach to stakeholder relations: stakeholders are to be managed 
by the firm in order to achieve the goals of its managers and shareholders.  The multi-fiduciary 
interpretation, on the other hand, states that managers have a fiduciary duty not just to 
shareholders, but to all stakeholders, and stakeholders are not merely a means to the firm’s ends.  
This approach is evident in the work of Freeman (1994).   
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In a multi-fiduciary approach to stakeholder relations, managers would give the same 
amount of concern to the interests of non-stockholder stakeholders as they would to 
stockholders.  Put another way, the interests of all stakeholders would be regarded as equally 
important.  Goodpaster (1991) asserts that a multi-fiduciary approach – though many argue it 
would bring ethics into corporate decisionmaking – is incompatible with widely held opinions 
concerning the special fiduciary obligations that are owed to shareholders due to their position of 
ownership with respect to the firm, and management’s role as their agent: the common-law 
position is that managers and directors are fiduciaries of shareholders, and therefore are obligated 
to operate the firm in shareholders’ interests (Boatright, 1994).  Goodpaster (1991) states that the 
obligations of managers to shareholders are, therefore, ethically different from their obligations 
to other stakeholders, and argues that regarding stakeholder-firm relationships in the same way 
as one regards stockholder-firm relationships creates as much of a problem as ignoring non-
stockholder stakeholders completely.  This idea he refers to as the “stakeholder paradox.”   
“It seems essential, yet in some ways illegitimate, to orient corporate decisions by ethical 
values that go beyond strategic stakeholder considerations to multi-fiduciary ones.”  
(Goodpaster, 1991) 
 
Thus, according to Goodpaster, (1991), ethics seems to both prescribe and prohibit the 
acceptance of profit-maximization as the sole goal of firms: management is forced to choose 
between fulfilling its fiduciary duties and serving the interests of other stakeholders (Marens & 
Wicks, 1999).  Managers have a fiduciary responsibility to stockholders, so a multi-fiduciary 
approach represents a betrayal of trust (Goodpaster, 1991), or, Friedman (1962) might argue, 
unabashed theft.  Goodpaster (1991), therefore, argues that a multi-fiduciary approach is 
inappropriate, but states that there are “morally significant” non-fiduciary responsibilities that 
managers have toward non-stockholder stakeholders.  These responsibilities are summarized in 
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his “Nemo Dat Principle,” which essentially states that investors cannot expect managers to 
behave in ways that are inconsistent with the reasonable ethical expectations of the community, 
nor should they expect managers to behave in ways that they themselves would not be willing to 
behave.  While this principle provides some justification for the acknowledgment of the interests 
of various stakeholders, it in many ways resembles Friedman’s (1962) position that managers 
should maximize profits “within the rules of the game” and within the bounds of contemporary 
ethical views.  
Marens and Wicks (1999) counter that, historically, the fiduciary obligations of 
management have not been imposed in order to give stockholders a privileged status with respect 
to other stakeholders; rather, these obligations were created in order to prevent self-dealing by 
directors and top managers, and to promote the exercise of care, loyalty, and honesty with 
respect to stockholders’ financial interests.  The goal, they submit, was to prevent managers from 
making business decisions that were primarily in their own interests or the interests of their 
colleagues.  They argue that the relationship between stockholders and managers is not an 
agency relationship: in an agency relationship, one is obligated to act in the interests of a person, 
whereas in a fiduciary relationship, one is only obligated to protect a person’s investment.   
Marens and Wicks (1999) assert that fiduciary duties do not impose any particular mode 
of business operation, and such duties are not equated by any courts with the maximization of 
shareholder wealth.  They conclude, based on case law, that the fiduciary obligations that 
managers have with respect to stockholders do not, practically speaking, present a substantial 
impediment to the implementation of a stakeholder-oriented management approach.  
Furthermore, they submit that the managerial obligations that arise from fiduciary duties to 
shareholders are not more important than the obligations that would be due to shareholders in a 
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stakeholder-oriented scheme.  They argue that there is no reason to assume that the fact that 
managers have certain duties to one type of stakeholder acts as a relevant constraint on how the 
law lets them treat other stakeholders.  In short, the realities of the law do not in any way 
preclude managers from acting as if they had fiduciary duties to both shareholders and other 
stakeholders.  Thus, to Marens and Wicks (1999), the stakeholder paradox does not exist, and 
managers in fact have substantial freedom to address the interests of various stakeholders 
concurrently.    
Boatright (1994) goes further than Marens & Wicks, arguing that managers do not have a 
fiduciary duty to shareholders to operate the firm in their interests, and that the FO’s 
relationships with shareholders is not ethically different from its relationship with other 
stakeholders.  He also sees Goodpaster’s (1991) solution to his “stakeholder paradox” as 
inadequate, and so presents an alternative solution. 
Boatright (1994) asserts that the most common argument in favor of the idea that 
managers have a fiduciary duty toward stockholders is that the latter’s property rights regarding 
the corporation can only be protected by the existence of duties that require managers to act in 
shareholders’ interests.  However, he points out that there is a logical gap between the property 
rights of shareholders and the idea that managers therefore have a fiduciary duty toward them.  
He asserts that ownership of a corporation is different from the ownership of personal property: 
for example, stockholders cannot use corporate assets for their own purposes.  While Boatright 
(1994) concedes that shareholders need to have their investments protected (which, according to 
him, was the initial reason for the idea of fiduciary duties owed to owners of a business), and 
therefore need a governance structure that looks after their interests, this argument does not 
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substantiate the claim that managers have a fiduciary duty to shareholders, and to shareholders 
alone. 
Boatright (1994) also identifies agency relationships between managers and shareholders 
as another possible source of fiduciary duties with respect to shareholders.  However, he, like 
Marens and Wicks (1999), submits that there is no explicit contract that is a source of such an 
agency relationship, and that the lack of interaction between managers and the typical 
shareholder makes it difficult to assert that there is an implied contract between the two.  
Boatright (1994) concludes that managers are not legally in contractual or agency relationships 
with shareholders, and that there are no good ethical reasons for assuming this to be true.  On 
these grounds, Boatright (1994) dismisses Goodpaster’s (1991) argument that the shareholder-
manager relationship is a purely fiduciary one; hence managers do not have purely fiduciary 
duties with respect to shareholders.   
Boatright (1994) offers a different solution to Goodpaster’s “stakeholder paradox.”  
Goodpaster (1991) appears to believe that all duties to shareholders are fiduciary in nature.  
Boatright (1994) responds by arguing for the decomposition of the duties managers have with 
respect to shareholders into those that are fiduciary in nature and those that are not.  Fiduciary 
duties owed to shareholders are rather limited in scope, so in the “ordinary conduct of business” 
the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders may, in fact, be taken into account by managers.  
From this approach, the stakeholder paradox ceases to exist, since moral considerations do not 
necessarily demand the use of a profit-maximization framework in managerial decision-making. 
Freeman (1994), in response to Goodpaster’s (1991) work, asserted that the existence of a 
perceived “stakeholder paradox” was inherently linked to “the separation thesis,” the idea that 
business and ethics are separate, a position that both asserts and acts to maintain divisions 
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between ethics and business in business and academic work.  He furthermore asserts that 
fiduciary duties owed to shareholders are irrelevant to normative work on stakeholder theory, 
since these duties themselves are not exempt from ethical scrutiny, must be morally justifiable, 
and do not allow managers to engage in unethical behavior with respect to non-shareholder 
stakeholders. 
2.1.5.12  A Feminist Interpretation.  Wicks, Gilbert, and Freeman (1994) state that the 
applicability of stakeholder theory has been restricted due to its reliance on “masculinist” 
assumptions derived from the business literature.  Therefore, they reinterpreted stakeholder 
theory based on a more “feminist” viewpoint, relying to a substantial extent on the work of 
Gilligan (1982).  They specifically challenge five masculinist assumptions: 1) that corporations 
are autonomous entities; 2) that corporations can and should enact or control their external 
environment; 3) that the management of firms is best described using the language of 
competition; 4) that we should be as objective as possible in determining strategy; and 5) that 
power and authority in corporations should adhere to strict hierarchies.  In general, the feminist 
viewpoint focuses on collaboration and relationship development and maintenance between 
firms and their stakeholders.   
Regarding the first assumption, that corporations are autonomous entities, Wicks et al. 
(1994: 483) present an alternative view of the corporation wherein it is seen as a “web of 
relations among stakeholders,” firms are inextricably embedded in their contexts, and the 
boundary between the corporation and its “external” environment is diminished in importance, 
replaced by “a sense of communal solidarity.”  
Regarding the assumption that corporations can and should enact and/or control their 
environments, Wicks et al. (1994) assert that, instead, firms should attempt to embrace chaos and 
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environmental change: the goal is to create “harmonious relationships” with the environment 
rather than to impose the will of the firm upon it.  This requires the firm and its stakeholders to 
acknowledge their interdependence and engage in collaboration to meet the dynamic needs and 
expectations of all parties. 
 Regarding the assumption that conflict and competition are the appropriate way to 
characterize the world of business, Wicks et al. (1994) state that this position may be 
inappropriate and is often detrimental to relationships with stakeholders.  They argue that 
corporations should focus on communication, collective action, and participation in their 
relationships with stakeholders, and so avoid conflict, or, at worst, facilitate its resolution should 
it occur. 
With respect to strategy, Wicks et al. (1994) present a feminist viewpoint which 
characterizes “strategy as solidarity” as an alternative to the masculinist point of view that 
strategic decisionmaking should be “as objective as possible.”  The latter approach attempts to 
describe strategic decisions as “business decisions” or based on “the numbers;” however, Wicks 
et al. (1994) assert that it distances managers from the responsibilities associated with the 
consequences of their actions.  The feminist point of view, in contrast, is based on the idea that 
managers’ strategic decisions should incorporate consideration of the relationships and 
responsibilities they have with respect to the firm’s stakeholders: stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
situations, what is at stake, and how it should be handled should be incorporated into strategic 
decisions.   
The final masculinist assumption identified by Wicks et al. (1994) is that power and 
authority in firms should be structured in a strict hierarchy.  Based on their reassessments of the 
first four assumptions, they assert that this assumption, too, must be dropped.  In its stead, the 
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authors advocate the collapsing of much of the hierarchy, and a focus on decentralization and 
empowerment, wherein the viewpoints of all stakeholders in the organization are seen as 
legitimate. 
Taken together, the assumptions of the feminist perspective on stakeholder theory 
presented by Wicks et al. (1994) advocate harnessing participation, collaboration, and 
communication to create value for all stakeholders rather than focusing on creating value for 
shareholders.   
Lampe (2001) also applied feminist ethical theory to stakeholder theory, extrapolating 
from the work of Wicks et al. (1994) to assert that mediation (rather than adversarial behaviors) 
is a preferable approach to addressing disagreements between FOs and their stakeholders.  
Lampe (2001) argues that mediation represents an approach to handling firm-stakeholder conflict 
that allows one to avoid time-consuming and costly approaches such as lawsuits, lobbying, 
strikes, and boycotts, which often are counter-productive, while considering simultaneously the 
interests of both the FO and the stakeholder and facilitating the preservation of the relationship 
between them.  Lampe (2001) posits that mediation, which requires cooperation, inclusion, and 
compromise, allows the stakeholder and the FO to jointly create win-win resolutions to their 
disagreements, and also allows parties to be educated regarding how to communicate and resolve 
future disagreements effectively.     
2.1.6  Instrumental Stakeholder Theory 
From its initiation, stakeholder theory has incorporated the instrumental view that stakeholders 
are critical constituents in the firm’s environment, and a firm must deal with them in order to be 
successful.  The fundamental idea concerning instrumental stakeholder theory is that firms that 
do not have good relationships with their stakeholders and do not look out for the latter’s 
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interests in an appropriate manner will suffer in terms of performance.  As Gibson (2000: 246) 
puts it, stakeholder theory is “… a more elaborate model of the appropriate considerations to 
determine what actions will be instrumental in making the firm more effective.”  In its extreme 
form, instrumental stakeholder theory takes the position that the management of most 
stakeholders is a means to an end, that end being the improvement of firm performance (Berman 
et al., 1999; Quinn & Jones, 1995): dealings with stakeholders are a necessary means that must 
be used in order for the firm to achieve ends such as profitability, since organizations exhibit 
resource dependence with respect to their stakeholders due to the fact that stakeholders can 
restrict the FO’s access to critical nonsubstitutable resources (Berman et al., 1999; Welcomer, 
2002).   
From this view, addressing the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders is “contingent 
on the value of those relationships to corporate financial success” (Berman et al., 1999: 492): 
from a transaction cost economics perspective, firms that make efforts to address the interests of 
stakeholders or indicate their willingness to take an interactive approach to their relationships 
with stakeholders may be able to avoid formal contractual mechanisms, regulation, and other 
control devices that can increase costs (Ruf et al., 2001), while from a resource-based view 
(Barney, 1991), strategic investment in the maintenance of stakeholder interests can lead to 
competitive advantages that are not easily imitable (Ruf et al., 2001).  Of course, even if it is a 
good idea for managers to heed the interests of stakeholders, they may not do so (Ogden & 
Watson, 1999).   
Work on the instrumental aspects of stakeholder theory has for the most part focused on 
the relationship between the nature of the FO’s relationships with its stakeholders and the 
organizational performance exhibited by the FO.  Jones (1995) presented the first compelling 
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version of what he himself terms “instrumental stakeholder theory.”  In this work, he outlines 
propositions concerning the effects of particular firm behaviors on firm performance.  Jones’ 
focus is on the “contracts,” or relationships, that exist between the firm and its various 
stakeholders.  He refers to agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mitnick, 1982), transaction 
cost economics (Williamson, 1975) and team production (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) to develop 
propositions based on the idea of opportunism on the part of the managers, who are “contracting 
agents” for the firm, forging and managing the various relationships between the firm and its 
stakeholders.  The essence of Jones’ (1995) argument is that opportunistic behaviors on the part 
of a firm’s managers leads to contracting inefficiencies (i.e., difficulties in forging or maintaining 
stable, cooperative, and, especially, trusting relationships with stakeholders), such that the firm’s 
performance will suffer relative to that of non-opportunistic firms (Jones, 1995).  Jones’ 
propositions articulate how behaviors by firms such as the use of shark repellant, poison pills, or 
greenmail, the payment of disproportionately high levels of compensation to executives, the use 
of many suppliers, the contracting out of work, and the use of external rather than internal labor 
markets may be seen as opportunistic behaviors that generate negative effects on firm reputation 
and erode trust between stakeholders and the focal organization, and therefore can have a 
negative impact on firm performance.  
Wicks et al. (1999) also suggest that the “amount” of trust in a FO’s relationships with its 
stakeholders has an influence on the performance of the FO; however, these authors assert that it 
is possible to “overinvest” in trust.  For example, the FO could trust its stakeholders too much or 
invest in trusting relationships with stakeholders who have little impact on its well-being.  
Conversely, of course, the FO can “underinvest” in trust: trust too little or fail to invest in the 
creation of trusting relationships with its stakeholders.  They present the concept of “optimal 
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trust,” which they define as existing when “one creates and maintains prudent economic 
relationships biased by a willingness to trust,” and present propositions that essentially advocate 
a “fit” between the degree of interdependence between the FO and the stakeholder and the 
degree of trust the FO should attempt to develop in its relationship with the stakeholder.   Firms 
that are able to create fit between the degree of interdependence exhibited with respect to its 
stakeholders and the amount of trust it creates in its relationships with those stakeholders will 
outperform firms that are unable to do so.   
Some empirical work supports the premise that stakeholder management is related to 
organizational performance.  Berman et al. (1999) tested the appropriateness of two models of 
stakeholder management: the “strategic stakeholder management model” and the “intrinsic 
stakeholder commitment model.”  In the strategic stakeholder management model, managerial 
concern for a stakeholder depends on managers’ perceptions concerning the ability of that 
stakeholder to contribute to the improvement of firm financial performance.  In the intrinsic 
stakeholder commitment model, on the other hand, the firm has a moral commitment to further 
the interests of its stakeholders, which shapes firm strategy and, secondarily, has an impact on 
firm financial performance.  Berman et al. (1999) investigated the effects of the adoption of each 
model on firm financial performance, focusing on firm activities in key stakeholder areas: 
employees, the natural environment, workplace diversity, customers, product safety, and 
community relations.  Employing a sample of 100 firms from the Fortune 500, they found that 
characteristics of some stakeholder relationships were related to financial performance.  
Employees and product safety/quality were positively related to financial performance, and all 
five stakeholder relationship variables moderated the relationship between strategy and financial 
performance.  Thus, regarding the strategic stakeholder management model, they argue that 
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stakeholder relationships have both direct (in the case of employee and customer relationships) 
and indirect effects on firm financial performance.  However, they found no support for the 
intrinsic stakeholder commitment model.  
Ulmer (2001) sought to identify the impacts of stakeholder relationships on crisis 
management.  He argues that strong relationships with stakeholders can potentially help the FO 
avoid some crisis situations.  Furthermore, stakeholder-FO relationships have important 
implications for the FO when a crisis does occur: stakeholders have an interest in the well-being 
of the FO, and so can be an important source of support in times of crisis.  If stakeholder-FO 
relationships are strong, such support may be forthcoming, but support is less likely if 
relationships between stakeholders and the FO are contentious.  Ulmer (2001) further suggests 
that crisis management activities by the FO should not be only concerned with the FO: its 
representatives must also eschew a stockholder focus and articulate their concerns for the well-
being of all stakeholders.  
Clarkson (1995) used his typology of responses to stakeholder interests – reactive, 
defensive, accommodating, or proactive – to test the effects of response strategy on financial 
performance.  He found that firms that take a proactive or accommodative approach to 
stakeholder relations perform better financially that those that take a defensive or reactive stance 
with respect to their dealings with stakeholders. 
Some results rebutting the position that stakeholder relations are positively related to 
performance come from Agle et al. (1999).  Their results indicated that managers’ perceptions of 
the salience of stakeholders (which would presumably translate into managerial attention being 
devoted to those stakeholders) were not related to organizational performance.  
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2.1.6.1  Stakeholder Theory and Social Performance.  A number of researchers have 
attempted to employ stakeholder theory as a means of conceptualizing the concept of corporate 
social performance (CSP).  These works often link “good” stakeholder relations (i.e., “good” 
CSP) with concepts other than firm performance.   
Waddock and Graves (1997) assert that the quality of the relationships that a firm has 
with its key stakeholders is the defining characteristic of its CSP; that is, “good” CSP manifests 
itself through “good” relationships with, for example, employees, shareholders, customers, 
communities, and the environment.  Thus, “from a stakeholder theory perspective, corporate 
social performance is assessed in terms of a company meeting the demands of multiple 
stakeholders” (Ruf et al., 2001: 43).  Waddock and Graves (1997) focus for the most part on 
relationships with primary stakeholders, saying only that CSP is “possibly” associated with some 
secondary stakeholders as well.  One interesting result of their reconceptualization of CSP is that 
financial performance is no longer seen as a variable determined in part by CSP (as is the 
common view in research relating CSP and financial performance); rather, financial performance 
is a measure of the treatment of a particular stakeholder (shareholders), and is itself a component 
of CSP.  This echoes the position of Jones (1995b), who likewise states that, since stockholders 
are stakeholders, financial performance represents a component of social performance, and 
should not be treated as a separate variable.  Waddock and Graves (1997) tested the hypothesis 
that quality of management can be explained by the quality of stakeholder relations (i.e., CSP).  
Their results suggest that perceived quality of management can indeed be explained by 
performance with respect to key stakeholders. 
Gerde (2000) describes and tests a model of organizational design geared toward 
Rawlsian justice, asserting that such an organizing principle best captures organizations’ efforts 
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to address the interests of a wide variety of stakeholders.  Her question was “Do organizations 
designed around the value of justice for their stakeholders have better CSP ratings than those that 
are not designed around justice?”  Using structural configuration, human resource policies and 
incentives, control systems, strategic planning, and organizational ethos as independent 
variables, and data from Kinder, Lydenburg, and Domini as a proxy for CSP, she found that 
firms with more design features of a “just organization” did not exhibit higher CSP ratings.  
 Wood and Jones (1995) used a stakeholder approach to examine empirical research in 
CSP, particularly work that examines potential relationships between CSP and financial 
performance.  They assert that the stakeholder approach is the best framework for assessing CSP, 
and submit that most studies correlating social and financial performance attempt to correlate 
variables that have no theoretical connection, which leads to ambiguous results.  Wood and Jones 
(1995) state that various stakeholders 1) set expectations about firm behavior, 2) experience the 
effects of firm behavior, and 3) evaluate the outcomes of firm behavior; however, the empirical 
work in the CSP literature “mismatches variables” by failing to match variables to the relevant 
stakeholders.  For example, they assert that correlating the existence of “employee-friendly” 
programs (which are relevant to outcomes experienced by employees) with financial measures 
(which are relevant to stockholders) is inappropriate, and furthermore presumes that only 
stockholders are able to evaluate how the company treats employees (and other stakeholders).  
Wood and Jones (1995) state that this presumption represents an implicit acceptance of 
shareholder primacy, and thus of the neoclassical view of the firm, which they regard as a 
violation of the underlying premises of the stakeholder model.   
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2.2  EQUITY THEORY 
2.2.1  Background  
“Fairness,” is a term that is often applied in the context of social interaction (Walster et al., 
1978).  Psychologists are widely concerned with perceptions of fairness and the ramifications of 
unfairness in social exchange (Darke & Dahl, 2003).  Equity theory is a theory of social inequity 
(or “unfairness”) that specifically addresses these issues (Lawler, 1973).  The goal of equity 
theory is to predict when people will perceive that they are being treated fairly or unfairly, and 
how they will react when faced with an unfair situation (Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid & 
Walster, 1973; Wilkens & Timm, 1978).  It asserts, in short, that people are most satisfied when 
they perceive that they are being treated fairly in their relationships (Fossum & Moore, 1975).  
Equity theory is perhaps the most widely studied theory or fairness (Greenberg, 1990; Grau & 
Doll, 2003), and represents “a broad theoretical framework for understanding the manner in 
which social cues lead to perceptions of fairness” (Darke & Dahl, 2003: 330).  It assumes norms 
of distributive justice (Homans, 1958) and reciprocity (Van Dierendonck, Schaufeli, & Buunk, 
2001), and takes the position that any type of relationship can be perceived as fair or unfair 
(Weick, 1966).  
Equity theory is a “process” theory of motivation.  Process theories “attempt to provide a 
generalized explanation of the processes that lead to choices among alternative courses of action, 
varying degrees of effort expenditure, and persistence over time” (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976: 
65).  Equity theory is also a “cognitive theory,” one which focuses on people’s perceptions.   
Equity theory posits that there are important consequences associated with fairness 
perceptions in relationships, and is regarded by many as the basic principle of justice in 
economic and social relationships (Wagstaff, 1998).  In equity theory, motivation stems from 
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attempts to redress unfairness, or “inequity” in relationships (Wilkens & Timm, 1978).  In short, 
a person assesses a given relationship in which he is a participant by evaluating his inputs to the 
relationship and outcomes he derives from it, and comparing those inputs and outcomes to those 
of a “comparison other” or “referent” (Scheer, Kumar, & Steenkamp, 2003).  Wagstaff (1998) 
calls equity “a form of sophisticated reciprocity,” wherein a person should receive favors 
(punishments) in proportion to the favors (harms) he or she has bestowed upon others. 
Though the results of some studies of allocation decisions have suggested that individuals 
sometimes eschew equity norms in favor of norms based on need and equality in the allocation 
of rewards (Wagstaff, 1998), equity theory remains critical to the analysis of perceptions of 
fairness in relationships.  Indeed, more recent augmentations of equity theory such as “equity 
sensitivity” (Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman, 1989) actually take into account preferences for non-
equity-based norms. 
Adams (1963; 1965) is generally regarded as the person who developed equity theory, 
though the theory and its hypotheses are, to a large extent, derived from Festinger’s (1957) work 
on cognitive dissonance.  Early equity formulations were also presented by Patchen (1961), 
Jaques (1961), and Homans (1958).  All these early works assume that people perceive “fair” or 
“unfair” returns for their contributions to relationships, employ social comparison processes, and 
try to reduce the inequities cognitively or behaviorally when they are perceived (Carrell & 
Dittrich, 1978).  Pritchard (1969: 176) notes that these various approaches “differ so little that 
testable differences cannot be deduced from them in areas where they would make predictions.”  
Cosier and Dalton (1983) attest that, while Adams’ equity theory is one of several exchange 
theories, it is the most explicit and rigorously developed model of fairness in assessments of 
relationships.  Furthermore, equity theory as it is understood today in organizational studies was 
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formalized by Adams (1963, 1965), and his work has inspired the vast majority of research 
(Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Hinton, 1972; Pritchard, 1969).  Accordingly, Adams’ formulation 
and its subsequent development will be the focus of this review.  I first present Adams’ theory 
and then discuss its critical components and development.  The amount of empirical evidence 
concerning equity theory is vast: in only the first decade after Adams’ initial work, Adams and 
Freedman (1976) noted more than one hundred studies of equity theory.  Therefore, the work 
reported here does not constitute an exhaustive review; rather, I introduce empirical evidence as 
necessary in my discussions of the key components of equity theory.  I have attempted to include 
evidence representative of both early and more recent work concerning the theory. 
2.2.2  Adams’ Equity Theory and Subsequent Developments 
As noted, Adams’ (1963; 1965) equity theory hinges on the inputs that social actors make into an 
exchange relationship and the outcomes they derive from that relationship.  Inputs represent 
“investments” in the exchange relationship for which the contributor expects some reciprocal 
return.  Inputs are perceived to be such by the social actor who contributes them, but will not 
necessarily be perceived as such by the other actor in the exchange relationship.  As long as the 
actor sees an input he or she contributes to the relationship as relevant to it, that input becomes 
an important factor in his or her perception of the equity or inequity of the relationship.   
On the other side of the exchange relationship are resources, returns, rewards, or 
compensation that the actor derives from the relationship.  Adams (1965) calls these receipts 
“outcomes.”  In the most general terms, outcomes can be conceived of as any consequences to 
the person of his or her participation in a relationship (Hunt, Kernan, & Mizerski, 1983).  
Outcomes, like inputs, are perceived, and their relevance to the exchange relationship stems 
merely from their recognition by the “receiver” as outcomes, whether or not they are perceived 
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as such by the “giver.”  Thus, assessments of the degree of equity or inequity in relationships are 
completely subjective: they are based entirely on the perceptions of the participants in the 
relationship (Webster & Rice, 1996).   
The key process in the development of perceptions of equity or inequity in exchange 
relationships is a social actor’s comparison of its inputs to and outcomes from the relationship 
with the inputs and outcomes of the other party in the relationship, others who are in similar 
exchange relationships (Adams, 1965; Oldham, Kulik, Stepina, & Ambrose, 1986; Ronen, 1986), 
or of the actor’s historical self (Bretz & Thomas, 1992).  Equity theory is thus founded on 
processes of social comparison (Festinger, 1957) and asserts that perceptions of fairness in 
relationships are based on such comparisons, which may be made consciously or unconsciously 
(Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Hinton, 1972).  For example, an untenured faculty member at a 
university might develop his expectations concerning what constitutes an equitable distribution 
of inputs to and outcomes from the university by referring to the inputs and outcomes of another 
untenured faculty member in the same department, though the comparison-other need not be so 
similar to the person.  The comparison other may even be an abstraction based on a class or 
category of others (e.g., “untenured faculty members”) rather than a specific individual 
(Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Cosier & Dalton, 1983).   
2.2.2.1  Equity in Relationships.  Using Adams’ notation, an individual or other social actor 
will perceive a situation to be equitable if and only if Op/Ip = Oo/Io, where O represents a 
weighted summation of outcomes from the relationship, I represents a weighted summation of 
inputs to the relationship, and the subscripts p and o represent the “person” and the 
“(comparison) other.”  In this condition the individual perceives his ratio of outcomes from the 
relationship to inputs to the relationship as equal to the corresponding ratio of the comparison-
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other, though equity effects are typically not seen as requiring exact balance (Cosier & Dalton, 
1983; Vogl-Bauer, Kalbfleish, & Beatty, 1999).  This state should lead to satisfaction for the 
participants in the relationship (Greenberg, 1990) regardless of the absolute levels of inputs and 
outcomes of either party (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976).  In Adams’ (1963; 1965) view, then, 
equitable relationships are thus usually regarded as the most satisfying type for both parties in an 
exchange relationship. 
2.2.2.2  Inequity in Relationships.  Inequity for an individual or other social actor exists when 
he or she perceives that the ratio of his outcomes from an exchange relationship to his inputs to 
the relationship is different from the corresponding ratio of the comparison-other.  As noted 
above, this can occur when the individual and the comparison-other are the two parties in the 
exchange relationship, or when both the individual and the comparison-other are in similar 
exchange relationships with a specific other party. 
Using Adams’ (1965) notation, inequity exists when either 1) Op/Ip < Oo/Io, or 2) Op/Ip > 
Oo/Io.  The condition depicted in Relation 1, where the individual perceives herself as relatively 
undercompensated compared to the comparison-other, is usually termed “underreward inequity.”  
The condition depicted in Relation 2, where the individual perceives herself as relatively 
overcompensated compared to the comparison-other, is usually termed “overreward inequity.”  
Inequities of either type are expected to produce “tension,” or “dissonance” (Adams, 1963, 1965; 
Festinger, 1957; Griffeth, Vecchio, & Logan, 1989), negative affect (e.g., anger, resentment) 
(Akerlof & Yellen, 1990; Ingersoll-Dayton et al., 2003; O’Malley & Davies, 1984; Sprecher, 
1986), guilt (Brockner et al., 1988; Ingersoll-Dayton et al., 2003), and even depression 
(Longmore & Demaris, 1997) on the part of the party who perceives the inequity, such that a 
need or drive for equity will be activated (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Laufer, 2002).   
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It is thus the dissonance, tension, or distress that accompanies inequity that is said to 
motivate individuals (Adams, 1963; Hunt et al., 1983; Walster et al., 1973).  Specifically, 
participants in a relationship that they perceive to be inequitable will be motivated to reduce the 
associated tension by attempting reduce or eliminate the inequity.  To Adams (1963; 1965), 
overrewarded individuals will exhibit “empathic distress” that evokes a desire to relinquish 
outcomes or contribute more to the relationship, whereas in underrewarded people, a self-interest 
motive will result (O’Malley & Davies, 1984).  In both cases, the person will strive to reduce the 
inequity (Adams, 1963, 1965; Griffeth et al., 1989).  Both overreward and underreward relate to 
relative deprivation, and need not be related to absolute levels of outcomes (Watson, Storey, 
Wynarczyk, Keasy, & Short, 1996): it is the comparison, rather than the absolute level of 
outcomes, that is important. The consequences of either type of inequity are expected to be 
proportional to its size (Pritchard, 1969; Vogl-Bauer et al., 1999; Webster & Rice, 1996); thus, 
the relationship between inequity and distress is usually characterized as “monotonically 
increasing” (Hunt et al., 1983). 
In brief, then, equity theory according to Adams (1965) can be summarized in four 
principles (Cosier & Dalton, 1983; Webster & Rice, 1996): 1) perceived inequity creates tension 
within a person; 2) the amount of resultant tension is proportional to the size of the perceived 
inequity; 3) the tension stemming from perceptions of inequity motivates the person to reduce it; 
and 4) the degree of motivation to reduce the perceived inequity is proportion its size. 
Walster et al. (1976) noted that Adams’ equity ratio is impractical in situations where 
inputs can be negative.  For example, in a situation where Op = -4 and Ip = 2 and  Oo = 4 and Io = 
-2,  both the person’s and the comparison other’s O/I ratios equal -2.  Adams’ predicts equity in 
this situation; therefore, no party should take action to alter his or her inputs our outcomes.  
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However, it is clear that, in this case, the comparison other is “getting a better deal,” contributing 
less than nothing and receiving substantially more outcomes than ‘person’: in reality, ‘person’ 
should perceive underreward inequity, experience substantial dissonance, and act to alleviate the 
inequity, while (according to Adams), ‘other’ should perceive overreward and likewise strive to 
reduce the inequity.  As a result of this shortcoming in Adams’ ratio, other equity ratios have 
been presented by Walster et al. (1976), Anderson and Farkas (1975), and Wagstaff and Perfect 
(1992) to accommodate negative input values.  For the sake of simplicity, however, and because 
the vast majority of equity researchers have adopted Adams’ formula, I employ it throughout this 
dissertation.   
2.2.3  Applications of Equity Theory  
Equity theory has been tested in hundreds of studies in laboratory and field settings.  Though it 
was originally developed to explain motivation in employee-employer relationships (most equity 
research still studies this relationship) and how motivation-related constructs such as effort 
(Adams, 1965; Akerlof & Yellen, 1990) and absenteeism (Dittrich & Carrell, 1979) relate to 
perceptions of pay equity or inequity, it has been successfully applied to explain diverse 
phenomena in other type of relationships.  Equity theory has been applied to investigate, among 
other things, the power structure in marital relationships (Webster & Rice, 1996), distribution 
among siblings in parent care (Ingersoll-Dayton et al., 2003), satisfaction with bargains (Darke & 
Dahl, 2003), satisfaction with service recovery (Hoffman & Kelley, 2000), relationships among 
older spouses (Ingersoll-Dayton & Antonucci, 1988) and other intimate relationships (Kuijer, 
Buunk, & Ybema, 2001), provision of public goods (Chan, Godby, Mestelman, & Muller, 1997), 
division of housework among spouses (Zuo & Bian, 2001), relationships between friends 
(Roberto & Scott, 1986), parent-adolescent relationships (Vogl-Bauer, et al., 1999), perceptions 
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of fairness of reward allocation in teams (Wilke, Rutter, & Van Knippenberg, 2000), results of 
baseball arbitration (Fizel, Krautmann, & Hadley, 2002), customer satisfaction with a seller 
(Alexander, 2002; Homburg, Krohmer, Cannon, & Kiedaisch, 2002), taxpayer perceptions of 
their relationships with the government (Kim, 2002), depression in relationships with relatives 
(Ramos & Wilmoth, 2003), the effects of inequity on worker health (Taris, Kalimo, & Schaufeli, 
2002), perceptions of the adequacy of sentences for convicted criminals (Izzett, 1981), and 
burnout among care providers in provider-patient relationships (Van Dierendonck et al., 2001).  
The following sections elaborate on key components of equity theory – inputs, outcomes, 
comparison others, and responses to inequity.  I include empirical evidence where relevant.   
2.2.4  Inputs and Outcomes 
2.2.4.1  Inputs.  In the terminology of equity theory, “inputs” include all those factors that the 
perceiver sees as relevant reward-worthy contributions to the relationship in which he or she is 
involved (Adams, 1965; Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Cosier & Dalton, 1983).  Alexander 
(2002) refers to inputs as expenditures of “money, time, or anything else.”  Weick (1966: 417) 
simply defines an input as, “anything that a person regards as relevant in the exchange and for 
which he expects a just return.”  In workplace relationships, which have dominated equity theory 
research, inputs have been said to include psychological or physical effort (Campbell & 
Pritchard, 1976; Pritchard, 1969; Taris et al., 2002), education (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; 
Kilduff & Baker, 1986; Lawler, 1973), experience (Cosier & Dalton, 1983; Kilduff & Baker, 
1986; Lawler, 1973), training (Janssen, 2001), professional reputation (Finn & Lee, 1972), 
productivity or performance (Brounstein, Norman, & Ostrove, 1980; Lawler, 1973), seniority, 
time, loyalty, compliance (Huseman & Hatfield, 1990), age (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; 
Lawler, 1973), sex (Lawler, 1973), amount of responsibility, knowledge, skills, abilities, and 
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organizational citizenship behaviors (Dyer, Schwab, & Theriault, 1976; Lawler, 1966; 
Konopaske & Werner, 2002; Moorman, 1991).  
The criteria that are perceived as inputs may vary widely across individuals, and will also 
vary with the nature of the relationship (e.g. employee-employer versus buyer-seller).  Thus, 
such disparate variables as ethnicity (Christian & Greene, 1976), word-of-mouth, loyalty, 
(Alexander, 2002), age, and beauty (Critelli & Waid, 1980; Weick, 1966), patronage frequency 
(Laufer, 2002), financial control, gender (Konopaske & Werner, 2002) and emotional 
contributions (Critelli & Waid, 1980; Grau & Doll, 2003; Hatfield, Utne, & Traupmann, 1979), 
may also be regarded as inputs.  The determination of relevant inputs may vary across culture 
(Laufer, 2002).  For example, consumers searching a mall for a product might be viewed as a 
valued outcome for consumers in one culture, but an annoyance (and so an input into the 
producer-consumer relationship) in another (Laufer, 2002).   
Lamm, Kayser, and Schanz (1983) noted that equity theory does not account for when a 
given type of input is perceived as relevant and which inputs are particularly weighty in 
determining perceptions of allocation fairness.  The results of their study indicated that effort 
tends to be given more weight than ability in assessments of the fairness of allocation decisions, 
leading them to suggest that a contribution will be seen as more relevant when it is under the 
control of the actor than when it is not.  In experiments by Boldero and Rosenthal (1984), it was 
determined that effort was also favored over experience in determining the fairness of reward 
allocation.  Tombari (1979) suggested that salience of inputs is determined in part by 
occupational group, and found that job-related inputs (e.g., planning, structuring, and labor 
management relations) were more salient than personal-related inputs (e.g., tenure) in equity 
assessments.   
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2.2.4.2  Outcomes.  As noted earlier, outcomes are all those factors seen by the perceiver to be 
valuable rewards for his contributions to the relationship in which he is participating (Cosier & 
Dalton, 1983).  Adams (1965) presented a variety of factors that can be perceived as work 
outcomes, and many other work related and non-work-related outcomes have been identified by 
later researchers.  However, the determination of what constitutes a relevant outcome also varies 
across individuals and the context of the relationship: for example, Tombari (1979) found that 
the salience of outcomes was related to occupational group: supervisors perceived outcomes 
differently from management and their subordinates.  Relevant outcomes can also vary across 
culture, and the perceptions of exchange partners as to what is a valuable outcome may also 
differ (Scheer et al., 2003).  Thus, the concept of an outcome is extremely broad.   
Kabanoff (1991: 417) takes the position that outcomes are “conditions and goods that 
affect well-being, which includes psychological, physiological, economic, and social aspects.”  
This definition allows for an infinite number of potential outcomes in exchange relationships.  
Such factors can include (but are by no means limited to) factors such as pay, supervisory 
treatment and recognition, benefits, promotions, status, prestige, authority, organizational 
communication, inclusion in decisionmaking, fringe benefits, the interest of a job, rule 
administration, work pace, task distribution, raises, incentives, working conditions, intrinsically 
rewarding tasks, a sense of accomplishment, social identity and other social rewards, ethical 
behavior , product quality, and service received (Adams, 1965; Alexander, 2002; Huseman & 
Hatfield, 1990; Ingersoll-Dayton et al., 2000; Jannsen, 2001; Kilduff & Baker, 1986; Lawler, 
1973; Tombari, 1979; Weick, 1966; Wilke, Rutte, & Van Knippenberg, 2000; Wilkens & Timm, 
1978; Zuo & Bian, 2001).   
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In the workplace, Huseman & Hatfield (1990) differentiate between four different types 
of outcomes: system, job, performance, and interpersonal.  System outcomes stem from a 
person’s membership in an organization, and include factors such as pay, fringe benefits, 
promotion and advancement, job security, and working conditions.  Job outcomes stem from 
doing one’s job, and include doing challenging work, using one’s abilities, making decisions, 
having responsibility, and doing meaningful work.  Performance outcomes are those that come 
from job successes, such as feelings of accomplishment, competence, personal worth, 
achievement, and confidence.  Interpersonal outcomes stem from relationships with others, and 
include factors such as recognition, status, a sense of belonging, appreciation  from others, and 
friendships. 
In most early equity research the manipulated outcome was pay (Greenberg, 1990a; 
Wilkens & Timm, 1978), which some researchers have categorized into pay rules (i.e., how one 
is paid compared to others in the organization) and pay level (i.e., how one is paid compared to 
others outside the organization).  More recently, though, researchers of equity theory have 
investigated various non-pay work-related outcomes (Greenberg, 1990a).  For example, 
Greenberg and Orenstein (1983) investigated the effects of job title on perceptions of equity.  
They found that a high status title did act, at least temporarily, as a valuable outcome: a high 
status title could be used to maintain equity when the employee’s work load (i.e., inputs) was 
increased.  However, when a high status title was not “earned” through good performance, it was 
not perceived as a reward in compensation for greater responsibility, and perceptions of 
underreward resulted.   
Greenberg (1988) also investigated workspace as a work-related outcome, using a sample 
of insurance underwriters who were temporarily relocated to better, equal, or worse offices.  
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Results indicated that being relocated to a higher-status office resulted in feelings of overreward 
and a corresponding (though temporary) increase in performance, while being relocated to a 
lower-status office was a source of perceptions of underreward and led to decreased 
performance.  Thus, office space seems to be seen as a relevant reward in equity considerations, 
most likely due to the status it confers.  This represents corroborating evidence for Adams’ 
(1965) stipulation that job status and status symbols are relevant outcomes in the equity equation. 
Contemporary equity theorists usually distinguish between “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” 
rewards or outcomes.  In general, extrinsic rewards are provided by others, while intrinsic 
rewards are provided by oneself.  For example, Darke and Dahl (2003) suggested that getting a 
discount may represent an ego-satisfying intrinsic outcome for consumers: shoppers will 
attribute a bargain to their own shopping skill and will thereby derive satisfaction.  In their study, 
bargains increased satisfaction even when no monetary rewards were available.  Thus, a discount 
appears to generate psychological intrinsic value (though it may also provide extrinsic (e.g., 
financial) rewards).  Other intrinsic rewards include factors like satisfaction with goal 
achievement (Kilduff & Baker, 1984).  Intrinsic and extrinsic outcomes will be discussed at 
length in the section concerning expectancy theory.     
2.2.4.3 Ambiguity Concerning Inputs and Outcomes.  Weick (1966), Pritchard (1969), and 
Tornow (1971) note some ambiguity concerning the nature of inputs and outcomes.  The variety 
of potentially perceived inputs and outcomes makes it difficult in some circumstances to 
ascertain which of the two a variable represents, which makes it unclear where it fits into the 
equity ratio.  Weick (1966), by way of example, presents a case where the comparison other 
sweats profusely.  It is unclear whether this should be regarded as a sign that this referent works 
very hard (which would raise perceptions of his inputs) or as an indication that the referent’s job 
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causes him great physical discomfort (which would lower perceptions of his outcomes).  
Similarly, if one is given greater responsibility, does this represent an input (due to the greater 
cognitive and other efforts required) or an outcome (due to the higher status) (Pritchard, 1969)?   
Weick (1966) suggests that individuals may make ascriptions of outcome/input status in 
such a way as to promote equity.  Thus, an underrewarded employee will regard greater 
responsibility as an outcome, whereas an overrewarded one will regard it as an input.  He further 
suggests that if a great number of ambiguous elements (i.e., those which could be considered 
either an input or an outcome) are present, it may be difficult for perceptions of large degrees of 
inequity to ever occur, as sources of inequity will be met with frequent interpretations of 
ambiguous elements in order to maintain equity.  Finally, Weick (1966) suggests that, in the 
presence of ambiguous elements, it will be unlikely that a person will resort to the cognitive 
strategy of switching referents described by Adams (1965) as a way to preserve perceptions of 
equity: once the choice of referent has been made, ambiguous elements make it relatively simple 
to maintain equity.   
It may be, though, that Weick’s (1966) criticisms stem from an assumption that people 
will fail to “decompose” observations to the appropriate degree: for example, in the example 
above sweating may simultaneously be a result of hard work (high inputs) and a source of 
discomfort (an influence on outcomes).  Weick (1966) assumes that the person cannot 
successfully perceive this.  Similarly, a person should readily be able to understand that greater 
responsibility may simultaneously confer status (an outcome) and require more effort (an input).   
If accurate decomposition of observations of referents and personal experiences is possible, the 
equity ratio itself will be less ambiguous, large perceived inequities will be possible, and Adams’ 
(1965) strategy of switching comparison others is still relevant. 
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2.2.4.4  Interdependence of Inputs and Outcomes.  Adams (1963), Pritchard (1969), and 
Weick (1966) also note that inputs and outcomes can be interdependent.  Weick (1966) states 
that the result of such correlations would be that inequity reduction becomes substantially more 
difficult: any attempt to reduce inequity by, for example, altering inputs, could simultaneously 
alter outcomes, resulting in another inequity.  He further posits that this situation will lead to 
people favoring cognitive responses to inequity over behavioral responses.  However, a 
substantial amount of empirical evidence suggests that behavioral reactions to inequity are 
common.   
2.2.5  Comparison Others 
As noted, a critical determinant of perceptions of equity or inequity in exchange relationships is 
the social actor’s comparison of its inputs to and outcomes from the relationship to the inputs and 
outcomes of a comparison other.  A person’s choice of referent should have an impact on the 
perception of the equity/inequity status of the relationship (Chen, Choi, & Chi, 2002).  As the 
referent changes, the comparison of O/I ratios will be seen as more or less favorable by the 
person, which, in turn, influences perceptions of the equity of the relationship.  For example, in a 
rare study of the importance of referents on satisfaction, Chen et al. (2002) looked at equity 
perceptions of local employees of an international joint venture (IJV) and found that these local 
employees perceived underreward with respect to expatriate employees of the IJV, but the 
dissatisfaction associated with this perception was counteracted by a perceived overreward 
relative to other locals.   
Though the choice of referent has substantial implications for perceptions of equity or 
inequity, and thus for the behavior of participants in a relationship, Adams (1963, 1965) did not 
delineate specifically who will be used as a referent other nor how the comparison would be 
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made.  Lawler (1973), however, notes Patchen’s (1961) assertion that, in the workplace, the 
choice of comparison other is influenced by relative wage position and mobility chances, and 
Andrews and Henry (1963) found that as education level rises, managers tend to look more 
outside of their organization for comparison others.   
Since the work of Adams, limited work has been done concerning the bases of these 
choices of referents (Watson et al., 1996).  Thus, it remains largely unclear as to who is likely to 
be a salient referent for a given individual (Akerlof & Yellen, 1990, Pritchard, 1969).  Martin 
and Peterson (1987), following Oldham et al., (1986) suggest that the choice of comparison 
others is dependent on the availability of information about potential referents and their 
attractiveness and relevance as an object of comparison.  Goodman (1977) asserted that the 
attractiveness of a referent, in turn, depends on its instrumentality in satisfying needs.  Akerlof 
and Yellen (1990) assert that there are three natural choices for a referent in a work setting: 
people in similar occupations in the same organization, people with dissimilar occupations in the 
same organization, and individuals in other organizations: Konopaske and Werner (2002) refer to 
the types of equity associated with these comparisons as “employee equity,” “internal equity,” 
and “external equity,” respectively.  Regarding these types of equity Roberts, Coulson, and 
Chonko (1999), in a study of salespeople, found that internal equity was more important than 
external equity, at least in its effects on organizational commitment and turnover. 
Akerlof and Yellen (1990) acknowledge that one may compare her O/I ratio to that of a 
very dissimilar entity: for example, an employee might look at her wage and compare it to the 
rewards earned by those who share in firm profits.  Martin and Peterson (1987), while concurring 
that important comparison others include “internal comparisons” and “external comparisons” 
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(with people in similar positions in other organizations), also contend that employees might use 
family members as referents.  
2.2.5.1  The Possibility of Internal Comparisons.  Weick (1966), Weick and Nesset (1968), 
Pritchard (1969), and Wagstaff (1998) assert that in some circumstances an individual will 
perceive his or her outcomes as equitable or inequitable based on an internal standard that is 
unrelated to comparisons with others.  For example, Martin and Peterson (1987) postulate that 
employees might compare their pay to a historical level.  Hinton (1972) similarly asserts that one 
may use himself as a comparison other. 
Taris et al. (2002) distinguish between interpersonal comparison (which employs an 
external referent) and intrapersonal comparison (which does not).  Intrapersonal comparison uses 
an internal standard which influences perceptions of equity/inequity.  This is a standard – based 
upon what the person feels she deserves – by which one makes assessments of the rewards and 
costs of a relationship.  
Carrell and Dittrich (1978) also state that one might compare her outcomes to a standard 
other than that established by treatment of a referent.  Their position is based on the assertion that 
people will attempt to “align discrepancies” even when there is no comparison other in the 
context, and that perceptions of imbalance in inputs and outcomes made internally should result 
in dissonance as much as an O/I imbalance relative to a referent.  When this internal comparison 
occurs, the person will make a simple comparison of outcomes to inputs (i.e., the O/I ratio will 
not be used); rather, equity will be perceived when outcomes are approximately equal to inputs 
irrespective of their absolute level.  When inputs are not equal to outcomes, inequity will be 
perceived, even if a comparison person is in a similar situation.  Wagstaff (1998) refers to this as 
the “basic form” of the equity principle.   
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Equity or inequity perceptions stemming from internal comparisons have not received 
much attention in the equity theory literature, perhaps due to the popularity of Adams’ (1963, 
1965) formulation, which mandates interpersonal comparisons.  However, Van Dierendonck, 
Schaufeli, ,& Buunk (1996) found that intrapersonal inequity due to an imbalance between an 
individual’s inputs and outcomes does indeed result in stress, and Taris et al. (2002) built on the 
foundation of Van Dierendonck et al. (1996) using a sample of 1297 Finnish workers to find 
“remarkably similar” results when comparing intrapersonal and interpersonal comparisons’ 
effects on dissonance-related variables.  Taris et al. (2002) also undertook to measure the relative 
contributions of intrapersonal and interpersonal comparisons.  Stepwise hierarchical regressions 
indicated that inclusion of referents’ O/I ratios in the equations added little explanatory value, 
and the change in R2 produced by the inclusion of these ratios was not significant in any of five 
analyses, leading the researchers to express preference for the use of intrapersonal comparisons 
due to their conceptual simplicity.  However, the results of Weick and Nesset (1968) generally 
showed that inequity is more uncomfortable when one makes a comparison with another (and 
O/I ratios are unequal) than when one merely compares his or her own outcomes to inputs (and 
finds them to be unequal), thus indicating that external comparisons may be more critical than 
internal ones in eliciting responses to inequity.    
2.2.6  Responses to Equity or Inequity 
Because equity – or the lack thereof – is in the eyes of the perceiver (Adams, 1963, 1965; 
Wilkens & Timm, 1978), perceptions of equity in a relationship are subjective, and objective 
observers may not make the same assessments of the degree of equity in a relationship that the 
participants in that relationship make (Critelli &Waid, 1980; Walster et al., 1978).  Similarly, the 
parties in the relationship may disagree completely on its degree of equity.  However, according 
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to Adams (1965), a relationship participant who perceives inequity, whether or not it exists 
objectively, should be motivated to ameliorate it.   
There are two broad categories of equity restoration activities (Greenberg, 1990; Walster 
et al., 1978).  In “actual” restoration activities, the perceiver of the inequity will attempt to 
change his or her inputs to or outcomes from the relationship (Walster et al., 1978; Ingersoll-
Dayton et al., 2003; Hunt et al., 1983) or to change the inputs or outcomes of the comparison 
other.  Alternatively, the perceiver might employ “cognitive” or “psychological” equity 
restoration, wherein he cognitively adjusts his perceptions of inputs and outcomes (Brockner et 
al., 1988; Greenberg, 1990; Hunt et al., 1983, Walster et al., 1978; Wilke et al., 2000) or 
switches referents (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976).  For example, an underrewarded person might 
reduce inequity-induced dissonance by invoking a perception of additional rewards by 
acknowledging the social rewards associated with work in addition to the financial rewards, or 
might perceive his work environment more favorably than previously (Greenberg, 1990).  
Wilkens and Timm (1978) identify five potential cognitive or behavioral responses to inequity: 
distress, demands for compensation or restitution, retaliation, justification of the inequity 
(wherein one cognitively distorts his perceptions of inputs and outcomes), and withdrawal 
(wherein one become less active in the relationship or leaves it altogether).  Weick (1966) 
suggested that responses such as “denial” and “task enhancement” should be included as well. 
In general, when undertaking equity restoration activities people will seek to: 1) 
maximize positive outcomes; 2) minimize effortful or costly inputs; and 3) resist behavioral and 
cognitive changes that are important to their self-esteem or central to their self-concept (Adams, 
1965).  Furthermore, people will prefer to change their cognitions concerning the inputs and/or 
outcomes of the comparison other rather than change cognitions about their own (Adams, 1963, 
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1965; Leventhal & Michaels, 1969; Pritchard, 1969).  Due to the associated stress and other costs 
(such as switching costs) (Sheehan, 1991), “leaving the field,” or “severance” of the relationship 
is seen as a last resort when faced with inequity, and it will tend to occur when the perceived 
inequity is substantial and other means of alleviating it are seen to be ineffective or unavailable 
(Adams, 1965; Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Pritchard, 1969).  Though changing of the 
comparison other may occur as a result of perceived inequity (Kilduff & Baker, 1984), if 
comparisons with the referent have been consistent over time, an individual will be highly 
resistant to changing referents (Adams, 1963, 1965; Pritchard, 1969). 
Opsahl and Dunnette (1966) suggested that the vagueness of arguments concerning 
which mode of equity restoration activity will be taken in a given circumstance make equity 
theory difficult to test.  They assert, for example, that if an overcompensated person did not 
exhibit a subsequent increase in inputs, one could not tell if this represents disconfirmation of the 
theory or if the person merely undertook a cognitive form of equity restoration.  Weick (1966) 
noted that the difficulty associated with prediction of the type of equity restoration activity is 
compounded by the vast number of potential inputs and outcomes that could be manipulated in 
an attempt to restore equity.   
2.2.6.1  Affective and Behavioral Responses.  Research concerning equity theory has looked at 
the effects of equity and inequity in relationships on several affective variables.  Concerning 
affective responses, perceptions of equity or inequity are often posited to relate to satisfaction 
with the relationship or the outcomes derived from it (Berkowitz, Fraser, Treasure, & Cochran, 
1987; Greenberg, 1990; Perry, 1993; Sheehan, 1991; Summers & DeNisi, 1990; Sweeny, 1990) 
as well as attitudes toward the relationship and its outcomes (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; 
Hauenstein & Lord, 1989; Moorman, 1991; VanYperen, Buunk, & Schaufeli, 1992).  There is 
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also some evidence that inequity is related to depression (Ybema, Kuijer, Buunk, DeJong, & 
Sangerman (2001), and liking (Brounstein et al., 1980). 
There is substantial evidence that behavioral responses to inequity are commonplace 
(Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Hunt et al., 1983; Sheehan, 1991).  Underrewarded employees, for 
example, might exhibit decreased effort (Adams, 1965; Akerlof & Yellen, 1990), increased 
absenteeism (Dittrich & Carrell, 1979; Geurts, Schaufeli, & Buunk, 1993), decreased enthusiasm 
or involvement in organizational processes (Monge, Cozzens, & Contractor, 1992), a decline in 
organizational citizenship behaviors (Moorman, 1991), sabotage (Akerlof & Yellen, 1990), 
disruptive behavior (Kilduff & Baker, 1984), a propensity for theft (Greenberg, 1990b), or might 
leave the organization altogether (Griffeth & Gaertner, 2001).  Equity perceptions may also have 
an effect on individuals’ performance in work settings (Adams, 1965; Hauenstein & Lord, 1989; 
Jannsen, 2001).  Jannsen (2001), for example, asserts that managers who perceive equity in their 
relationship with their organization are likely to perform better than those who perceive that they 
are underrewarded.  Overrewarded employees, on the other hand, might increase the quality of 
their output (Adams, 1965) or engage in organizational citizenship behaviors (Moorman, 1991), 
among other possible reponses.  In general, underreward inequity in relationships is seen as a 
force which undermines relationship cohesion, trust, commitment, and continuity (Chenet, 
Tynan, & Money, 2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1988), while equity or overreward is often proposed to 
increase commitment (Martin & Peterson, 1987; Rhodes & Steers, 1981) and organizational 
citizenship behaviors (Moorman, 1991).   
2.2.6.2  Underreward.  As noted earlier, it is expected that the perception of underreward in a 
relationship leads to feelings such as frustration, resentment, and anger, because the person feels 
he is not getting what he deserves (Grau & Doll, 2003; Huseman & Hatfield, 1990; Martin & 
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Peterson, 1987; Scheer et al., 2003), and is expected to lead to equity restoration attempts such as 
reduction of inputs (e.g., through reduction of effort, performance, etc.), changing of referent, 
severance of the relationship, or cognitive distortion of the situation (Adams, 1965; Bretz & 
Thomas, 1992; Griffeth et al., 1989; Scheer et al., 2003).  From early work concerned with 
workplace inequity by Adams (1963, 1965), Lawler & O’Gara (1967) and the like to very recent 
work applying equity theory to a wide variety of contexts, empirical work has consistently 
indicated the robustness of the theory’s predictive utility in cases where a participant in a 
relationship perceives underreward (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Campbell & Pritchard, 1976).  It is 
safe to conclude that when underrewarded, people will often respond with attempts to alleviate 
the inequity.  The vast number of studies reporting on underreward effects precludes a 
comprehensive examination of them all; however, those discussed below should indicate the 
breadth of studies concerning underreward and the wide variety of relationships in which 
underreward is seen to elicit affective and behavioral responses.   
 Many work-related studies support equity theory’s postulates concerning underreward.  
Most of the early work in equity theory used quality of work, quantity of work, or both as 
dependent variables, and varied pay in order to manipulate perceptions of equity/inequity.  
Homans (1954) conducted interviews with two types of clerical workers in a large company.  
‘Cash posters’ and ‘ledger clerks’ were paid about the same, despite the fact that one had to have 
several years’ experience as a cash poster in order to attain the position of ledger clerk.  Thus, 
there existed what could be seen as an underreward situation for the ledger clerks.  Open-ended 
interviews indicated that about 75% of ledger clerks found the situation to be unfair and desired 
extra pay based on their higher inputs (seniority and skill).   
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 Andrews (1967) varied pay levels in a piece-rate payment system in order to manipulate 
perceptions of equity/inequity, and assessed work quality and quantity.  Tasks involved either 
checking pages of data or interviewing students.  In accordance with equity theory, underpaid 
subjects increased their quantity of work at the expense of quality, thus increasing their outputs 
and reducing their inputs simultaneously.   
 Lawler and O’Gara (1967) also recruited subjects to conduct interviews.  They were paid 
a certain sum for each interview conducted (the pay rate represented the equity/inequity 
manipulation).  Results indicated that, relative to equitably rewarded subjects, underrewarded 
subjects conducted more interviews, and their interviews were of lower quality.  Thus, in 
accordance with equity theory, underrewarded subjects acted to increase their outcomes without 
increasing their inputs (by conducting more interviews while spending less time on each).   
 In another pay study, Pritchard, Dunnette, and Jorgenson (1972) hired men to work for a 
fictitious business they established.  After three days of work, some subjects’ pay was cut in 
order to induce a perception of underreward.  The researchers found that underreward 
perceptions resulted in dissatisfaction and a decline in performance. 
 In support of the proposition that inequity can lead to severance of the relationship, 
Valenzi and Andrews (1971) found that, among employees, underreward was positively related 
to quitting or thoughts of quitting.  They hired workers at a specified wage, but then altered that 
wage based on a fictitious budgetary issue to induce inequity.  Twenty-seven percent of subjects 
in the underreward condition quit immediately.  Similarly, Carrell and Dittrich (1978) found that 
perceived equity among employees of a service organization was a significant predictor of 
turnover and absenteeism.  
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 Other early work supporting the equity propositions concerning underreward come from 
Andrews (1967) and  Lawler & O’Gara (1967), who found that in a low piece rate reward system 
subjects will produce a large number of low quality-products (which raises their outcomes 
without substantially raising their inputs). 
A rare instance of an empirical study failing to support the effects of underreward comes 
from Hinton (1972).  In an experiment employing students hired to undertake a card-sorting task, 
Hinton (1972) found that equity/inequity condition was only related to performance in one of 
four conditions.  However, it is important to note that some work in motivation shows that 
motivation and performance are tenuously related, since a number of other variables (e.g., 
ability) moderate the relationship.  Furthermore, in the same study, two conditions had to be 
eliminated due to subject behavior that appeared to support equity theory’s predictions 
concerning underreward: when some subjects (all underrewarded) learned about the inequity, 
they simply refused to participate in the experiment and left.  In one condition, one subject talked 
another subject into joining him in the experimenter’s office to protest the underreward.  The 
experimenter agreed to raise their pay; however, one of the protesters succeeded in having an 
exposé concerning the experiment printed in a university paper.  The exposé contained 
substantial pejorative information, some of which was misleading, and advised others to “help 
sabotage the project.”  The next day, the subject group’s productivity was over two and a half 
times the previous high because two staff members from the paper had infiltrated the experiment.  
This, in fact, seems to be a manifestation of relatively extreme behavioral responses to 
underreward.  Indeed, the author reported he was “in the somewhat unusual situation of being 
required to report greater success in his experimental manipulation than had, in fact, ever been 
dreamed of” (Hinton, 1972: 445).  
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 More recent work continues to generally support Adams’ version of equity theory as it 
applies to underreward.  Evidence from work-related studies has been augmented by the findings 
from studies of other relational contexts.  In a study of major league baseball players, Hauenstein 
and Lord (1989) found marginally significant support for the proposition that players who lost in 
the salary arbitration process (and who the authors asserted would feel underreward) would 
exhibit greater performance decrements in the season following arbitration than would players 
who won in arbitration (and should therefore feel overrewarded); that is, underrewarded players 
should reduce their inputs (and so play worse).  Results generally supported this hypothesis.  
Furthermore, in accordance with predictions from equity theory, in the case of “inexperienced” 
pitchers the performance decrement was related to the magnitude of the inequity; however, for 
experienced pitchers the degree of performance change was not related to the degree of inequity.  
For hitters there was also substantial support for the hypothesis concerning the relationship 
between performance decrements and degree of underreward.  In total, four of eight sub-groups 
manifested a significant relationship between magnitude of inequity and degree of performance 
decline.  
 In another study of arbitration cases in baseball, Bretz and Thomas (1992) likewise found 
that arbitration loss (representing underreward) had a negative effect on subsequent player 
performance.  The average arbitration loser exhibited a significantly larger decline in 
performance than arbitration winners (both groups were expected to regress to their historical 
mean performance levels after arbitration).  This seems to indicate that, for losers, a reduction of 
inputs was used to respond to the inequity.  Bretz and Thomas (1992), unlike Hauenstein and 
Lord (1989), did not find that the degree of performance decline was related to the magnitude of 
the underreward, which controverts the prediction of equity theory that the magnitude of 
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response to inequity depends on the degree of the inequity.  Bretz and Thomas (1992) also found 
significant differences between the proportions of arbitration winners and losers who left 
baseball, and a marginally significant difference between the two groups in terms of the 
proportion that changed teams: this result supports the position that underreward should be 
positively related to severance of relationships.  Fizel et al. (2002), in yet another baseball study, 
came to the conclusion that equity was a significant determinant of a player’s initial decision to 
file for arbitration. 
Greenberg (1990b) found that when employees had their pay temporarily reduced, they 
perceived underreward.  The perception of underreward led to increased theft among employees 
who did not receive a sufficient justification for the pay cut.  Other theft-related evidence of the 
impact of underreward comes from the work of Glass and Wood (1996), who, in a study of 
students, found that subjects’ intentions to pirate software for someone else was related to the 
price of the software.   
The effects of underreward inequity (relative to their three most important comparison 
others) on managers’ turnover intentions was investigated by Summers & Hendrix (1991).  They 
found that, though underreward inequity was not related to performance, it had an indirect effect 
on turnover intentions.  The relationship between inequity and turnover intentions was mediated 
by attitudinal variables such as pay and job satisfaction.   
Jannsen (2001) hypothesized that managers who perceived equity in their relationships 
with their organizations would exhibit higher levels of satisfaction and performance than those 
who perceived underreward.  Using a sample of 134 low- and mid-level managers from a Dutch 
food company, Jannsen (2001) found that there was a significant correlation between equity 
perceptions and supervisory satisfaction.  In a study of African-Americans, Perry (1993) also 
 84
found that perceptions of underreward with respect to pay were negatively related to pay 
satisfaction.  Studies by Sheehan (1991, 1993) investigated the effects of perceived underreward 
inequity that results when a coworker leaves the organization for a better job.  Results indicated 
that the underreward was negatively related to both job satisfaction and performance. 
Geurts et al. (1993), in a study of bus drivers, found that underreward led to increased 
conflict with supervisors and increased absenteeism.  However, supervisor conflict mediated the 
relationship between inequity and absenteeism; therefore, the authors concluded that absenteeism 
could not be seen as a direct attempt by the bus driver to restore equity.  
Studies of non-work relationships have also provided support for the postulates of equity 
theory regarding underreward.  Ingersoll-Dayton et al. (2003) reported that siblings who 
described an imbalance in responsibilities pertaining to care of a parent reported considerable 
distress.  In a study of couples where one of the individuals had cancer, Kuijer et al. (2001) 
found that those who felt underrewarded in their relationship were less satisfied with it than 
those who perceived equity or overreward.  However, underreward did not lead to dissatisfaction 
in the relationship when the cancer patient was quite impaired physically.  In another study 
involving cancer patients, Ybema et al., (2001), found that in couples where one person had 
cancer, the healthy partner was more likely to be depressed if she felt underrewarded in the 
relationship. Webster and Rice (1996) hypothesized that, in “traditional families” (i.e., where the 
husband is the breadwinner while the wife acts as homemaker), wives should perceive inequity 
after the husband retires, because his inputs are reduced while hers remain the same.  Therefore, 
the wife may seek to reduce the tension associated with this underreward by moving toward 
equality in decisionmaking.  Results indicated that decisionmaking concerning the purchase of 
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medium- and high-involvement products did become more egalitarian after the husband in a 
traditional family retired.  
2.2.6.3  Overreward.  Evidence concerning overreward has been substantially less conclusive 
than that concerning underreward (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Cosier & Dalton, 1983; 
Mowday, 1991; Walster et al., 1978).  According to Adams (1963, 1965), overreward should 
lead to perceptions of inequity, dissonance, and, finally, guilt, or what O’Malley and Davies 
(1984) refer to as “an empathic negative affective state.”  However, two distinct motivating 
forces – equity and self-interest – may compete in conditions of overreward (Brounstein et al., 
1980); thus, overreward may lead to a conflict between self-interest and guilt, and, if the 
overreward is not excessive, it may be justified because it is in the individual’s self-interest to do 
so (Kuijer et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2002): by reciprocating a high level of outcomes with a lower 
level of inputs, a person’s self-interest is promoted (Brounstein et al., 1980).  Thus, individuals in 
an overreward situation may cognitively adjust (e.g., re-evaluate the value of their inputs or 
outcomes) because it is less costly for them to do so than to increase their actual inputs or lower 
their actual outcomes (Walster et al., 1978; Wilkens & Timm, 1978).  As a result, overreward 
may not lead to behavioral attempts to restore equity.  This position has come to be known as the 
“maximum gain hypothesis” (Fossum & Moore, 1975).  Perhaps due to these conflicting 
motives, while the motivational effects of underreward have received relatively unambiguous 
support in laboratory and field studies (Cosier & Dalton, 1983), the empirical work concerning 
responses to overreward inequity has led to mixed results (Carrell & Dittrich, 1978; Mowday, 
1991; Walster et al., 1978).   
While Adams (1963) and others (e.g., Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962; Adams & Jacobsen, 
1964; Andrews, 1967; Friedman & Goodman, 1967; Goodman & Friedman, 1968; Lawler, 
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Koplin, Young, & Fadem, 1968) found the hypothesized effects of overreward (for example, in a 
piece-rate pay system, overreward led to increased quality of work, but a decreased quantity), 
their experimental protocol (which was adopted by numerous others) has been the subject of 
considerable criticism (Andrews & Valenzi, 1970; Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Carrell & 
Dittrich, 1978; Greenberg, 1990a; Hinton, 1972; Lawler, 1973; Pritchard, 1969; Pritchard et al., 
1972).  Many of these critics argue that Adams and his colleagues, in their attempts to induce 
perceptions of overreward, inadvertently manipulated other critical variables – specifically self-
esteem and job security – which led to the observed performance enhancement that Adams 
attributed to the overreward.  A typical instance of an attempt to induce a perception of 
overreward in early equity theory experiments was to inform the subject (who was to be paid at a 
particular rate for performing a given task) in a peremptory and cursory manner that they were 
not qualified to perform the required task, and would therefore be receiving more money than 
they were worth for performing it (Andrews & Valenzi, 1970; Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; 
Pritchard, 1969; Lawler, 1973).  The improvements in performance which often resulted can thus 
be interpreted in three ways: 1) as a response to a perception of overreward and the guilt that 
accompanies it (as postulated by Adams); 2) as an attempt by the subject, as a response to his 
threatened self-esteem, to prove to the experimenter and himself that he is, in fact, qualified to do 
the task; or 3) as an attempt by the subject to avoid getting fired, which he might perceive as 
likely, given his lack of qualifications (Andrews & Valenzi, 1970; Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; 
Lawler, 1968, 1973; Pritchard, 1969).  This third postulate conflicts with the work of Adams and 
Jacobsen (1964), who found that job insecurity did not influence subjects’ behavior; however, 
Lawler (1973) asserts that Adams and Jacobsen’s (1964) work does not represent an “ideal test” 
of the job insecurity postulate, and the above criticisms suggest that early studies (e.g., Adams, 
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1963; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964; Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962; Friedman & Goodman, 1968; 
Goodman & Friedman, 1968; Lawler et al., 1968) cannot be taken as clear evidence that 
overreward leads to dissonance and subsequent attempts to ameliorate the inequity, due to the 
possibility that their results are artifactual (Hinton, 1972).   
In support of the latter position, in an early study similar to the flawed ones mentioned 
above but designed in such a way as to avoid the manipulation of self-esteem and perceptions of 
job security, Andrews (1967) found that, in a piece rate system, overrewarded subjects produced 
less than equitably rewarded subjects (in accordance with equity theory).  However, the 
difference was not statistically significant, and most of the difference in production between the 
underrewarded subjects and the overrewarded ones was due to the underrewarded subjects 
producing more rather than overrewarded ones producing less, leading Pritchard (1969) to assert 
that Andrews’ (1967) data do not support equity theory’s predictions concerning overpayment. 
Due to the dubious evidence concerning the results of overreward, many researchers have 
questioned the degree to which it leads to perceptions of inequity by the one being overrewarded.  
Some suggest that overreward may be related to positive affective and behavioral outcomes, such 
as satisfaction, commitment, loyalty, compliance, and acquiescence (Chenet et al., 2000; 
Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987; Vogl-Bauer et al., 1999).  Others postulate that overreward 
inequity may be dealt with differently from underreward inequity - the “thresholds” for under- 
and overreward inequity may differ (Brounstein et al., 1980; Dansereau, Cashman, & Graen, 
1973; Greenberg, 1987; Leventhal, Weiss, & Long, 1969; Mowday, 1991; Pritchard & 
Campbell, 1976; Weick, 1966) or individuals may differ in their “sensitivities” to overreward 
(Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1985; Miles, et al., 1989).  As a result, individuals may be more 
tolerant of overreward than they are of underreward.   
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Adams (1965:282) himself asserted that 
 “…the threshold would be higher presumably in cases of overreward, for a certain 
amount of incongruity in these cases can be acceptably rationalized as ‘good fortune’ 
without attendant discomfort…”  
 
and Weick (1966), too, suggested that overreward might be viewed as the result of good luck.  In 
a similar vein, Campbell and Pritchard (1976) asserted that, at least in organizational settings, 
overreward may be tolerated unless the overrewarded party perceives that the overreward implies 
that he or she is treating someone else unfairly: people may typically believe that the 
organization does not feel it is being treated unfairly (or it would lower the person’s outcomes or 
increase his or her inputs).  Therefore, they will not strive to reduce overreward in such contexts.  
Others have suggested that overreward may not be perceived as inequity at all (Cosier & 
Dalton, 1983).  Locke (1976), for example, argues that employees who were being overpaid 
might see that restoring equity psychologically or cognitively is less costly than restoring actual 
equity: an overrewarded employee might rationalize the situation by adjusting her ideas of 
equitable payment rather than perceiving herself as being overrewarded and attempting to 
alleviate the inequity.  Thus, even if an overreward condition is successfully created, employees 
may cognitively adjust themselves to that overreward (Kilduff & Baker, 1984).  Likewise, 
Mowday (1991) posits that pay is a critical means for employees to derive information about the 
worth of their contributions; hence, overrewarded individuals may use outcomes they derive 
from a relationship as sources of information about the value of their contribution to the 
relationship, and an objectively overrewarded individual may therefore perceive his or her inputs 
to the relationship as very valuable, and so may not experience feelings of inequity; rather, the 
overreward will be seen as deserved (Brounstein et al., 1980; Weick, 1966).  For example, 
Martin and Peterson (1987) suggest that an overrewarded employee might cultivate feelings of 
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desert by using a historical wage as a comparison rather than looking to a lower-paid colleague 
as a referent.  This is consistent with Janssen’s (2001) position that in employee-employer 
relationships, employees are more likely to perceive underreward (and have more intense 
reactions to it) than overreward.   
Others have found that people vary in terms of “equity sensitivity” (Huseman et al., 
1985): at least some individuals are, in fact, more satisfied with relationships characterized by 
overreward than with equitable relationships (Hartman, Villere, & Fok, 1995; Miles et al., 1989), 
and may strive to maintain overreward inequity (Brounstein et al., 1980).  For example, Watson 
et al. (1996) found that overreward relative to a comparison income level resulted in significantly 
higher job satisfaction.  If overreward is seen as desirable, it will not result in tension, and 
therefore will not result in motivation to rectify the overreward (Cosier & Dalton, 1983).  
Accordingly, Akerlof & Yellen (1990) state that people will work less hard if they are 
underrewarded, but will not work harder if they are overrewarded. 
Substantial empirical evidence corroborates the position that overreward may be better 
tolerated than underreward.  Greenberg (1987), in his study of 192 undergraduates, found that 
distributions of rewards that provided higher outcomes to the self tended to be perceived as fairer 
than distributions that provided them with lower outcomes.  Similarly, Greenberg (1983) showed 
that subjects perceived as fair those outcome distributions that benefited themselves.  Greenberg 
(1988), in a study where office reassignment created conditions of overreward and underreward, 
found that the performance of those who moved to higher status offices increased to a lesser 
degree than the performance decreases exhibited by those who were moved to lower status 
offices.  Likewise, in that study, significantly lower levels of satisfaction were exhibited by some 
underrewarded individuals, but not by overrewarded ones.   
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, Vogl-Bauer et al. (1999), in a study of parent-adolescent dyads, 
found that adolescents are actually more satisfied when they are overrewarded in their 
relationship with a parent than when that relationship is characterized by equity.  Lapidus and 
Pinkerton (1995) found that subjects in their inequitable, high outcome condition did not 
experience significantly more guilt than others, and in a study of couples where one party to the 
relationship had cancer, Kuijer et al., (2001) found that being overrewarded did not lead to 
reductions in satisfaction over being in a situation of equity.   
In a study of Finnish workers, Taris et al. (2002) found that overrewarded subjects 
experienced less emotional exhaustion, cynicism, and health complaints (symptoms of 
dissonance) than their underrewarded counterparts.  On four of the five dependent variables 
tested (emotional exhaustion, cynicism, lack of efficacy, and health complaints), there was no 
significant difference between overrewarded and equitably treated participants.  Only measures 
of sickness absence were consistent with the initial formulation of equity theory, with equitably 
treated subjects evincing less than either overrewarded or underrewarded subjects.  Thus, they 
concluded that the relationship between equity and health-related effects of inequity is J-shaped, 
rather than U-shaped as asserted by early formulations of equity theory: if indeed overrewarded 
individuals felt stress (which they may not have), they appeared to be able to deal with it.  Many 
other authors similarly report weaker effects of overreward on dissonance (e.g., Anderson & 
Shelly, 1970; Perry, 1993; Valenzi & Andrews, 1971).  
Culture seems to moderate responses to the perception of overreward.  VanYperen & 
Buunk (1991), in their study of subjects from the U.S. and the Netherlands, found that for 
American subjects overreward resulted in reduced relationship satisfaction, while for subjects 
from the Netherlands overreward increased relationship satisfaction beyond the satisfaction 
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associated with equity, though culture’s relationship with tolerance for overreward was 
moderated by communal orientation: those high in communal orientation did not feel guilty in 
overreward conditions.  Scheer et al. (2003) hypothesized that in achievement-oriented, 
competitive cultures, overreward would be more tolerable than in more egalitarian, 
cooperatively-oriented cultures.  In the former cultures, overreward would be seen as a validation 
of one’s competencies and value, and would not be a source of guilt.  They found that, contrary 
to the results of VanYperen and Buunk (1991), Dutch subjects were more likely to have negative 
responses to both overreward and underreward, whereas U.S. subjects did not necessarily 
respond negatively to overreward.   
Some researchers have found that overreward inequity does result in some of the 
outcomes expected by Adams.  For example, Pritchard et al. (1972) found that when inequity 
perceptions were elicited by changing a pay system at the halfway point of a week’s work, 
overreward (as well as underreward) resulted in less satisfaction than did equity.  Hauenstein and 
Lord (1989), in their study of baseball players, found that players that won in salary arbitration 
proceedings (and who they stated should therefore feel overrewarded), consistent with Adams’ 
position, exhibited improved performance after arbitration.   
Likewise, Van Dierendonck et al. (2001) found that among human service professionals, 
overreward resulted in emotional exhaustion even more than did equity or underreward, leading 
them to suggest that perceptions of advantage might be even more stressful than perceptions of 
relative deprivation.  Van Dierendonck et al. (1996) similarly found that human service 
professionals who perceived overreward in their relationships with service recipients exhibited 
more emotional exhaustion than those who perceived equity in their relationships.   
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Levine (1993) looked at wage residuals (which compare employees’ relative wages based 
on demographic, education, and training variables) for 8,000 employees.  Employees with high 
wage residuals (and who should, therefore, feel overrewarded) were willing to work harder than 
they had to, were less likely to quit and more satisfied with their pay, and were more committed 
to the organization. 
Brockner et al. (1988) contended that layoffs would inspire guilt in those who remained 
with the organization, as they would perceive themselves as overrewarded (assuming they 
thought there was at least a chance that they could have been laid off themselves).  In an 
experiment employing undergraduate psychology and management students, an experimental 
confederate was fired part way through the experiment, either randomly or (ostensibly) based on 
merit (or lack thereof).  “Survivor” subjects reported overreward and guilt.  In a very similar 
experiment, Brockner, Davy, and Carter (1985) also tested the hypothesis that surviving a firing 
would lead to perceptions of overreward and feelings of guilt.  As in the work of Brockner et al. 
(1988), an experimental confederate was fired part way through a task (while in a control group, 
no dismissal occurred).  Results indicated that subjects in the layoff condition experienced more 
guilt and subsequently increased the quantity of their work.   
 Carr, McLoughlin, Hodgson, and MacLachlan (1996) found that Australian employees 
who were overrewarded with respect to others in their occupation were less satisfied than those 
who perceived equity with respect to their pay.  
Finally, in a study of relationships involving cancer patients and their partners, patients 
who perceived overreward in the relationship exhibited more symptoms of depression than did 
those who perceived equity in their relationships (Ybema et al., 2001). 
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2.2.6.4  Equity and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors.  Some recent work has looked at 
the effects of equity perceptions on organizational citizenship behaviors – discretionary 
behaviors that are not within the employee’s job description.  Such behaviors can be regarded as 
a specific instance of the more general concept of “prosocial” or “helping” behaviors, and, in any 
relationship, a party can be seen as going “beyond the call of duty,” exceeding the expectations 
of the other party.  Employees can adjust organizational citizenship behaviors in order to 
maintain equity without having an effect on variables such as salary, because they are not a 
necessary condition for employment (Harder, 1991).  Moorman (1991) found that supervisors’ 
ratings of employees’ organizational citizenship behaviors varied with employees’ perceptions of 
interactional justice in the organization, while Niehoff and Moorman (1993) found that such 
behaviors varied with subjects’ perceptions of procedural fairness.  Meanwhile, Deluga (1994) 
found that employees’ organizational citizenship behaviors were related to their perceptions of 
the fairness of their supervisor.   
 
2.2.6.5  Moderators of Responses to Inequity.  As noted, not all inequity leads to action taken 
to eliminate it (Cosier & Dalton, 1983; Weick, 1966).  More recent theoretical and empirical 
work in equity theory has suggested that reactions to inequity are moderated by a variety of 
individual-level and interpersonal variables (Griffeth et al., 1989), including, but not limited to, 
exchange orientation (Buunk & VanYperen, 1991), nationality (Vanyperen & Buunk, 1991), 
type of relationship (Wagstaff, Huggins, & Perfect, 1993), attraction to the comparison other 
(Griffeth et al., 1989), attribution of the cause of inequity (Holmes & Levinger, 1994), resource 
dependence, the costs of reaction, gender, and mood or dispositional variables.  In the interests of 
brevity, I have summarized the literature concerning most of the moderators of responses to 
inequity in Appendix A.  (One critical moderator, equity sensitivity, is discussed at greater length 
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below.)  The appendix comprises the potential moderators, arguments concerning why they may 
act as moderators, and applicable empirical data.   
2.2.7  Equity Sensitivity   
A substantial problem with early equity theory research was that it did not incorporate individual 
differences into its predictions (Brockner, O’Malley, Hite, & Davies, 1987; Huseman et al., 
1987; Miles et al, 1994; Opsahl & Dunnette, 1966; Pritchard, 1969; Vecchio, 1981; Walster et 
al., 1978; Weick, 1966).  Early work focused so much on contextual variables that researchers 
were led to “almost totally disregard the impact that personality variables may have on 
perceptions of equity” (Hochwarter, Stepina, & Perrewe, 1996: 458).  As Opsahl and Dunnette 
(1966: 113) put it,  “…there are distinct differences in the way different kinds of people respond 
to feelings of inequity.  The incorporation of such variables into (equity) theory may increase its 
explanatory power.  As it stands, the theory ignores individual differences.”  Similarly, Lawler 
and O’Gara (1967: 410) suggested that when it “comes to understanding the role of personality 
and the importance of outcomes, it appears that further elaboration is needed if the theory is to 
handle individual differences in reactions to an inequity situation.”   
Miner (1980) and Mowday (1991) averred that equity theory could not be considered a 
universal theory of human motivation unless it could account for observed differences in 
reactions to inequity.  As a result, many authors called for the incorporation of individual 
differences into equity theory (e.g., Greenberg, 1979; Larwood, Levine, Shaw, & Hurwitz, 1979; 
Lawler & O’Gara, 1967; Major & Deaux, 1982; Miner, 1980; Mowday, 1991).  One response to 
this criticism, and a key refinement of the original version of equity theory, came in the form of 
the “equity sensitivity” construct, first developed by Huseman et al. (1987), which represents a 
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parsimonious means to incorporate into equity theory a wide variety of personality variables that 
can moderate responses to inequity.   
Proponents of equity sensitivity as an influence on responses to inequity note that the 
“distress prediction” of equity theory – that is, the proposition that the greater the perceived 
inequity in a relationship, the more distress that will be felt by the perceiver – assumes that all 
individuals are equally sensitive to equity.  Under this assumption, all individuals will prefer 
relationships with equal outcome/input ratios.  However, some research into reactions to inequity 
suggests that there are exceptions to the rule that inequity leads to distress: for example, 
demographic (Weick, Bougon, & Maruyama, 1976) and personality (Greenberg, 1979) variables 
seem to have an impact on the degree of distress associated with perceptions of inequity.  
Therefore, equity sensitivity researchers posit that people differ in their sensitivities to inequity 
such that some will tolerate inequity, and, indeed, some individuals may prefer inequity to equity 
(Parnell & Sullivan, 1992).  This position is consistent with those of Adams (1965), and others 
(e.g., Mowday, 1991), who submit that “thresholds” for inequity may vary across individuals, 
and is also consistent with the research that suggests that individuals react differently to inequity 
(Major & Deaux, 1982) and that not all allocators of rewards follow norms of equity (Greenberg, 
1978; Shapiro, 1975). 
The acknowledgment of equity sensitivity has increased the predictive utility and 
explanatory power of equity theory by highlighting individual differences in the way people 
react to inequity in relationships (Allen & White, 2002; Bing & Burroughs, 2001; Kickul & 
Lester, 2001; King & Miles, 1994; King, Miles, & Day, 1993; Mueller & Clarke, 1998; O’Neill 
& Mone, 1998), and appears to help explain conflicting results in some studies of reaction to 
inequity (Fok, Hartman, Patti, & Razek, 2000).  Differences in equity sensitivity may determine 
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whether or not the distress or tension identified by Adams as resulting from inequitable situations 
does indeed manifest itself, and thereby explain why some people do not react as predicted when 
confronted with inequity; that is, why they are not sufficiently motivated to act to reestablish 
equity in inequitable contexts.  Such individual differences may be based on psychology (Major 
& Deaux, 1982), gender (Austin & McGinn, 1977), or culture (Fok et al., 1996), among other 
things.  Individual differences such as these appear to manifest themselves through differential 
degrees of equity sensitivity.   
2.2.7.1  Equity Sensitivity “Types.”  In short, equity sensitive advocates propose that 
individuals react differently to perceived equity and inequity due to differences in preferences, 
and that these differential reactions are consistent over time.  Huseman et al. (1987) propose that 
there are three basic classes of individuals: benevolents, equity sensitives, and entitleds.  
Benevolents prefer their O/I ratio to be lower than that of the others in their exchange 
relationships, equity sensitives prefer their O/I ratio to be equal to the O/I ratios of others with 
whom they have exchange relationships, while entitleds prefer their O/I ratio to be higher than 
that those of others with whom they have exchange relationships.  Equity sensitivity can thus be 
viewed as a continuum, with entitleds at one end, benevolents at the other, and equity sensitives 
in-between (Mueller & Clarke, 1998).  Based on this typology, only equity sensitives should 
behave in strict accordance with equity theory as formulated by Adams (1963; 1965).  
Benevolents and entitleds will not necessarily behave as posited by Adams (Patrick & Jackson, 
1991).   
2.2.7.2  Benevolents.  Benevolents are, at least on the surface, altruists, as they have a 
heightened tendency to give without expecting anything in return (Huseman et al., 1987), and 
derive contentment from knowing they have made a valuable contribution to a relationship rather 
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than from receiving valuable outcomes from it (Wheeler, 2001).  They want to contribute more 
than they receive (Parnell & Sullivan, 1992), and are prepared to “cooperate and contribute” in 
relationships (Bing & Burroughs, 2001).  They focus on inputs to a relationship rather than 
outcomes, and on the relationship dimension of the exchange (Huseman, et al., 1985; Kickul & 
Lester, 2001), such that, to them, the relationship itself is regarded as a valuable outcome (King 
& Hinson, 1994).  Intangible, relationship based outcomes (e.g., friendship) are regarded as more 
important than tangible ones such as pay (Bing & Burroughs, 2001).   
Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman (1989) suggest that the traits of benevolents could have their 
source in a Calvinistic heritage (which promotes a personal philosophy of high personal inputs 
without regard for outcomes) (Weick et al., 1976), empathic arousal (which motivates 
individuals to act altruistically), or “disguised self-interest” (King et al., 1993; Merton, Merton, 
& Barber, 1983).  In the latter case, the benevolent acts in an altruistic manner in order to 
manage impressions (Sauley & Bedeian, 2000), gain social approval, or enhance his self-image.  
Whatever the derivation of the benevolent’s preferences, he will tend to feel distress when 
confronted with either equity or overreward in relationships.   
While the original definition of a benevolent, depicted in Table 2.2, was that of an 
individual who preferred her O/I ratio to be lower than that of her comparison others, some later 
researchers suggest that benevolents, rather than preferring underreward, are simply more 
tolerant of it (King et al., 1993).  For example, Miles et al. (1989) found that benevolents had a 
lower preference only for tangible outcomes, not intangible ones.  In any case, a benevolent 
should be more satisfied than others in an underrewarding relationship (Huseman et al,. 1987) or 
a relationship where his inputs are high (Miles et al., 1989).  Thus, benevolents are less likely to 
respond (at least, overtly) when they are underrewarded (Allen & White, 2002): contrariwise, 
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being on the “receiving end” of a social exchange will be anathema to such a person (O’Neill 
and Mone, 1998).  
    
Table 2.2: Preferences of Equity Sensitivity “Types” 
 
Benevolents:   O/I (person) < O/I (other) 
Equity Sensitives:  O/I (person) = O/I (other) 
Entitleds:   O/I (person) > O/I (other) 
 
2.2.7.3  Equity Sensitives.  Equity sensitives are those individuals who prefer equity to inequity, 
and who therefore conform to equity theory as originally presented by Adams (1963; 1965).  
They adhere to the norm of equity, and feel tension when faced with either underreward or 
overreward in a relationship.  They will strive to reduce the inequity in the relationship in order 
to alleviate this tension.  The behavior of equity sensitives has been discussed at length in the 
sections concerning responses to inequity.    
 
2.2.7.4  Entitleds.  Entitleds have a high threshold for overreward and any guilt associated with 
it (Huseman et al., 1987; Miles et al., 1989).  For entitleds, satisfaction and receipt of rewards are 
positively and linearly related (King & Hinson, 1994): the more they can get out of a 
relationship, the better they like it.  They experience less dissonance than others when they are 
overrewarded, and are more dissatisfied and more likely to act when they are underrewarded 
(Allen & White, 2002).  They are also expected to be dissatisfied with equity (O’Neill & Mone, 
1998).  They can have a tendency to exploit and manipulate others, and put them into their 
service.  Some entitleds feel they should receive more than they contribute simply because of 
who they are (Parnell & Sullivan, 1992), and they may use strategies such as shyness, charm, 
temper, or intimidation to get their way (Patrick & Jackson, 1991).  They prefer to receive than 
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to give (Wheeler, 2001), and focus on outcomes from a relationship rather than inputs to it 
(Kickul & Lester, 2001; King & Hinson, 1994; Miles et al., 1994).  Tangible outcomes such as 
pay are typically their focus, while intangible ones, such as friendship, are discounted (Bing & 
Burroughs, 2001).  They tend to exhibit low social responsibility, and sacrifice work ethic in 
order to achieve personal gains (Mudrack, Mason, & Stepanski, 1999).  Parnell & Sullivan 
(1992) characterize them as “greedy.”  Huseman et al. (1987) speculate that an entitled 
orientation may stem from post-World War II cultural values, overly permissive child-rearing, or 
our “age of anxiety,” which leads one to get what he can before “trouble” arises.   
2.2.7.5  Influences of Equity Sensitivity.  Huseman et al. (1987) posit that equity sensitivity 
moderates the relationship between equity/inequity and organizational outcomes such as job 
satisfaction, quantity of work, quality of work, absenteeism, and turnover.  While they suspect 
that equity sensitivity is a trait, they do not defend this position beyond referring to the relatively 
stable nature of values.  Thus, it is unclear whether equity sensitivity is a relatively stable trait or 
a transitory one, and it is not clear whether a person’s equity sensitivity will be consistent across 
time and situations.  Huseman et al. (1987) note that it seems possible that individuals exhibit 
different equity sensitivities in different types of relationships.  For example, a person might 
exhibit entitled tendencies in his relationship with his employer, but exhibit benevolent 
tendencies in his relationships with family members.  Thus, the type of relationship may act as a 
determinant of the degree of equity sensitivity a person displays in a given situation.  
As noted earlier, some equity researchers are troubled by the ambiguity which surrounds 
the concepts of inputs and outcomes (Pritchard, 1969; Campbell & Pritchard, 1976).  
Specifically, what one regards as an input, another might regard as an outcome.  For example, an 
employee that likes challenges might view added decision-making responsibilities as an 
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outcome, whereas another employee might view the acceptance of such responsibilities as an 
additional input.  Huseman et al., (1987) suggest that equity sensitivity may act as a determinant 
of how such ambiguous job elements are regarded.  They suggest that benevolents will be more 
likely to regard ambiguous job elements as outcomes, whereas entitleds will tend to regard them 
as inputs.  Furthermore, entitleds might simultaneously regard such job elements as inputs for 
themselves, but outcomes to others. 
2.2.7.6  Evidence Concerning Equity Sensitivity.  A substantial number of empirical studies 
have investigated equity sensitivity.  Empirical work has typically (though not universally) 
supported the concept (King & Hinson, 1994).  It appears that equity sensitivity is indeed an 
important moderator of responses to inequity, and it seems to be a relevant predictor of a host of 
individual-level preferences related to equity theory, such as level of inputs into a relationship, 
and O/I ratio.  It has also been found useful in the prediction of satisfaction with outcomes and 
preference for extrinsic versus intrinsic outcomes.  Empirical studies concerning equity 
sensitivity are summarized in Appendix B.   
2.2.8  Summary of Equity Theory 
Based on the existing literature concerning equity theory, it appears that perceptions of equity or 
inequity are a critical determinant of motivation.  There is strong evidence that underreward in 
relationships leads to dissatisfaction and attempts to resolve the inequity.  Evidence concerning 
underreward is much more equivocal, with some results indicating that overreward does lead to 
dissatisfaction with relationships in the ways proposed by Adams (1963, 1965), while other 
results suggest that overreward may be tolerated to a substantial degree or may even represent a 
source of satisfaction.  Empirical work also indicates the existence of a wide variety of 
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moderators of responses to inequity, many of which are captured in the concept of equity 
sensitivity.   
 
2.3  EXPECTANCY THEORY 
2.3.1  Background 
Expectancy theory has been called “perhaps the most widely accepted theory of work and 
motivation” (Wahba & House, 1974: 121) and the “dominant paradigm” for workplace 
motivation research (Connoly, 1976).  In basic terms, expectancy theory posits that people’s 
behavior results from their expectations about the consequences of their actions.   
Psychologists have a long history of analyzing actions using expectations and subjective 
values (Feather, 1992b).  Early work of Lewin (1938), Tolman (1959), Rotter (1955) and others 
converged into an approach to motivation in industrial and organizational psychology that came 
to be called “expectancy theory,” though it is also sometimes referred to as “VIE theory” (for 
Valence, Instrumentality, and Expectancy Theory) or “expectancy X valence theory.”  Like 
equity theory, expectancy theory is a process theory of motivation, in that it focuses on “classes 
of motivational constructs and the manner in which they interact as opposed to detailing the 
specific outcomes or needs that presumably motivate behavior” (Oliver, 1974: 244).  It is also 
like equity theory in that it focuses on individuals’ perceptions.  However, rather than 
concentrating on perceptions of fairness, expectancy theory states that motivation comes from 
perceptions of one’s likelihood of achieving or obtaining specific outcomes, and the values, or 
“valences,” one ascribes to those outcomes (House, Shapiro, & Wahba, 1974; Reinharth & 
Wahba, 1975).  In short, a person will be motivated if: 1) effort expenditure will lead to 
successful performance of an activity, task, or behavior, 2) successful performance of that 
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activity, task, or behavior will lead to a specific outcome or outcomes for the person, and 3) the 
outcome or outcomes are valued by the person.  Pay has been the most frequently investigated 
outcome in expectancy research, however some (e.g., Oliver, 1974) argue that there is no 
evidence that pay is the most important motivator, even in work settings.  Outcomes can be 
psychological (e.g., satisfaction with a job well-done, a sense of camaraderie) as well as tangible 
(Oliver, 1974). 
Lewin (1938) asserted that people have cognitive expectancies concerning the outcomes 
that are likely to occur as a result of their actions, and have preferences among various potential 
outcomes.  The work of Lewin was followed by the development by others of other theories of 
motivation that included the concepts of valence – the attractiveness or importance of an 
outcome – and expectancy – the likelihood that a given action will lead to a certain outcome or 
goal (Lawler, 1994).  These theories typically see expectancy and valence as combining 
multiplicitavely to determine motivation.  They include work by Edwards (1954) (subjective 
probability x utility), Atkinson (1958) (expectancy x (motive x incentive)), Rotter (1955), 
(expectancy, reinforcement, value), and Vroom (1964) (expectancy x (instrumentality x 
valence)).  It was the work by Vroom (1964) that brought expectancy theory to the forefront of 
motivation theory.   
The roots of expectancy theory lie in the principle of hedonism (Atkinson, 1964; Isaac, 
Zerbe, & Pitt, 2001; Reinharth & Wahba, 1975), which can be traced back to Greek 
philosophers, and was the principle underlying the utilitarian ethics of Bentham and Mill 
(Vroom, 1964).  Hedonism assumes that people will behave in order to recieve pleasure and/or 
avoid pain (Lawler, 1994).  Likewise, in exepectancy theory, behavior is seen as being motivated 
by a desire to maximize certain outcomes (e.g., rewards, satisfiers, positive reinforcements) and 
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minimize others (e.g., punishments, dissatisfiers, negative reinforcements) (Isaac et al., 2001; 
Vroom, 1964).   
Reinharth and Wahba (1975) aver that the cognitive assumptions of expectancy theory 
limit its explanations to the rational portion of human behavior. The rationality described in 
expectancy theory, though, may only be perceived by the actor: people perceive connections 
between certain behaviors and their goals, and behave in order to achieve those goals; however, 
their perceptions may be erroneous.  Feather (1992b) asserts, therefore, that that seeing 
expectancy theory as strictly based in rational self-interest represents an oversimplification of the 
model, since the model allows for the effects of affect-related variables, among others.  Lawler 
(1994), too, notes the distinction between expectancy theorists’ view of rationality and the 
concept of “economic man,” who has full information concerning alternatives and their 
outcomes, unlimited information processing capabilities, and clear preferences between 
outcomes, and will therefore make optimal decisions that will appear rational to outside 
observers.  Lawler (1994) accepts Simon’s (1957) view of people as bounded in their rationality, 
tending toward satisficing rather than optimizing behavior, unable to consider all the outcomes of 
their behaviors, and prone to distortions of perception.  They make decisions that are not optimal, 
and while these decisions may be “rational” to the actor based on his perceptions, they may not 
appear to be so from the point of view of an objective observer, because the observer may have 
different perceptions of, for example, alternatives, valences, or expectancies, or may be easier or 
more difficult to satisfy.  Lawler’s (1994) position, then, is that expectancy theory is based on 
“intended” rationality from the point of view of the actor rather than the rationality associated 
with economic man.   
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Though early results indicated that the relationship between expectancy variables and job 
performance was weak, leading some to be dismissive of expectancy theory, key proponents of 
expectancy theory did not in fact assert that there should be a strong relationship between these 
constructs, given the existence of mediator variables such as skills and ability (Lawler, 1973; 
Vroom, 1964).  Furthermore, each of the components of expectancy theory has been confirmed 
to have a positive influence on motivation (Fudge & Schlacter, 1999).     
In the decades since its initial development, expectancy theory has been “subjected to 
rigorous academic testing and has been shown to have strong support” (Fudge & Schlacter, 
1999: 296).  Expectancy theory has been applied to an astonishing variety of topics.  Researchers 
have employed it to investigate, among other things, job satisfaction of a wide variety of groups 
(Miller & Grush, 1988; Pool, 1997), job effort and performance (Galbraith & Cummings, 1967; 
Graen, 1969; Hackman & Porter, 1968; Mastrofski, Ritti, & Snipes, 1994), job turnover,  
occupational choice of student nurses, accountants, and others (Brooks & Betz, 1990; Miller & 
Grush, 1988; Mitchell & Beach, 1976), pay system effectiveness (Kraizberg, Tziner, & 
Weisberg, 2002; Lawler, 1973), student motivation (Campbell, Baronina, & Reider, 2003; 
Harrell, Caldwell, & Doty, 1985; Geiger, Cooper, Hussain, O’Connell, Power, Raghunandan, 
Rama, & Sanchez, 1998), training effectiveness (Mathieu, Tannenbaum, & Salas, 1992), 
professional obsolescence (Harel & Conen, 1982), technology use (Snead & Harrell, 1994), 
anxiety pathology (Schmidt, Lerew, & Joiner, 1998), social investment decisions (Fry, 1975), 
social loafing (Shepperd & Taylor, 1999), budgeting (Ronen & Livingstone, 1975), incentives 
(Kraizberg et al., 2002), competitive retaliation (Chen & Miller, 1994), political advertising 
(Pfau, Parrott, & Lindquist, 1992), values (Feather, 1992a), drug and alcohol use (Stacy, 
Newcomb, & Bentler, 1991; Oei & Baldwin, 1994), unemployment (Feather, 1992b), free-
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ridership (Powers & Thompson, 1994), eating disorders (Hohlstein, Smith, & Atlas, 1998), 
children’s motivation (Xiang, McBride, & Guan, (2001), unethical behavior (Fudge & Schlacter, 
1999), underreporting by accountants (Lightner, Adams, & Lightner, 1982), and choice of 
sorority (Mastrofski et al., 1994), and has been applied to concepts such goal setting (Klein, 
1991; Mento, Locke, & Klein, 1992), leader-member exchange (Klein & Kim, 1998), 
decisionmaking, learning theory, social power, coalition formation, attitudes, and a variety of 
others (Reinharth & Wahba, 1975).   
Perhaps because Vroom’s (1964) theory was explicitly developed for organizational 
settings it has achieved, by far, the most popularity in organizational studies.  For this reason, I 
will deal with the work of Vroom (1964) and subsequent developments of his model – 
particularly those of Lawler (1973, 1994) – in my subsequent discussions of expectancy theory. 
2.3.2  Vroom’s Theory  
Vroom (1964) was the first to apply expectancy theory to the study of behavior in organizations 
(Mitchell, 1974; Sheridan, Slocum, & Richards, 1974).  Wahba and House (1974: 121) called 
Vroom’s (1964) book “perhaps the most widely accepted theory of work and motivation among 
today’s industrial and organizational psychologists.”  His theory describes the key components 
of expectancy theory: valence, instrumentality, and expectancy, and explains how their 
combination affects “motvational force.”  It hinges on the idea that employees are motivated by 
their perceptions concerning whether or not effort will lead to performance and performance will 
lead to rewards.  The key components of Vroom’s version of expectancy theory are outlined in 
the following sections. 
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2.3.2.1  Valence of Outcomes.  People have preferences among outcomes or states, what Vroom 
(1964: 15) calls “affective orientations toward particular outcomes.”  These affective orientations 
are the valences of those outcomes.  In other terms, the valence of an outcome is a representation 
of the anticipated satisfaction associated with the outcome, though it is common to interpret the 
term “valence” to refer to the “desirability” or “importance” of an outcome.  An outcome is 
positive in valence if the person prefers attaining the outcome to not attaining it, and negative in 
valence if the person prefers not attaining it to attaining it.  However, due to the perceptual 
nature of valences, in many cases a person may in fact derive very little satisfaction from the 
attainment of an outcome that was expected to be the source of very much satisfaction, or may 
initially attempt to avoid an outcome that is found to be very satisfying once it is obtained.  Thus, 
the valence of an outcome may differ substantially from the “value” of the outcome, the actual 
satisfaction derived from its attainment.   
Vroom (1964) does not specify in-depth why people value outcomes, nor what outcomes 
are likely to be valued.  In this sense, outcomes are “chosen” by the individual (Reinharth & 
Wahba, 1975), and which outcomes are valued can vary drastically across individuals.  In the 
literature, rewards that have been proffered as having high valences include pay, bonuses, 
promotion, and recognition, among others (Fudge & Schlacter, 1999); however, the valence of a 
given outcome can vary drastically across individuals (Isaac et al., 2001; Snead & Harrell, 1994), 
in part because a given outcome will satisfy – or fail to satisfy – different needs for different 
people (Lawler, 1973).  Valences can also vary over time (Isaac et al., 2001; Sheridan et al., 
1974), and across situations (Lawler & Porter, 1967).  They are derived in part from the 
environment, and in part from personal characteristics (Lawler, 1994) and values (Feather, 
1992b).  Perceptions of outcome valences can be developed through communication from others 
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concerning the desirability of the outcome, the “degree of motive arousal” or “need state” (e.g., 
the length of time one has gone without sleep) (Lewin, 1951), and the frequency with which the 
outcome has been associated with an established reward or punishment (Vroom, 1964).  For 
example, Kopelman and Thompson (1976) asserted that outcome preference could be seen as 
based on Maslow’s need hierarchy, with higher needs becoming more important as lower needs 
are met to a greater degree.  Campbell et al. (2003) found that, of three outcomes, student 
subjects tended to focus on one to the exclusion of others, which suggests that individuals may 
focus on a single high-valence outcome as a source of motivation, and may be only marginally 
motivated by other, lower-valence outcomes.   
2.3.2.2  Instrumentality.  Some outcomes, such as the completion of a certain task, may be 
regarded as positive or negative in valence even if the person does not perceive them to be 
intrinsically satisfying or dissatisfying – that is, satisfying in and of themselves.  In these cases, 
the valences of such outcomes are derived from the anticipated satisfaction associated with other 
outcomes, which are expected to result from attainment of the initial outcome.  For example, a 
person might strive to do a good job at work not because the work itself is satisfying, but because 
she expects that good work will lead to a pay raise.  Thus, “means acquire valence as a 
consequence of their expected relationship to ends” (Vroom, 1964: 16).   
For this reason, Vroom’s concept of valence has two components: 1) the anticipated 
satisfaction associated with an outcome (as noted above) and 2) the perceived “instrumentality” 
of the outcome – its usefulness in facilitating the attainment of one or various other outcomes.  
For example, if a behavioral outcome (such as the performance of a work-related task) is 
expected to lead to desired outcomes or prevent undesired ones, its valence will be heightened, 
while if it is perceived as leading to undesired outcomes or inhibiting the attainment of a desired 
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one, its valence will be reduced.  Thus, Vroom (1964) presents the valence of an outcome as a 
function as: 
             n  
V j = fj [Σ (VkIjk) (j=1…n), 
             k=1 
where Vj  is the valence of behavior j, Vk is the valence of outcome k, and Ijk is the perceived 
instrumentality of behavior j for the attainment of outcome k.  Instrumentality ranges in value 
from -1 (indicating that the second outcome is impossible without the first (behavioral) outcome 
and certain with it) to +1 (indicating that the first (behavioral) outcome is both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for the second outcome).  In other terms, instrumentality of an action is 
positive if performance of it results in attainment of an outcome, negative if it blocks attainment 
of the outcome, and zero if it has no effect on the attainment of the outcome. 
2.3.2.3  Expectancies.  Expectancies represent connections between effort and the successful 
achievement of an outcome (e.g., the accomplishment of a task or behavior), and are another part 
of what motivates individuals (Atkinson, 1958; Rotter, 1955; Tolman, 1959; Vroom, 1964).  An 
“expectancy” in Vroom’s theory is defined as “the belief concerning the likelihood that a 
particular act will be followed by a particular outcome” (Vroom, 1964: 17).  For example, a 
person considering undertaking a task will have perceptions concerning the likelihood that doing 
so will result in specific outcomes, such as the successful completion of the task.  Expectancies 
are perceptions, and so represent subjective rather than objective probabilities (Lawler & Porter, 
1967).   
The concept of expectancy takes into account the fact that outcomes attained by an 
individual are dependent not only on his or her choices and behaviors, but also on many factors 
which are not under the control of the person.  For example, whether or not one can complete a 
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given task is not dependent solely on her effort, but also on her ability and various environmental 
factors: there is uncertainty present due to various influences that could impede or facilitate her 
attempt to complete the task.   
Whereas instrumentality is seen by Vroom (1964) as ranging from -1 to +1, expectancy, 
as a subjective probability, ranges from zero to one.  Certainty that a particular act will be 
followed by a particular outcome represents maximum expectancy (an expectancy of 1), whereas 
certainty that a particular act will not be followed by a particular outcome represents minimum 
expectancy (an expectancy of 0).  In Vroom’s model, expectancy differs from the concept of 
instrumentality in that expectancy is an action-outcome relationship (i.e., it describes perceived 
relationships between actions and outcomes, such as successful task performance) whereas 
instrumentality is an outcome-outcome relationship (i.e., it describes perceived relationships 
between outcomes, such as that between successful task performance and other subsequent 
outcomes) (Vroom, 1964).  Vroom (1964) noted that expectancies can be influenced by the 
objective probability that i follows j, communication from others (e.g., feedback), and vicarious 
learning.  In general, though, as noted by Lawler (1994), expectancy theorists have not been 
particularly expansive in dealing with how expectancies are formed; however, as will be 
discussed in a subsequent section addressing his model, Lawler (1994) himself attempted to 
identify some of the key determinants.   
2.3.2.4  Motivational Force.  Valence and expectancy jointly determine what Vroom (1964) 
terms “motivational force,” which is the force on an individual to engage in a particular activity.  
Vroom (1964) posits that the force on a person to perform a given act is “a monotonically 
increasing function of the algebraic sum of the products of the valences of all outcomes and the 
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strength of his expectancies that the act will be followed by the attainment of these outcomes” 
(Vroom, 1964: 18).  Mathematically,  
Force = ∑ (Expectancy x Valence), or: 
 
          n 
Fi = [∑ (EijVj)] (i=n+1…m), 
        j=1  
 
Where Fi is the force to perform act i, Eij, is the strength of the expectancy that act i will be 
followed by outcome j, and Vj is the valence of outcome j. 
The force function is conceived as a product because both valence and expectancy are 
seen as necessary but not sufficient conditions for motivation: an outcome high in valence does 
not motivate if the expectancy that that outcome can be achieved is zero.  Conversely, an 
outcome that is certain to be accomplished (i.e., has a very high expectancy) does not motivate if 
one does not care whether or not the outcome is achieved (i.e., the outcome has a valence of 
zero).  Furthermore, since the expectancy by valence products for all outcomes are summed, a 
highly valent reward may not be sought if negatively valent outcomes are also associated with 
the behavior required to attain it; thus, for example, tying a highly valent outcome, such as pay, 
to good performance on the job may not motivate one to perform well if good performance is 
also associated with excessive fatigue or stress (Lawler, 1994).   
Vroom (1964) further asserts that when choosing between alternative acts, the one with 
the strongest positive (or weakest negative) force is the act that will be chosen.  For example, if 
pay increases and job security might potentially be achieved through negotiation as well as 
through unionization, the activity that will be undertaken is the one with the greater motivational 
force.  This criterion also holds for “non-acts.”  For example, if unionization has a strong 
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motivational force, but not unionizing has a greater force, attempts to unionize will be unlikely to 
occur. 
2.3.3  Developments of the Expectancy Model 
A number of writers after Vroom developed their own expectancy theories or further developed 
Vroom’s model (Graen, 1969; Lawler, 1973; Lawler & Porter, 1967; Porter & Lawler, 1968).  
Though Heneman and Schwab (1972) asserted that most of the variation in expectancy models 
has been due more to differences in terminology than to conceptual disagreements, some 
meaningful developments of the expectancy model did arise. 
Since Vroom’s work, there have been three key areas of development of expectancy 
theory: the differentiation between first-level outcomes (the level of performance associated with 
a given effort level) and second-level outcomes (the reward or penalty associated with the level 
of performance), the differentiation between intrinsic and extrinsic outcomes, and the inclusion 
of Expectancy 1 (or E-P expectancy) and Expectancy 2 (or P-O expectancy) as separate variables 
(House et al., 1974; Reinharth & Wahba, 1975; Wahba & House, 1974). 
2.3.3.1  First- and Second-Level Outcomes.  Galbraith and Cummings (1967) tested a 
distinction between first- and second- level outcomes, which had been suggested earlier by 
Vroom (1964) and Lawler and Porter (1967).  First-level outcomes result directly from behavior 
(e.g., performing at a certain level).  Their valences comes from their instrumentalities in 
obtaining second-level outcomes (e.g., pay, promotion, recognition), which have their own 
valences (and may have valences due to their instrumentality in obtaining other outcomes) 
(Lawler & Suttle, 1974).  According to Galbraith and Cummings (1967), 
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            n 
W = Σ(ΣI ijVj) 
           j=1 
 
W = effort; E = the expectancy that effort leads to performance; 
Iij = the instrumentality of performance for the attainment of second-level outcomes; 
Vj = the valence of the second-level outcome; 
n = the number of outcomes. 
 
This represents a combination of Vroom’s original effort and valence models.  Job effort is 
predicted from the expectancy that a certain level of effort leads to a given level of performance 
weighted by the valence of that performance level.  The valence of the performance level is 
determined by the degree to which it is perceived as instrumental for the attainment of second-
level outcomes, which are weighted by their valences.  The model was tested with only one first-
level outcome: performance.  This represented a simplification of the Vroom model, which did 
not restrict the number of first-level outcomes. 
   
 
 
 
E: Expectancy that effort will lead to first-level outcome (e.g., task completion) 
V: Valence of Outcome 
I: Instrumentality (i.e., perception that first outcome will lead to second-level outcome) 
 
Figure 2.2: The Galbraith and Cummings Model (adapted from Mitchell (1974)) 
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(Performance) 
Second-Level 
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Behavior 
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I
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2.3.3.2  Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Outcomes.  Early expectancy researchers have tended to 
focus on extrinsic outcomes; that is, those such as pay, recognition, or promotion, which are 
administered by others and are not directly associated with engaging in a given behavior (Isaac et 
al., 2001; Powers & Thompson, 1994).  However, later researchers noted that outcomes can be 
extrinsic or intrinsic. Intrinsic outcomes are those that motivate due to “subjectively 
administered” rewards: those psychological rewards associated with, for example, working on a 
task, completing a task, or performing well (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Graen, 1969; House, 
1971; Mastrofski et al., 1994; Naylor, Pritchard, & Ilgen, 1980; Porter & Lawler, 1968; Lawler 
& Hall, 1970; Ronen & Livingstone, 1975).  Indeed, some (e.g., Powers & Thompson, 1994) 
argue that one cannot be motivated to undertake an enterprise that is completely devoid of 
intrinsic value. 
In some versions of expectancy theory, both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards are seen as 
important (Fudge & Schlacter, 1999).  For example, an expectancy model developed by House 
(1971) incorporates the distinction between the valences associated with intrinsic and extrinsic 
outcomes.  In House’s formulation: 
                                  n 
M = IVb + P1 (IVa + ∑ P2i EVi), i = 1,2,…, n 
                                 i=1 
where 
 
M = motivation to work 
IVa = intrinsic valence associated with successful task performance 
IVb = intrinsic valence associated with goal-directed behavior 
EVi = extrinsic valences associated with the ith extrinsic reward contingent upon work- 
          goal accomplishment 
P1 = the expectancy that goal-directed behavior will accomplish the work-goal 
P2i = the expectancy that work-goal accomplishment will lead to the ith extrinsic reward 
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Graen (1969) classified the outcomes of meeting or not meeting the standards for specific 
work roles into three classes: intrinsic, internally generated consequences that the individual 
bestows upon herself if she achieves the standard (e.g., a sense of achievement) and extrinsic, 
externally mediated outcomes of two types – those provided by a person in power such as a 
supervisor, and those that are specified by the organization or the culture (e.g., pay) (Porter & 
Lawler, 1968).  A factor analysis by Lawler and Suttle (1974) indicated that people do, in fact, 
distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic outcomes.     
Some (e.g., Ronen & Livingstone, 1975) argue that intrinsically valent outcomes are 
more motivating than extrinsic ones, because for intrinsic outcomes the behavior leads directly to 
satisfaction, whereas extrinsically valent outcomes are contingent on others.  Support for this 
position comes from Tyagi (1985), who found that intrinsic motivation had a larger effect on 
performance than did extrinsic motivation, and Mitchell (1974), who reported that studies that 
test both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation found that intrinsic outcomes are better predictors of 
satisfaction and performance.  On the other hand, Oliver (1974) suggests that intrinsic outcomes 
are “motivationally dysfunctional,” and argues that psychological needs have been 
overemphasized in the expectancy literature.  The same author (1974) found that some extrinsic 
outcomes were useful in predicting performance, but intrinsic outcomes were not.   
Kanungo and Hartwick (1987) disagree with the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction.  First, they 
point out that there is variation in the definitions of “intrinsic” and “extrinsic:” two common 
definitions coexist in the literature.  The first definition is distinguished by its focus on the 
relation between the activity and the reward: intrinsic rewards are derived from the inherent 
nature of the task, while extrinsic rewards are external to or separate from the task.  The second 
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definition focuses on the entity that administers the reward: intrinsic rewards are “self-
administered” whereas extrinsic rewards are administered by others.   
There does appear to be some disagreement among researchers concerning the 
appropriate definitions of the aforementioned terms.  For example, Dyer and Parker (1975) asked 
members of a division of the American Psychological Association to provide definitions of 
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.  They found that 47% used the first definition, while 29% used 
the second.  Furthermore, when asked to categorize various rewards as intrinsic or extrinsic, only 
one third of the rewards were classified as either intrinsic or extrinsic by more than 75% of 
respondents.  Kanungo and Hartwick (1987), in an investigation of white-collar workers, found 
that even when respondents were provided with detailed definitions, there was considerable 
disagreement on whether a reward was intrinsic or extrinsic.  When the first definition was 
employed, only 3 out of the 48 rewards they listed were categorized as either intrinsic or 
extrinsic by more than 75% of respondents.  Results were somewhat better when the second 
definition was employed; however, still only 22 out of the 48 rewards were classified as either 
intrinsic or extrinsic by more than 75% of respondents.  Kanungo and Hartwick (1987: 756) 
concluded, “Overall…, there does not seem to be a high degree of agreement among our 
respondents as they attempt to classify work rewards according to each of the definitional 
distinctions.”  They therefore assert that the intrinsic-extrinsic construct is seriously flawed, and 
suggest that it be dropped from work in expectancy theory.  Nonetheless, there does seem to be 
substantial face validity associated with the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, 
with the result that the dichotomy is maintained in some of the literature.     
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2.3.3.3  E-P and P-O Expectancies.  Further modification of the expectancy model came from 
Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and Weick (1970).  They distinguished between external task goals 
(set by the employer or work group) and internal task goals (which the individual sets for 
himself).  Furthermore, they differentiated between two separate expectancies: EI and EII.  EI is 
the expectancy that behavior (i.e., effort) will lead to task goals: this concept is the same as 
expectancy in Vroom’s (1964) theory, and came to be known as “effort-performance 
expectancy,” or E-P expectancy.  EII is the expectancy that task goals will lead to rewards (i.e., 
valued second-level outcomes): this came to be known in later work as “performance-outcome 
expectancy,” or P-O expectancy.  P-O expectancy is roughly analogous to Vroom’s (1964) 
concept of instrumentality.  Though Vroom (1964) stated that instrumentality ranges from -1 to 
+1, most empirical tests of his theory treated instrumentality as a probability (Mitchell, 1974; 
Reinharth & Wahba, 1975), which is what EII represents.  This eventually led to the widespread 
adoption of EII (P-O expectancy) as a replacement for the instrumentality component of 
Vroom’s (1964) model.  Most expectancy researchers today equate instrumentality with P-O 
expectancy (e.g., Fudge & Schlacter, 1999; Isaac et al., 2001).   
Some researchers (e.g., Lawler & Porter, 1967) collapse EI and EII into one “effort-
reward” expectancy, which represents the subjective perception of the likelihood that desired 
rewards will follow from certain effort levels: this has been a common approach in empirical 
work (Mitchell, 1974). 
2.3.4  Lawler’s Expectancy Model 
Lawler (1973, 1994) developed an expectancy model that attempted to overcome criticisms of 
Vroom’s model and incorporate various developments of the model into expectancy theory.  His 
model can be seen as a culmination of the developments in expectancy theory that followed 
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Vroom’s (1964) initial forays into the topic.  Lawler’s model regards motivation as a function of 
the perceived likelihood that effort toward a behavioral or task goal will lead to the successful 
accomplishment of that goal (E-P expectancy), the likelihood that the successful accomplishment 
of the behavior goal will result in the securing of outcomes or rewards (P-O expectancy), and the 
valence of these outcomes or rewards (V).  An adaptation of Lawler’s (1994) model is presented 
in Figure 2.3.  Heneman and Schwab (1972) report general support for the Lawler model in a 
review of nine studies.   
 
 
Performance A: The intended performance.  A successful result from effort. 
Performance B: Performance other than intended.  An unsuccessful result from effort. 
Outcome A: An outcome that is sought as an end unto itself. 
Outcome B: An outcome sought as a prerequisite to other outcomes 
Outcome C: An outcome that is possible whether or not effort leads to intended performance. 
 
Figure 2.3: Lawler’s Motivation Model (Adapted from Lawler, 1994) 
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2.3.4.1  Expectancies.  Lawler refers to the two different types of expectancies: E-P expectancy 
and P-O expectancy.  As noted, this approach is slightly different theoretically from Vroom’s 
(1964), but it fits well with operationalizations used in much of the early expectancy theory 
research, which did not correspond exactly to Vroom’s model (Heneman, 1971; Reinharth & 
Wahba, 1975).  Effort – performance (E-P) expectancy is the person’s subjective estimate that 
expending effort will lead to a “first level outcome” (Pool, 1997), successful performance of the 
intended behavior: for example, an employee appointed to a particular task will have an E-P 
expectancy concerning the relationship between putting forth effort and successful 
accomplishment of the task – he might think he has a 50 percent chance.  Lawler asserts that this 
expectancy should be regarded as varying from zero to one: it is a subjective probability estimate 
concerning the likelihood of successful performance of a given behavior.  He further states that 
this type of expectancy should be more salient for relatively complicated tasks than for tasks 
where the degree of ability or skill required is low.  Some suggest that the relationship between 
E-P expectancy and motivation is not linear.  For example, Isaac et al. (2001) suggested that 
tasks must be reasonably challenging in order to promote motivation (i.e., E-P expectancies 
should be moderate), as extremely unchallenging work leads to boredom, while overly 
challenging tasks are seen as unattainable. 
P-O expectancies concern the perceived relationship between the first-level outcome – 
for example, successful task performance – and various other consequences, or second-level 
outcomes (Pool, 1997).  For example, an employee might have a P-O expectancy concerning the 
connection between successful task accomplishment and the receipt of a promotion.  Since a 
successful behavior may be related to many outcomes, several P-O expectancies may be 
associated with a given act.   
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 Lawler (1973, 1994) states that it is possible to derive a motivation “score” similar to 
Vroom’s (1964) “motivational force” by taking the product of the E-P expectancy, P-O 
expectancy, and valence.  The P-O expectancies for the various outcomes are multiplied by the 
corresponding outcome valences, all multiplied by the   E-P expectancy.  Mathematically,  
  
Motivation = (E→P)* Σ [(P→O)(V)]  
 
While Lawler (1994: 66) notes that some authors (e.g., Campell et al., 1970) suggest that it 
is “premature” to hypothesize multiplicative relationships between expectancy components, he 
asserts that “it is important to think of these terms as combining in a basically multiplicative 
manner.”  The reason for this is similar to Vroom’s (1964) reason for asserting a multiplicative 
model.  In the case of Lawler’s model, if either the E-P or the P-O expectancy is zero, no 
motivation is expected.  An additive model, though, would imply that motivation occurs even 
when one of the expectancies is zero.  This seems unreasonable on the face of it, as people do not 
seem to be motivated to undertake actions they know they cannot successfully accomplish (i.e., 
actions with a zero E-P expectancy).  Likewise it would seem strange for a person to be highly 
motivated to undertake an action that will not lead to any valued outcome (i.e., that has a zero P-O 
expectancy or leads to outcomes with valences of zero): as Lawler (1994: 66) puts it, “people do 
not perform many tasks, even though it is obvious that they are able to perform these tasks.”  
Lawler (1994) also asserts that the multiplicative combination allows negative valences to 
accumulate so that “negative motivation” is possible, which is consistent with the observation that 
people avoid many activities. 
 In short then, Lawler’s model suggests that people will be motivated to undertake an 
action, task, or behavior if: 1) they perceive that they have a reasonable chance of doing so 
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successfully, and 2) they perceive that successful performance of the action, task, or behavior is 
positively related to obtaining desired outcomes.   
Motivation is thus most directly related to effort; that is, one will direct effort toward 
behaviors that have high motivation scores.  One may also choose between levels of effort based 
on their motivation scores.  Many researchers (e.g., Lawler, 1973; Mastrofski et al., 1994) note 
that motivation is only indirectly related to performance, since variables such as ability and 
situational factors moderate the effort-performance relationship: Oliver (1974) notes that while 
the variance in performance explained by the expectancy model is typically significant in 
empirical studies, it tends to be relatively low, while Seybolt and Pavett (1979) regard support 
for expectancy effects on performance as “weak to moderate.” 
2.3.4.2  Determinants of Expectancies.  Lawler (1994) goes further than does Vroom in 
specifying the determinants of the variables in his model.  Concerning E-P expectancies, Lawler 
(1994) states that the most important determinant is the objective situation, though deficiencies 
in people’s perceptions imply that our expectancies may not correspond perfectly with reality.  
Another influence on our E-P expectancies is communications from other people, especially 
those with experience with the situation (Lawler, 1994; Naylor et al., 1980).  For example, a new 
PhD student might develop a perception of her likelihood of success in the program through 
communication from more advanced students.  Personality factors such as self-esteem may also 
play a role (Lawler, 1973): those with high self esteem may perceive themselves as generally 
more likely to be successful at various tasks (i.e., have high E-P expectancies).  On the other 
hand, those low in self-esteem may have negatively biased perceptions of their abilities to carry 
out particular behaviors, and therefore underestimate themselves (i.e., have low E-P 
expectancies).  A final influence on E-P expectancies is learning from experiences (Feather, 
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1992b; House, 1971; Lawler, 1994), or vicariously through observation of others: Lawler states 
that as one gains more experience in a given situation, her perceptions of the likelihood of 
success at a behavior or task will become more accurate, increasing the accuracy of her E-P 
expectancies.   
 Concerning P-O expectancies, they, like E-P expectancies, are strongly influenced by the 
objective situation (Lawler, 1994), past experiences with the situation and reinforcement history 
(Maki, Overmeier, Delos, & Guttman, 1995), and communication from others (especially high-
credibility sources) about the situation (Galbraith and Cummings, 1967; Lawler, 1994; Naylor et 
al., 1980; Smith, Jones & Blair, 2000).  They need not correspond to reality, though Lawler 
(1994) asserts that they tend to be fairly accurate.  The importance of communications from 
others in determining P-O expectancy was empirically corroborated by the work of Smith et al. 
(2000), who found that managerial communication concerning sales potential was positively 
related to motivation.   
Regarding past experience, while Vroom (1964) suggests that expectancy theory is future 
is future-oriented rather than a “hedonism of the past,” many (e.g., Maki et al., 1995; Porter & 
Lawler, 1968) assert that reinforcement history is critical in determinant of expectancies.  
Holhstein et al. (1998) and Naylor et al. (1980) suggest that observational and experiential 
learning are critical in the development of P-O expectancies, with differential learning histories 
leading to individual differences in expectancies, and thus to individual differences in 
motivation.   
Another possible determinant of P-O expectancies is the nature of the outcomes: for 
example, positive outcomes may be seen as more likely than negative ones, and extremely 
positive outcomes may be regarded as less likely than moderately positive ones (Lawler, 1994).  
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E-P expectancies may also influence P-O expectancies: when E-P is about .5, a desire for 
achievement is triggered, and P-O outcomes related to achievement may be influenced.  
Personality can affect P-O expectancy as well: for example, a person with an internal locus of 
control might have higher P-O expectancies in general than one with an external locus of control 
(Broedling, 1975; Giles, 1977).  Broedling (1975) found that locus of control was indeed related 
to the concept of instrumentality (which corresponds to P-O expectancy) in his study.  In a 
similar vein, Feather (1992b) states that attributional approach and perceived controllability – the 
degree to which the person believes that outcomes are related to internal forces versus external 
forces, luck, and fate – also influence P-O expectancies.   
Both expectancies can change over time.  For example, Sheridan et al., (1974), in a 
longitudinal study of nurses, found that expectancies changed over a fifteen month period.  Many 
P-O expectancies can be influenced directly by policy makers: for example, organizations can 
manipulate the relationship between performance and pay, which should result in manipulation 
of employees’ P-O expectancies.   
2.3.4.3  Determinants of Valences.  Lawler (1973; 1994) did not describe the determinants of 
valences in depth; however, Porter and Lawler (1968) suggest that satisfaction with an outcome 
affects future perceptions of its valence.  They are unsure what the effect of satisfaction with a 
reward on valence is, but submit that it may depend on the type of reward.  For example, 
satisfaction with food might reduce its valence, but satisfaction with a feeling of accomplishment 
might increase its valence.  Naylor et al. (1980) argued that valence is largely determined by 
needs and “temporary need-state arousal.”  The work of Campbell et al. (2003) suggests that the 
valences of various outcomes may vary across cultures, while the results of a study by Sheridan 
(1974) indicated that valences of outcomes may vary over time. 
 123
2.3.5  Multiplicative Versus Additive (and Other) Models 
One important debate in the expectancy literature concerns the efficacy of the multiplicative 
models that have typified expectancy research.  While some (e.g., Campbell et al., 1970) did not 
explicitly propose the multiplicative combination of expectancies and valences, Vroom (1964) 
and Lawler (1973; 1994) both developed multiplicative models, as did other early expectancy 
advocates.  Using such a model implies that, as Isaac et al. (2001) put it, “the motivational chain 
is… only as strong as its weakest link.”  Thus, if any one of the three components of the model is 
zero, no motivation will be present.  Oliver (1974: 251) asserts, though, that “no evidence exists 
on how individuals actually process valence and instrumentality perceptions.” 
Some researchers have questioned whether a multiplicative model in fact explains more 
variance in motivation than a model that simply adds together the main effects of valence and 
expectancies (Heneman & Schwab, 1972; Oliver, 1974).  For example, Stahl and Harrell (1981) 
argued that a less cognitively demanding and mathematically complex additive model may be 
just as effective at predicting motivation as multiplicative models.  They assert that the 
mulitiplicative combination of valences and expectancies is too complex a process for 
individuals to undertake in real life.   
In support of such a position, Heneman (1971), based on a study of department store 
managers, states that “the evidence appear(s) to offer little support for the hypothesized 
interaction between valence and instrumentality,” and suggests that the interactions among 
expectancy theory variables be deemphasized.  Similarly, Heneman and Schwab (1972) found 
little support for the hypothesized interactions between valence, instrumentality, and expectancy, 
and Oliver (1974) found no evidence that a multiplicative model explained more variance in 
motivation than an additive one.  Reinharth and Wahba (1975: 534), based on their study, stated 
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that “It… appears that the widely accepted aggregate model is no better than, and in certain 
circumstances is considerably inferior to, the individual components within the model”; 
however, they further asserted that the debate concerning multiplicative versus additive models 
may be moot “since a multiplicative relationship becomes additive with a logarithmic 
transformation of the variables.”  Sybolt and Pavett (1979) also found that a multiplicative model 
did not improve prediction over an additive model, and the results of Harrell et al. (1985) 
indicated that 65 of 77 subjects used an additive model rather than a multiplicative one in making 
decisions: the use of a multiplicative model added in only a small degree to the predictive ability 
of the model, even for those individuals who used a multiplicative approach in making decisions. 
Baker, Ravichandran, and Randall (1989) tested additive and multiplicative expectancy 
models, and asserted that while many of their subjects did adhere to the multiplicative model, it 
may not be the appropriate model for all individuals, since many other subjects favored an 
additive model.  They assert that contextual, normative, and personality factors all may influence 
the functional form of individuals’ valence and expectancy calculations.  The complexity and 
ambiguity of information, and the type, sign, range, number, and magnitude of outcomes may 
also influence the functional form of the decision model one uses: for example, if information is 
complex and ambiguous, a more simple (e.g., additive) expectancy model might be favored over 
a more complex one.   Their general conclusion is that there is no one motivational model that 
fits everybody. 
Lawler & Suttle (1974) tested the predictive value of various combinations of the 
components of expectancy theory.  Results indicated that there were correlations between job 
behavior and some of the expectancy-type attitude measures, indicating support for expectancy 
theory, but though the full expectancy model (Lawler’s model) was the best predictor of 
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performance, it did not represent an improvement over the simpler measures, (E-P) or ∑(P-O).  
Furthermore, weighting expectancy items by valence items did not increase the predictability of 
behavior: the authors speculate this may be due to range restriction of the valence measurements, 
social desirability bias, or people not being aware of what is truly important to them.  They note 
that Porter and Lawler (1968) found that valence did increase the attitude-performance 
relationship. 
Evidence supporting the multiplicative version of the equity model comes from 
Georgeopoulos, Mahoney, and Jones (1957), who found that the relationship between 
performance and P-O expectancies was stronger for those for whom pay was a high-valence 
outcome than for those for whom it was a low-valence outcome.  Similarly, Porter and Lawler 
(1968) found that the relationship between E-P expectancies and performance was stronger when 
the outcome was important to the subject than when it was not.  Work by Galbraith and 
Cummings (1967) also fits the multiplicative model: they found a significant interaction between 
valence and P-O expectancies.  Other evidence supporting the multiplicative model comes from 
Lawler and Porter (1967) and Hackman and Porter (1967): both of these studies also found the 
predictive power of P-O expectancies with respect to performance increased when multiplied by 
the importance subjects ascribed to pay. 
 Some expectancy researchers have proposed what can be described as the “valence 
dominance” hypothesis.   For example, Geiger et al. (1998) tested an expectancy model for its 
ability to predict student motivation in various cultures.  They found that expectancy theory 
variables did predict students’ effort levels across cultures, but the valence of academic success 
dominated expectancy in predicting effort.  Only students from Singapore emphasized 
expectancy over valence.  Valence dominance has also been found by Harrell et al. (1985) and 
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Geiger and Cooper (1996).  However, Campbell et al. (2003) did not find valence dominance in 
their sample of Russian students.  Indeed, the majority of students in three of four groups 
weighted expectancy more heavily than valence in determination of effort.  Campbell et al. 
(2003) suggested that the degree of valence dominance is determined in part by values and 
gender, but is not determined by organizational forces.  
Mitchell (1974) suggested that attainability of an outcome (i.e., expectancies) may be 
related to its attractiveness (i.e., its valence).  A difficult to attain outcome might be perceived as 
more valuable whereas a very easily attained outcome might be seen as low in value.  Thus, 
expectancies and valences may not be independent.  Yancey, Humphrey, and Neal (1992) found 
evidence suggesting that the components of expectancy theory may, in fact, have countervailing 
influences on performance, such that their effects cancel each other out.   
2.3.6  Summary of Expectancy Theory 
Based on the literature, it appears that the components of expectancy theory – E-P expectancy, P-
O expectancy, and valence – do have an important impact on motivation, though it has not been 
established unequivocally how those components can best be combined to predict effort, and 
such motivational impacts need not necessarily translate into improved performance, due to 
mediating variables such as ability.   
 
2.4  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter I explored the substantial literatures concerning both equity theory and 
expectancy theory.  In the next chapter, I combine concepts from expectancy theory with those 
of equity theory to develop a framework for understanding stakeholder motivation to take action 
against a FO.   
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3.0  THE THEORY 
 
  
In this chapter, I recapitulate briefly the key premises of equity theory and expectancy theory, 
and argue that both motivation theories can be applied to understanding stakeholder-FO 
relationships: in particular, these theories can be employed to make predictions concerning the 
likelihood that a stakeholder will take action against a FO (this includes “indirect” actions, such 
as the solicitation of assistance from other stakeholders in the stakeholder network in sanctioning 
the FO).  Finally, I develop a framework – based on both equity theory and expectancy theory – 
for understanding stakeholder propensities to act.  
   
3.1  EQUITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION TO STAKEHOLDER ACTION 
3.1.1  Recap of Equity Theory 
Equity theory hinges on the inputs that social actors make into an exchange relationship and the 
outcomes they derive from that relationship.  Inputs represent “investments” in the relationship 
for which the contributor expects something in return.  Outcomes are resources, returns, rewards, 
or compensation that the actor derives from the relationship.  Both inputs and outcomes are 
perceptual concepts: they are only important in determinations of the degree of equity in a 
relationship to the extent that they are perceived as relevant inputs and outcomes by the parties in 
the relationship.   Each party compares its inputs to and outcomes from the relationship with the 
inputs and outcomes of the other party in the relationship, or another party who is in a similar 
exchange relationship, and develops perceptions of equity based on this comparison.  Inequity 
for a social actor exists when she perceives that the ratio of her outcomes from the exchange 
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relationship to her inputs to the relationship is different from the corresponding ratio of the 
comparison other.  Equitable relationships are usually the most satisfying for both parties in an 
exchange relationship.  Inequities, on the other hand, are expected to produce “tension,” or 
“dissonance” which leads to motivation to reduce the inequity.  However, overreward may be 
tolerated better than underreward, and sensitivities to inequity may differ across individuals.   
3.1.2  Equity Theory Applied to Stakeholders 
 
Given that stakeholder management implies, in part, making decisions concerning the allocation 
of resources among a variety of constituents (Freeman, 1984), concerns of fairness (i.e., equity) 
in the distribution of resources – and the implications of fairness for stakeholder support of the 
FO – are implicitly acknowledged in much of the stakeholder literature (Husted, 1998).  As 
noted by Adams (1965), the “person” and the “comparison other” in the exchange relationship 
need not refer to individuals: they may also represent groups or organizations.  Husted (1998) 
points out that though concepts of justice are commonly applied in the context of employee-
employer relationships, such concepts are easily applicable to relationships between the FO and 
its other stakeholders: stakeholders compare their inputs to the FO to the outcomes they derive 
from it, and use this comparison make assessments concerning the fairness of the FO’s resource 
allocations.  Therefore, equity theory can be applied without undue extension to understanding 
the role of fairness in relationships that exist between FOs and their stakeholders.   
Hill and Jones (1992) note that the firm-stakeholder relationship represents an exchange 
relationship.  In compensation for providing resources or other support necessary for firm 
survival, various groups or organizations may require certain actions from it (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  Thus, stakeholders provide the firm with critical resources, in exchange for which they 
expects their interests to be met.  For example, stockholders provide capital, and in exchange, 
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they expect a return on that investment. Creditors finance the firm, and expect repayment in 
exchange.  Managers and employees provide time, effort, abilities and skills, and expect 
adequate working conditions and a fair income in exchange, communities provide location and 
infrastructure, and expect the firm to enhance – or at least avoid damaging – the community in 
exchange.  Similar exchange relationships occur between the firm and all other stakeholders.  
Thus, FO-stakeholder relationships are based on exchange, and certainly both the FO and any 
given stakeholder will have particular opinions on what constitutes a fair exchange in their 
relationship: the FO or any one of its stakeholders may perceive the other’s treatment of it as 
“unfair” or “inequitable.”  For this reason, too, equity theory seems to be a reasonable and useful 
way of understanding a stakeholder’s motivations in its relationship with the FO.    
3.1.3  Equity Theory and Stakeholder Action 
Stakeholders and FOs exist in exchange relationships that are susceptible to perceptions of 
inequity by either party.  Furthermore, Husted (1998: 647) argues, “Fairness in… decisions… is 
logically an essential element in stakeholder perceptions of the firm and in their willingness to 
support the firm” (1998: 647).  A stakeholder’s propensity to aid, cooperate with, or act against a 
FO, then, will be determined in part by its perception of the degree of equity in its relationship 
with that organization FO.  Therefore, equity theory seems to be a reasonable and useful way of 
understanding stakeholders’ motivations to act against an organization.  Below, I present 
arguments concerning stakeholders’ responses to the two types of inequity.  
3.1.3.1  Underrewarded Stakeholders.  The perception of underreward often leads to conflict 
when attempts to rectify the inequity are made (Kabanoff, 1991), and this can be the outcome in 
stakeholder-FO relationships.  Consider a situation in which a stakeholder perceives that the ratio 
of outcomes it derives from the FO (whether they be tangible resources or some less tangible 
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consideration) to what it contributes to the FO is less than the corresponding ratio of the FO.  
Adapting Adams’ (1965) notation, the following relationship holds (from the stakeholder’s 
perspective): Os/Is < Of/If , where Os represents the outcomes the stakeholder derives from its 
relationship with the FO, Is represents the inputs the stakeholder contributes to the relationship, 
Of represents the outcomes the stakeholder perceives the FO to derive from the relationship, and 
If represents the inputs the stakeholder perceives the FO as contributing to the relationship.  In 
situations where this relation holds, the stakeholder will perceive itself as underrewarded, will 
find the relationship inequitable, and will be motivated to take action to remedy that inequity. 
Reducing the inequity might require the stakeholder to take action against the FO in order to 
increase the outcomes it derives from the relationship, reduce the inputs it contributes to the 
relationship, or reduce the outcomes the FO derives from it.  Thus, a stakeholder’s propensity to 
act against a FO is positively related to the degree to which it perceives underreward inequity in 
its relationship with that organization.   
As noted earlier, inequity may be perceived when the social actor is in a direct exchange 
relationship with the comparison other, or when both the social actor and the comparison other 
are in exchange relationships with a third party.  Applying the latter notion to FO-stakeholder 
relations, a stakeholder may also perceive inequity when the ratio of its outcomes from its 
relationship with a FO relative to its inputs to that relationship is lower than the corresponding 
ratio of some other stakeholder.  Again adapting Adams’ (1965) notation, a stakeholder will 
perceive inequity when the following relationship holds:  
Os/Is < Oco/Ico, where Os represents the outcomes the stakeholder derives from its relationship 
with the FO, Is represents the inputs the stakeholder contributes to its relationship with the FO, 
Oco represents the outcomes some comparison other stakeholder derives from its relationship 
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with the same FO, and Ico represents the inputs that comparison other stakeholder contributes to 
the FO.  Where this relation holds the stakeholder will again perceive itself as underrewarded, 
will find its relationship with the FO inequitable, and will be motivated to take action to remedy 
that inequity.   
Threat of stakeholder action due to the perception of underreward underlies most 
stakeholder-FO relationships.  For example, all stakeholders can use voice, a low-cost action, to 
make their opinions of the FO known.  Threat of severance of the relationship is another general 
approach that stakeholders may use when their interests are not being met (though this may be a 
higher-cost option), since such a move can deny the FO critical resources which may, in extreme 
cases, threaten the survival of the firm (Hill & Jones, 1992): a dissatisfied customer, for example, 
can shop elsewhere, or, worse for the FO, convince others to likewise sever their relationships 
with the firm.  Employees can quit their jobs.  Shareholders can sell their stock.  The repertoire 
of potential stakeholder actions taken against the FO is vast.  Exacerbating this issue is the fact 
that various institutions (e.g., labor unions, special interest groups) have evolved to facilitate 
such action (Hill & Jones, 1992).  Thus, labor unions can call for a strike if employees’ interests 
are not being met, and special interest groups can organize a consumer boycott if consumers’ 
interests are not being safeguarded.   
3.1.3.2  Resource Dependence in Responses to Underreward.  The degree of resource 
dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) that a stakeholder exhibits with respect to the FO should 
be a critical moderator of its responses to underreward inequity.  One’s tendency to respond to 
inequity will be tempered if such response is very costly (Adams, 1965; Watson et al., 1996).  
Therefore, if a stakeholder is highly dependent on the FO for a critical resource (for example, if 
no substitutes are available), the propensity to act against the FO – especially by severing the 
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relationship – will be moderated because of the increased costs of action.  In such circumstances, 
because behavioral responses are costly, cognitive responses to perceived inequity will be more 
likely (Watson et al., 1996).   
Thus, sanctions in general, and  severance of the relationship in particular, will be less 
common if the stakeholder exhibits a great deal of resource dependence on the FO, since, for 
example, severance of the relationship would mean the stakeholder no longer has access to 
critical resources.  This is consistent with the position of Ring and Van de Ven (1994), who state 
that severance is more likely if alternative relationships exist that can satisfy one’s needs.  (If 
such alternatives are not available, a higher degree of resource dependence exists.)  For example, 
an underrewarded employee who has no job opportunities due to a lack of skills or a very tight 
job market elsewhere will be more likely to cognitively adjust or submit to the inequity than to 
quit.  On the other hand, if many job opportunities are available to her, quitting is a very viable 
option.   
 Resource dependence may also temper responses to inequity due to its influence on 
cognitive variables such as attributions.  Kabanoff (1991) asserts that resource dependence is 
inversely related to power, and states that in a relationship characterized by power imbalance, the 
more powerful (i.e., less dependent) party will attribute some of the contributions of the weaker 
party to its own influence, and will therefore discount the contributions of the weaker party.  As 
a result, the powerful party may feel justified in garnering more outcomes than the weaker party.  
Kabanoff (1991) also posits that the weak party is less likely to perceive “objective” violations of 
equity by the stronger party as such.  Furthermore, should the weak party in fact object to 
underreward, the stronger party may be in a favorable position to provide a justification for the 
inequitable reward distribution.  Thus, in a relationship characterized by a substantial power 
 133
imbalance (or a high degree of resource dependence for one party), the weak party in a 
relationship may be less likely to respond to underreward inequity, and motivation to restore 
equity will be weak, difficult to sustain, or lacking completely.  In relationships characterized by 
low resource dependence (for either party), on the other hand, participants are more likely to 
engage in overt conflict aimed at remedying the inequity (Kabanoff, 1991).   
 There is some empirical evidence concerning the influence of resource dependence on 
responses to underreward inequity such as relationship severance.  Zuo and Bian (2001) found 
that Chinese women who perceived inequity in their marriages tended to stay in those 
relationships, due to their lack of either resources or alternatives to their current marriage: 
attempts to negotiate a move toward equity could be countered with threats of divorce, which 
would have a negative impact on the standard of living of the wife.  Therefore, Zuo and Bian 
(2001) assert that women dependent on their marriage tend to tolerate inequitable divisions of 
labor, or to regard them as fair (i.e., engage in cognitive distortion).    
 Watson et al. (1996) found that managers who were likely to be at their current job for 
another two years tended to express less dissatisfaction in the face of underreward than those 
managers who were not likely to be at their job for another two years.  They assert that managers 
who were going to stay focused on cognitive adjustment to inequity rather than on behavioral 
responses to it.  Managers that expected to move to another firm, on the other hand, were less 
likely to undergo cognitive adjustment in response to underreward inequity.   These findings, 
too, suggest that behavioral responses to underreward inequity are much more likely to result in 
contexts where the underrewarded individual is not dependent on his or her exchange partner for 
a critical resource.   
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 In the marketing literature, Hoffman and Kelley (2000) proposed that factors that 
increase the dependence of a customer on a particular service provider moderate responses to 
inequities in the relationship.  Specifically, the related factors of customization and high 
switching costs increase the resource dependence of the customer on the service provider, and 
affect responses to inequity.  If a customized product is unavailable elsewhere, resource 
dependence will be high, and a behavioral response to inequity is less likely (Alexander, 2002).  
Similarly, when switching suppliers is very costly (in terms of time, money, effort, and 
cognition), resource dependence will be high, resulting in high commitment (Alexander, 2002; 
Chenet, Tynan, & Money, 2000) and loyalty (Alexander, 2002; Olivia, Oliver, & Macmillan, 
1992): severance of the relationship is less likely.  Evidence from Hurley (1998) and Heide and 
John (1988) also supports this position: relationship commitment was positively related to 
switching costs.   
 In general, then, it appears that resource dependence should have an important influence 
on the propensity of an underrewarded stakeholder to take action against (and, especially, to 
sever its relationship with) a FO.  
3.1.3.3  Overrewarded Stakeholders.  How a stakeholder will respond to the second type of 
inequity condition, overreward inequity, is less clear.  According to Adams (1965), just as an 
individual perceiving underreward inequity will be motivated to attempt to reduce that inequity, 
so an individual perceiving overreward inequity will be motivated to reduce it.  However, in 
general, it seems that individuals are often much more willing to be overrewarded than to be 
underrewarded (Leventhal et al., 1972; Mowday, 1979; Vogl-Bauer et al., 1999): indeed, they 
may not perceive overreward as such.  Generalizing from this idea, a stakeholder experiencing 
overreward inequity may not strive to reduce that inequity (should it, in fact, perceive it).  That 
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is, one would not necessarily expect a stakeholder that perceived it was getting more out of its 
relationship with the FO relative to what it was contributing than was the FO (or a comparison 
other stakeholder) to do anything to alter the situation.  Indeed, if the stakeholder’s threshold for 
overreward was high enough (or, put another way, if its equity sensitivity was low enough), it 
might even try to increase its outcome/input ratio relative to those of the FO or other 
stakeholders.  
3.1.4  A Note on Stakeholders’ Consideration of Other Stakeholders   
It must be noted that the outcomes a given stakeholder derives from a FO may also be associated 
with the interests of other stakeholders, or even those of non-stakeholders.  Therefore, 
perceptions of inequity on the part of one stakeholder can be based in part on the FO’s treatment 
of another stakeholder or a non-stakeholder.  For example, a positive outcome to an 
environmentalist group could be the safety of a particular species.  Such is the case with the 
International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), which campaigns against seal hunting in Canada 
(Guy, 2000; Wilson-Smith & Deziel, 2000). In this case, the interests of the stakeholder (the 
IFAW) coincide with the interests of a non-stakeholder (the seals - though some (e.g., Driscoll & 
Starik, 2004; Näsi, Näsi, & Savage, 1998) would argue that the natural environment is a 
stakeholder, and, therefore, might argue that seals are stakeholders).  Actions taken by the IFAW 
are responses to inequity, the perception of which is generated in part by sealers’ and furriers’ 
treatment of seals rather than their direct treatment of the IFAW.  Thus, to any one stakeholder, 
the treatment of another stakeholder (or non-stakeholder) can represent an important outcome, 
and can therefore be an important determinant of the propensity of the first to take action. 
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3.2  EXPECTANCY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION TO STAKEHOLDER ACTION 
3.2.1  Recap of Expectancy Theory 
 
According to expectancy theory, motivation to perform a given action is a function of: 1) 
perceptions of the likelihood of successful performance of the action (i.e., E-P expectancy), 2) 
perceptions of the likelihood that specific outcomes will ensue from that performance (i.e., P-O 
expectancy), and 3) the valence that the individual ascribes to those outcomes.  Expectancies and 
valences are all subjective, and will vary across individuals. 
3.2.2  Expectancy Theory Applied to Stakeholders  
It is readily apparent that not all discontented stakeholders will take action against the FO.  For 
example, in her book, “Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America,” Barbara 
Ehrenreich (2001) documents how employees at a Wal-Mart store, though clearly feeling 
underrewarded by the company, showed little interest in taking action to rectify the situation.  
Therefore, in addition to perceptions of inequity, other forces must be at work.  According to 
Mitroff (1983), stakeholders are usually conceived of as rational, calculating entities.  Indeed, he 
states, “The most important property of stakeholders… is the presumption of rationality” (1983: 
43).  It is the rationality (or, at least, the subjective rationality) of stakeholders which leads to a 
contingency noted by Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003): a stakeholder must perceive that is has 
the ability to take action, or it will not do so.  Both these concepts – subjective rationality and 
ability (or at least the perception of ability) – are concisely addressed in the concepts of 
expectancy theory.  Hence, expectancy theory seems to be an appropriate framework for 
discussing what motivates stakeholders to act.   
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My application of expectancy theory to stakeholder-FO relationships is based on three 
assumptions, which are derived by generalizing from similar assumptions (about individuals) 
that are the basis of expectancy models of motivation.   
1. Stakeholders have preferences concerning outcomes influenced by the FO.  For example, 
employees might prefer more pay and more job security to less pay and less job security. 
 
2. Stakeholders have expectancies concerning their abilities to undertake particular actions 
(that is, they have E-P expectancies).  For example, employees might have expectancies 
concerning the likelihood that attempts to unionize will, in fact, lead to unionization. 
 
3. Stakeholders have expectancies about the likelihood that particular outcomes will follow 
from those actions (that is, they have P-O expectancies).  For example, employees might 
have expectancies concerning the extent to which a successful attempt to unionize will 
lead to higher pay and greater job security. 
 
Based on these premises and the tenets of expectancy theory, I take the position that a 
stakeholder’s motivation to act against a FO is determined in part by the expectancies and 
preferences it possesses. 
3.2.3  Expectancy Theory and Stakeholder Action 
I assert that stakeholders will be motivated to act against the FO when the following conditions 
hold.  First, the stakeholder must believe that taking a given action against the FO will lead to 
particular outcomes (i.e., it must have a positive P-O expectancy).  Second, the stakeholder must 
ascribe positive values (i.e. positive valences) to those outcomes: a zero-valence outcome will 
not be a source of motivation.  Third, the stakeholder must have some degree of belief that it can 
successfully undertake the proposed action (i.e., it must have a positive E-P expectancy).  If any 
of these conditions does not hold, a stakeholder will not take action.  Motivation resulting from 
positive expectancies and valences is thus seen as an underlying force behind stakeholder efforts 
to act against the FO.  Therefore, I assert that a stakeholder is only likely to act against an 
organization if a highly valued outcome is at stake, it believes it can successfully undertake the 
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proposed action, and it believes that successful action is likely to substantially promote 
attainment of the outcome. 
3.2.4  Influences on Stakeholder Expectancies 
A wide variety of variables can influence a stakeholder’s expectancies concerning action against 
the FO.  Rowley and Berman (2000) and Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) list a number of 
factors that can influence the likelihood of stakeholder action.  Many of these variables can 
readily be seen to have an effect on stakeholder expectancies.  
One critical factor is resources, whether material (e.g., computers, manpower) or non-
material factors (e.g., leadership) (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003).  Simply put, a stakeholder that 
perceives that it lacks the resources to organize, mobilize, or otherwise undertake the required 
action is unlikely to do so.  I submit that resource constraints affect the propensity for 
stakeholders to act, in part, by acting on expectancies:  a stakeholder that perceives that it does 
not possess the necessary requirements to undertake a given action directed against the FO will 
have a low E-P expectancy, and so will be less likely to take that action.   
Another precursor to stakeholder action identified by Rowley and Berman (2000) and 
Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) is past action against the FO.  Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) 
point out that groups that have organized in the past are more likely to do so again because the 
relationships, norms, and common understandings concerning their interests developed in the 
past, along with experience with the action, make it easier for stakeholders to monitor the FO and 
coordinate with one another in taking action.  In addition, costs (to the stakeholder) of action 
may be reduced when group infrastructure and a shared understanding of group goals have been 
developed through previous action.   
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These relationships, norms, and reduced costs of action should increase the stakeholder’s 
E-P expectancies: experience with taking action in the past, reduced costs, and the existence of 
relationships to facilitate such action should lead to heightened perceptions that the stakeholder 
can successfully undertake the action.  Furthermore, if action against the FO has, in the past, led 
to valued outcomes, P-O expectancies will be enhanced, further promoting stakeholder action.  
Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003: 210) note that “the influence of past action is transferable across 
focal organizations”; that is, past action by a stakeholder against one FO should raise the 
likelihood of it taking action against another FO.  This should also be reflected in expectancies.  
For example, a stakeholder that has successfully organized a boycott in the past will have a 
higher expectancy that it can do so again to stand against a different FO: its E-P expectancy will 
be heightened with respect to organizations in general, not a specific FO.  In general, then, both 
the infrastructure and norms developed during past actions and the outcomes of those actions 
will have effects on stakeholder expectancies concerning a proposed action, and so will affect the 
likelihood that that action occurs.   
 
3.3  AN EQUITY/EXPECTANCY FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING 
STAKEHOLDER ACTION 
 
Though there have been only a few attempts to look at expectancy and equity concurrently (e.g., 
Harder, 1991; 1992), perceptions of equity and expectancies will combine in their effects on 
motivation (Cosier & Dalton, 1983).  Thus, it makes sense to consider the effects of both on 
stakeholder action simultaneously.  Below I develop an equity/expectancy framework for 
understanding stakeholder propensities for action directed against an organization.  The 
framework, depicted in Figure 3.1, considers stakeholder expectancies and equity perceptions 
concurrently to produce a typology describing those propensities.  
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Figure 3.1: An Equity/Expectancy Framework for Stakeholder Action 
 
3.3.1  Dimensions 
The framework includes two dimensions.  The first dimension is “type of inequity” which 
represents the type of inequity the stakeholder perceives in its relationship with the FO.  Of 
course, real equity perceptions are a continuous variable; however, for the sake of simplicity, and 
because reaction to inequity hinges pivotally on the type of inequity encountered in addition to 
its degree, I follow Mowday (1979) in reducing the inequity continuum to two conditions, 
“underreward” and “overreward.”  The underreward condition represents a situation where the 
stakeholder perceives that its ratio of outcomes from to inputs to the stakeholder-FO relationship 
is lower than the corresponding ratio for either the FO (i.e., Os/Is < Of/If) or a comparison other 
stakeholder (i.e., Os/Is < Oco/Ico).  The overreward condition represents a situation where the 
stakeholder perceives that its ratio of outcomes from to inputs to the stakeholder-FO relationship 
is greater than the corresponding ratio for the FO (i.e., Os/Is > Of/If) or a comparison other 
stakeholder (i.e., Os/Is  > Oco/Ico).   
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The second dimension is “expectancy.”  Lawler & Porter (1967) advise that effort-reward 
probabilities can be determined through a multiplicative combination of the effort-performance 
and performance-reward probabilities.  Such a multiplicative approach to defining overall 
expectancy has also been suggested by Steers and Porter (1979) and Kopelman and Thompson 
(1976).  While this approach is slightly different theoretically from Vroom’s (1964), it in fact 
corresponds well with much of the early expectancy theory research, which tended to combine 
instrumentality and expectancy.  Furthermore, (Heneman, 1971), and Sybolt and Pavett (1979) 
found that combining expectancies resulted in better predictive validity than using both 
expectancies separately.  Accordingly, this dimension represents the multiplicative combination 
of the stakeholder’s E-P expectancy (i.e., the expectancy that it can successfully undertake a 
given action directed against the FO) and its P-O expectancy (i.e., the expectancy that successful 
action against the FO will lead to desired outcomes).  Like perceptions of equity, expectancy, 
which represents subjective probabilities, is a continuous variable.  However, to simplify the 
framework I have reduced it to two levels, “high” and “low.”   
The framework does not include a dimension representing the valence variable in the 
expectancy equation for deriving motivational force.  It presumes that the FO has at least partial 
discretion over an outcome or outcomes that are of reasonably high positive valence to the 
stakeholder.  It also presumes reasonable levels of visibility; that is, FO activities that influence 
outcomes to the stakeholder and are relevant for making judgments of equity are apparent to the 
stakeholder to some extent. 
3.3.2  Explanation of the Framework 
According to the framework, different combinations of the equity and expectancy dimensions 
will lead to different stakeholder propensities to act against the FO.  Consider first the northwest 
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quadrant.  In this situation, action by the stakeholder against the FO is likely.  Under these 
conditions, underreward inequity will result in motivation for the stakeholder to take action 
against the FO.  Simultaneously, due to the high expectancy, the stakeholder will see attempting 
to take action against the FO as likely to be successful and to lead to desired outcomes, which 
will also motivate it to do so.  In this case, then, equity and expectancy considerations will be 
compounded to produce a strong propensity for action by the stakeholder against the FO; that is, 
the stakeholder will be likely to impose sanctions on the FO.  For example, Greenberg (1990b) 
found that groups of employees whose pay was temporarily reduced had significantly higher 
theft rates than groups that did not experience pay cuts.  The equity/expectancy framework 
explains this result in this manner: some members of the former group suddenly perceived 
themselves as underrewarded relative to members of the latter.  Furthermore, they saw theft as an 
achievable endeavor and a potential means to remedy the inequity (i.e., they had high 
expectancy).  Therefore, they engaged in theft.  
 In the northeast quadrant, the stakeholder experiences overreward in its relationship with 
the FO combined with a high expectancy that action directed against the FO will be successful 
and will lead to desired outcomes.  According to Adams (1965), overreward should lead the 
stakeholder to either increase its contributions to the stakeholder-FO relationship or reduce the 
outcomes it derives from that relationship, and indeed Harder (1992) found that overreward was 
positively related to team-oriented, cooperative behavior on the part of the overrewarded party.  
In this condition, therefore, the stakeholder may, due to the overreward, be very cooperative and 
even engage in prosocial, or “helping” behaviors (Masterson, 2001) in its relationship with the 
FO.   
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On the other hand, as noted earlier, overreward inequity is often tolerated, so stakeholder 
behaviors aimed at reducing this inequity may not ensue.  Indeed, a stakeholder’s threshold for 
overreward or sensitivity to equity may be such that it behaves in an “aggrandizing” manner, 
striving to get more from its relationship with the FO despite the overreward.  Such aggrandizing 
behavior may occur in this quadrant because of the high expectancy: the stakeholder will believe 
that successful action against the FO, leading to desired outcomes, is a strong possibility.  Thus, 
whether this overreward/high expectancy condition leads to cooperative or aggrandizing 
behavior is in part dependent on the degree to which the stakeholder is tolerant of overreward in 
its relationship with the FO.  
In the southeast quadrant, where the stakeholder perceives itself to be overrewarded in its 
relationship with the FO, and the expectancy of successful action against the FO leading to 
beneficial outcomes is low, the stakeholder is not likely to engage in action directed against the 
FO.  A stakeholder in this quadrant may exhibit a great deal of cooperation with the FO or 
undertake prosocial behaviors, and will not act against it.  Despite the fact that overreward may 
be tolerated, aggrandizing behavior on the part of the stakeholder is not likely in this quadrant 
due to the low expectancy condition: even if tolerance for overreward is very high, the 
stakeholder will not perceive that action against the FO is likely to be successful and to lead to 
desired outcomes.  Therefore, even if a stakeholder experiencing this combination of equity and 
expectancy conditions does not exhibit cooperation or prosocial behaviors, it is not likely to act 
negatively against the FO, instead exhibiting “contentedness.” 
In the southwest quadrant, where a stakeholder perceives underreward inequity in its 
relationship with the FO and low expectancy, the stakeholder is likely to be dissatisfied with its 
relationship with the FO, but will not see attempting to act against it as likely to succeed and 
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produce desired outcomes.  Therefore, in this case, the stakeholder may submit to the inequitable 
relationship.  Such submission to an inequitable situation due to low expectancies is evident in 
the findings of Makoul and Roloff (1998), who observed that the propensity to withhold 
relational complaints was negatively related to the expectancy that such complaints would lead 
to a change in the behavior of the subject’s partner.  
Adams (1965), though, asserts that severance of a relationship is one way to reduce the 
dissonance that results from an inequitable relationship.  So, alternatively, a stakeholder in the 
underreward, low expectancy condition may choose to sever its relationship with the FO.  This 
latter notion is consistent with the position that the perception of equity in a relationship is 
positively related to its maintenance (Dubinsky & Levy, 1989; Vogl-Bauer et al., 1999; Walster, 
Walster, & Traupmann, 1978) and the suggestion that a relationship characterized by the 
perception of underreward inequity is more likely to dissolve (Griffeth & Gaertner, 2001; 
Kunkel, 1997).  However, Adams (1965) sees withdrawal from a relationship as a last resort in 
situations of inequity, though he does not elaborate on the conditions that will precipitate such 
action.  It is generally thought, though, that individuals will choose the least costly approach to 
inequity reduction (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983).  Therefore, it seems likely that one factor that will 
have a very strong influence on which recourse – severance or submission – is undertaken is the 
degree of resource dependence (Barney, 1991) that characterizes the FO-stakeholder 
relationship.   
Resource dependence has been identified as a source of stakeholder power over the FO 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Jonker & Foster, 2002; Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000).  Stakeholders 
that supply critical resources to the FO and put sufficient assets at risk that they can make 
legitimate claims will be better able to influence the FO.   However, if a stakeholder exhibits 
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resource dependence with respect to the FO, this will represent a source of FO power over the 
stakeholder, and an impediment to the stakeholder’s ability to sever its relationship with the FO.  
Resource dependence on the part of stakeholders can be the result of investments in or 
possession of specific assets relevant to its relationship with the FO (for example, employees 
with skills that are uniquely relevant to the FO) (Hill & Jones, 1992).  Resource dependence also 
exists if the stakeholder depends on the FO for a non-substitutable resource: for example, if the 
FO is the sole supplier of a particular component.   
Resource dependence on the part of the stakeholder increases exit costs (i.e., the costs 
associated with severance of the relationship) substantially (Hill & Jones, 1992).  Thus, if the 
stakeholder is subject to a high degree of resource dependence on the FO, exit from the 
relationship will be unlikely due to its high cost, and submission of the stakeholder to the 
inequitable relationship will be the probable outcome in the southwest quadrant.  On the other 
hand, where the stakeholder’s resource dependence on the FO is low – for example, if it can 
easily find a substitute for the resources provided to it by the FO – exit may be a low-cost means 
of inequity reduction, and severance of the stakeholder’s relationship with the FO becomes a 
very viable option.  This position is consistent with Floyd and Wasner’s finding (1992) that 
relationship commitment results, in part, from the limited availability of desirable alternative 
relationships, and the general argument that the likelihood of behavioral responses to inequity is 
inversely related to its cost (Adams, 1965; Watson et al., 1996).   
3.3.3  A Note on the “Domain” of the Framework 
The above framework is based on the assumption of conflict in stakeholder-FO relationships.  As 
noted earlier in this dissertation, the potential for conflict is typically seen as underlying 
stakeholders’ relationships with organizations (Frooman, 1999; Lampe, 2001).  Lampe (2001) 
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asserts that stakeholder-FO conflict, or the potential for it, gives the stakeholder concept its 
meaning.  Frooman (1999) emphasizes the divergence of interests that characterizes many such 
relationships: often, the interests of the FO conflict with the interests of its stakeholders.  For 
example, employees tend to prefer high wages, but it is often in the interests of a firm to keep 
wages low.   
Essentially, the framework described above hinges on this idea of conflict between the 
interests of the FO and stakeholder; it focuses on situations where the stakeholder can forward its 
own interests by taking action against the FO, which may impede the interests of the FO.  This 
limitation in the domain of the framework is evident in my focus on the implications of equity 
and expectancy perceptions for stakeholder action directed against the FO.   
It is possible, however, that a stakeholder’s interests may, in fact, coincide with the 
interests of the firm.  For example, employees who are part of profit-sharing programs may 
promote their own interests by promoting the interests of the FO as a whole.  In such situations, 
stakeholder propensities to take action against the FO might be very different from those 
depicted above, and prosocial behaviors might be more likely to occur, since by helping the FO 
the stakeholder might help itself.  A coincidence of stakeholder-FO interests would lead to 
different propositions from mine: one might speculate, for example, that in these situations, the 
stakeholder’s propensity to take action that “helps” the FO might be linked to the expectancy that 
it could do so, and the expectancy that doing so would lead to positive outcomes.  This contrasts 
with my framework, in which expectancy is related to the stakeholder’s propensity to take action 
against the FO. 
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3.3.4  A Note on the Dynamic Nature of Perceptions of Equity/Inequity 
It is also critical to acknowledge that the framework depicted above represents a “snapshot” of 
stakeholder propensities to take action against a focal organization; that is, it depicts those 
propensities at a particular point in time, and does not incorporate potential sources of 
dynamism, including the passage of time, in perceptions of equity or inequity in stakeholders’ 
relationships with FOs. 
 Researchers such as Vecchio (1982) and Cosier and Dalton (1983) assert that students of 
equity theory should (but seldom do) consider the moderating role of time, and argue that an 
accurate reflection of responses to inequity requires acknowledgment of a time parameter.  
Cosier and Dalton (1983: 313) argue that the feelings of tension associated with the perception of 
inequity might be modeled as “a geometrically declining weighted average of present and past 
levels of tension that have occurred in (the) relationship.”  They assert that present and past 
inequities are cognitively combined and result in a given level of dissonance, which is reduced as 
time passes.  Likewise, Carrell and Dittrich (1978) state that the perception of inequity is a 
transitory phenomenon that diminishes over time.  Accordingly, both Vecchio (1982) and Cosier 
and Dalton (1983) altered previous mathematical representations of equity/inequity to include a 
time component, though these approaches have not caught on in the literature.   
The moderating effect of time on the propensity to respond to inequity may be more 
pertinent to overreward situations than to underreward contexts.  Cosier and Dalton (1983) assert 
that underreward, which, on average, produces greater tension than overreward, should remain 
salient for a longer time.  This implies that time will have less of a moderating effect on 
responses to inequity in contexts of underreward than in contexts of overreward, at least in the 
short-term.  This position is consistent with the work of Greenberg (1988), who found that an 
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initial extreme reaction to gross overreward was not sustained over time: overpayment in the 
second week of his study did not result in as extreme a reaction from subjects as overpayment in 
the first week.  The temporary effects of overreward have also been found by Greenberg and 
Orenstein (1983) and Pritchard, Dunnette, and Jorgenson (1972).   
Other evidence supporting this position comes from Lawler, Koplin, Young, and Fadem, 
(1968), who suggest that any sacrifice on the part of an overrewarded employee to restore equity 
is likely to be transitory, as the person would soon find that the inequity could be reduced in 
more favorable (i.e., less costly) ways than reducing outcomes or increasing inputs.  They found 
that there was an effect of time on the quantity and quality of work produced by overrewarded 
subjects: subjects exhibited reduced work quantity and increased quality relative to equitably 
paid subjects in the first two-hour period (in accordance with equity theory’s predictions 
concerning piece-rate pay), but this difference was not manifest in the second two-hour period, 
indicating that attempts to reduce inequity declined in that time period.  However, the results of 
this study may have been contaminated by the manipulation used to induce overreward: subjects 
were told they were not qualified for the job, which, as noted earlier, may lead to alterations in 
subjects’ work performance due to changes in their perceptions of job security and/or self-esteem 
(Andrews & Valenzi, 1970; Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Pritchard, 1969; Lawler, 1973).   
 In any case, the potential moderating effect of the passage of time on the propensity to 
respond to inequity introduces an important caveat to the framework presented above.  In effect, 
the framework implies that the stakeholder must be able to act relatively quickly based on its 
perceptions of the degree of inequity in its relationship with the FO: if the stakeholder does not 
have the capacity to act quickly on its perceptions, the passage of time may act to reduce its 
propensity to take action (irrespective of whether this action is aimed at helping or harming the 
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FO); however, it is not expected that such a propensity will be completely eliminated.  The 
import of this time component should be greater for overrewarded stakeholders than for 
underrewarded ones. 
Beyond the idea that the tension associated with perceptions of inequity generally 
diminishes over time, one must consider that various other forces may alter current conditions in 
ways that alter perceptions of equity/inequity.  Such dynamism is not accounted for in the above 
framework.  For example, finding out the level of pay of a newly hired employee may lead a 
longer-tenured employee to suddenly acknowledge the former as a relevant comparison other.  
As demonstrated by Chen et al. (2002), such changes in the nature of the comparison other can 
have an impact on perceptions of the equity/inequity status of the relationship: as the referent 
changes, equivalent outcomes will be seen as more or less favorable by the person, which, in 
turn, influences perceptions of the equity of the relationship.   
More generally, any number of discrete events that affect the choice of comparison other 
or perceptions of ones own or the comparison other’s inputs or outcomes can suddenly alter 
equity perceptions or make a preexisting inequity more salient that it was previously.  The 
framework depicted above does not account for the changes in equity/inequity perceptions that 
can accompany such events, and so does not describe variation in the propensity of the 
stakeholder to act due to these occurrences; however, it is possible to envision a stakeholder 
“moving” from one cell of the framework to another as conditions change in ways that alter 
perceptions of the degree of equity in the stakeholder’s relationship with the FO. 
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3.4  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter applied concepts from equity theory and expectancy theory to stakeholder 
relationships with a FO and described a framework, based on these concepts, for understanding 
stakeholder action.  The next chapter presents hypotheses based on this framework and describes 
a study designed to test those hypotheses. 
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4.0  EXPERIMENTAL HYPOTHESES AND METHODS 
 
This chapter presents hypotheses derived from the theory presented in Chapter 3 and describes 
the methods I employed to test them.  First, I present a general overview of the study, including 
the hypotheses and the experimental design.  I then discuss the vignettes used to manipulate key 
variables, the manipulations themselves and checks of those manipulations, and how the 
independent variables were measured.  Finally, I discuss my subjects and the pilot studies used to 
develop the instrument.     
 
4.1  OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
4.1.1  Hypotheses 
The purpose of my empirical study was to test hypotheses related to some of the key propositions 
implied by the equity/expectancy framework described in Chapter 3 and depicted in Figure 3.1.  
The following experimental hypotheses were tested: 
H1:  A stakeholder’s propensity to act against a FO is positively related to the degree to 
which it perceives underreward inequity in its relationship with that organization. 
 
H2: A stakeholder’s propensity to act against a FO is positively related to its expectancy 
that it can successfully undertake the proposed action and the action is likely to 
substantially promote attainment of some valued outcome. 
 
H3: A stakeholder’s propensity to engage in prosocial activities with respect to the FO is 
positively related to the degree to which it perceives overreward inequity in its 
relationship with that organization. 
 
H4: The propensity of an underrewarded stakeholder to terminate its relationship with the 
FO is negatively related to the degree of resource dependence the stakeholder exhibits 
with respect to the FO. 
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H5: The propensity of an overrewarded stakeholder to act against the FO is positively 
related to its tolerance for overreward.  
 
H6: The propensity of a stakeholder to exhibit prosocial behaviors with respect to the FO 
is negatively related to its tolerance for overreward. 
 
In order to generate data that would provide evidence either supporting or disconfirming 
my hypotheses, I developed an experiment involving two vignettes.  Each subject was asked to 
read both vignettes and respond to sets of questions concerning them.  The vignettes manipulated 
key independent variables: “type of inequity,” “expectancy,” and “resource dependence.”  
Dependent variables in my study were subjects’ propensities to take various actions against the 
FO, (including severance of their relationship with the FO), and the likelihood that they would 
engage prosocial behaviors with respect to the focal organization.  Measures of these variables 
are discussed at length in the sections concerning each of the two vignettes employed in my 
study.  The instrument is depicted in Appendix D.  Due to the length of the instrument, I have 
included only the variations corresponding to the underreward, low expectancy, low resource 
dependence condition and the overreward, high expectancy, high resource dependence condition.     
4.1.2  Experimental Design 
The experimental design was a post-test only 2X2X2 factorial design.  A factorial design uses 
two or more independent variables (factors).  Each factor comprises at least two levels.  A basic 
depiction of a 2X2X2 factorial design, adapted from Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002) is 
presented in Figure 4.1. 
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R XA1B1C1 O 
R XA1B2C1 O 
R XA2B1C1 O 
R XA2B2C1 O 
R XA1B1C2 O 
R XA1B2C2 O 
R XA2B1C2 O 
R XA2B2C2 O 
 
Figure 4.1: Experimental Design 
 
 
R represents the random assignment of subjects to conditions.  XAiBjCk  represents the treatment 
assigned to subjects in that condition (Factor A, Level i; Factor B, Level j; Factor C, Level k).  
Factors A, B, and C were the independent variables “type of inequity,” “level of expectancy,” 
and “resource dependence,” each of which included two levels (underreward/overreward, high 
expectancy/low expectancy, high resource dependence/low resource dependence).   O represents 
the post-test measurement which followed administration of the treatment.   
I conducted the experiment using a between-subjects design.  While expectancy theory 
and equity theory technically posit within-subjects effects, I used a between-subjects design for 
two reasons.  First, I was concerned about the recruitment of subjects.  Since undertaking the 
instrument corresponding to a single condition takes subjects about 20 minutes, it would be 
extremely difficult to find subjects who were willing to be exposed to all eight conditions.  
Second, I was concerned about the potential for respondent fatigue: even if it were possible to 
recruit subjects for such an extended period of time, it is unlikely that they would be able to 
focus on the tasks for that duration and differentiate meaningfully between the conditions.  For 
these reasons, it was decided that a between-subjects design would be used, despite the fact that 
this is not strictly in accordance with equity and expectancy theories.  This is, in fact, not an 
unusual approach in motivation research: it is worth noting, for example, that the substantial 
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majority of empirical tests of expectancy theory use a between-subjects design (Van Eerde & 
Thierry, 1996). 
 
4.2  VIGNETTES AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES 
I have asserted that the propensity of a stakeholder to act against a FO will be positively related 
to the degree of underreward it perceives in its relationship and its expectancy that it can 
successfully undertake action that will alleviate the underreward.  I further asserted that the type 
of action undertaken will vary with the resource dependence the stakeholder exhibits with 
respect to the FO: specifically, severance of the relationship is unlikely if the stakeholder is very 
dependent on the FO.  Therefore, for my experiment I developed two sets of vignettes in order 
manipulate subjects’ perceptions of equity in their relationships with a FO, their expectancies 
that successful action can be taken against the FO to influence outcomes of importance to them, 
and the degree of resource dependence that characterizes the stakeholder-FO relationship.   
In total, there were sixteen vignettes, each simulating the conditions of one of the four 
cells in the framework in Figure 3.1 in either a “high resource dependence” or “low resource 
dependence” condition.  Eight vignettes depict an employee’s relationship with his or her 
employer, while eight others depict a consumer’s relationship with a retailer.  In choosing these 
two relationship types, I was attempting to: 1) employ relationships that would universally be 
considered stakeholder-FO relationships according to widely used definitions of the term 
“stakeholder,” 2) address more than one type of stakeholder relationship in order to increase the 
generalizability of my results, and 3) employ relationships to which virtually all potential 
subjects could relate.     
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4.2.1  Vignette 1: Employee-Employer Relationship 
4.2.1.1  Vignette Summary.  Vignette 1 concerns an employee’s relationship with his or her 
employer.  I chose an employee-employer relationship for two general reasons.  First, employees 
are without exception regarded as important stakeholders by researchers in the field; thus, this 
vignette deals with a critical stakeholder-FO relationship.  Second, it was expected that most 
adults in the areas in which data collection was to occur would have at least some employment 
experience; therefore, putting the subjects in a situation in which they take the part of an 
employee would not subject them to an unfamiliar situation.  The vignette is loosely based on 
one used by King et al. (1993) in their equity sensitivity experiment.  The most important 
adaptations I made to their instrument involved expanding it considerably in order to allow for 
the possibility of manipulations of expectancy and resource dependence rather than just equity, 
and altering it to take place in a business school context, since it was expected that I would use 
undergraduate business students as my subjects. 
 The subject/employee in Vignette 1 is a university student, and works for the Center for 
Research in Organizational Behavior (the Center) in the university’s Faculty of Business.  At the 
beginning of the vignette, another individual, Person B, also works for the Center.  Person B is 
meant to act as a comparison other for the subject/employee.  Both the subject and Person B 
found their work at the Center through the University’s Student Employment Office.  Very little 
information concerning Person B is presented, since some variables associated with a 
comparison other (e.g., attraction) have been found to influence perceptions of equity (Griffeth, 
Vecchio, & Logan, 1989).  In the vignette, both the subject and Person B are hired to code 
questionnaires.  I stipulated that there is plentiful work for both, so the subject and Person B are 
not in competition for scarce resources: the reason for this stipulation is that some research 
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indicates that people’s preferences concerning allocation norms (e.g., equity as opposed to 
equality) may be different in situations of finite reward pools versus situations in which the 
reward pool is not limited.   
Both the subject and Person B are equally productive, and their supervisor makes a point 
of stating that they seem to be equal in terms of accuracy and speed; thus, the subject and Person 
B are equivalent in terms of key inputs into their relationships with the Center.  Both individuals 
are also “typically paid the same wage,” so the subject and Person B are likewise equal in 
regards to a key outcome from their relationships with the Center.  Because, according to 
expectancy, a person is unlikely to be motivated if the valence of an outcome is zero, the vignette 
states that “it is very important to both of you that you earn money to support yourselves while 
attending university, as you can barely afford the tuition.”  The goal of this statement is to ensure 
that the subjects perceive pay as a high-valence outcome in this case. 
In the vignette, after a few weeks of working at the Center, Person B is reassigned to a 
different research center, the Institute for the Study of Strategic Management (the ISSM).  The 
term “Institute” and its abbreviation, “ISSM” were used to contrast Person B’s new organization 
with “the Center” and so avoid confusing subjects.  At the ISSM, Person B makes a different 
wage from what she made at the Center, and so now does not make the same wage as the 
subject/employee.  It is made clear that the subject/employee is aware of this discrepancy, and 
that the discrepancy is not temporary.   
Next, the vignette describes how student employees at University research centers have 
sometimes attempted to elicit pay increases from their employers, and indicates various means 
that have been used in such attempts.  It then stipulates whether or not such attempts have 
typically been successful in actually eliciting such an outcome.  The vignette then indicates that 
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“university by-laws prevent supervisors of student employees from retaliating against employees 
who take such actions.”  The reason for the inclusion of this statement is that responses to 
inequity are expected to vary with the cost of the response (Adams, 1965).  Retaliation by the 
supervisor against the subject/employee would increase the costs of action.  This statement, then, 
is included to control for variations in the subjects’ perceptions concerning the likelihood of 
retaliation and the costs it implies. 
The final statement in Vignette 1 indicates the extent to which there are other work 
opportunities for the subject/employee on campus or in the community. 
4.2.2  Manipulation of Independent Variables in Vignette 1 
This section describes the manipulations of independent variables employed in Vignette 1.  
These manipulations are summarized in Table 4.1.  For the sake of simplicity, the table explains 
each manipulation rather than presenting the actual vignette text used for the manipulation.  The 
relevant text is highlighted in the vignettes reproduced in Appendix D.  (The highlights were not 
included in the instruments administered to experimental subjects.)   
4.2.2.1  Type of Inequity Manipulation.  King et al. (1993) found that manipulation of 
outcomes was perceived as more important than manipulations of inputs in determining 
perceptions of equity, so outcomes to the subject/employee and Person B were the basis for my 
manipulations of equity.  Pay was chosen as the outcome to be manipulated because it is a 
ubiquitous outcome in work-related studies concerning expectancy theory, and is commonly held 
to be an outcome that is high in valence.  As noted, the valence of pay to both the 
subject/employee and Person B was emphasized by including the statement, “it is very important 
to both of you that you earn money to support yourselves while attending university, as you can 
barely afford the tuition.”  A manipulation check (to be discussed later) was also incorporated 
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into the instrument in order to confirm that pay represented a high-valence outcome to the 
subject.   
 
Table 4.1: Manipulations Used in Vignette 1 
Variable Condition Situation Depicted 
Type of Inequity Underreward Person B’s wage is increased considerably compared to that of the subject/employee. 
 Overreward Person B’s wage is decreased considerably compared to that of the subject/employee.  
Expectancy High Actions by student employees aimed at securing pay increases have very often been effective. 
 Low Actions by student employees aimed at securing pay increases have never been effective. 
Resource 
Dependence High 
There are very few other job opportunities that would offer 
similar or higher wages.  
 Low There are many other job opportunities that would offer similar or higher wages. 
 
 
The type of inequity (underreward/overreward) was manipulated through the alteration of 
the wage of Person B when he/she is reassigned to the ISSM.  In the underreward condition, 
Person B’s wage increases from $9.00/hr. to $15.00/hr. (the subject/employee’s wage is 
$9.00/hr.) after the reassignment.  This substantial change in the O/I ratio of Person B was 
expected to result in perceptions of underreward by the subject/employee.  Conversely, in the 
overreward condition, Person B’s wage decreases from $15.00/hr. to $9.00/hr. while the 
subject/employee’s wage stays at $15.00.  This represents a substantial reduction in the O/I ratio 
of Person B, such that the subject/employee was expected to perceive overreward. 
4.2.2.2  Expectancy Manipulation.  For the expectancy manipulations in both the employee-
employer vignette and the customer-retailer vignette, as for the framework presented in Chapter 
3, I followed the approach of Lawler and Porter (1967) and Mowday (1979), and collapsed E-P 
expectancy and P-O expectancy into one “effort-reward” link, thereby relating effort to an 
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outcome without differentiating between the likelihood that effort will lead to a first-level 
outcome (e.g., an attempt to organize a strike will lead to successful organization of a strike) and 
the likelihood that that first-level outcome will lead to a second level-outcome (e.g., the 
successful organization of a strike will lead to a pay increase).  Mitchell (1974) notes that this is 
a common approach in empirical work concerning expectancy theory.   
Vignette 1 notes a variety of actions that student employees at University research centers 
have taken in attempts to elicit pay raises.  It states,  
“On occasion, student employees at various research centers throughout the University 
have used various means to try to obtain pay increases from their respective employers.  
They have, among other things, 1) complained to their superiors and to the Student 
Employment Office, 2) attempted to organize a union or attempted to join existing 
unions, and 3) organized impromptu “strikes,” wherein they temporarily stop reporting 
for work.”   
 
The manipulation of expectancy occurs in the following sentence.  In the low expectancy 
conditions, the vignette states, “Without exception, these attempts have been unsuccessful in 
bringing about pay raises.”  This was expected to result in the subject/employee perceiving that 
undertaking action in an attempt to elicit a pay raise was very unlikely to work: the 
subject/employee was expected to perceive a low expectancy concerning the effort-reward 
relationship.  In the high expectancy conditions, the vignette states, “Very often, these attempts 
have been successful in bringing about pay raises,” which was expected to result in the 
subject/employee perceiving that undertaking action against the FO is reasonably likely to elicit 
a raise in pay: the subject/employee was expected to perceive a high expectancy concerning the 
effort-reward relationship. 
4.2.2.3  Resource Dependence Manipulation.  In Vignette 1, I attempted to manipulate the 
subject/employee’s perception of his resource dependence on the FO by adjusting the availability 
of similar (or better) job opportunities.  As noted, Vignette 1 induces the perception that the 
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subject/employee’s job and the money it brings in are high in valence.  If there are very few 
similar work opportunities available, the subject/employee is highly dependent on the Center for 
money, a key resource.  If, on the other hand, alternative job opportunities are plentiful, this 
resource dependence is greatly reduced.  Accordingly, in the high resource dependence 
conditions, the final sentence in the vignette reads, “…there are very few other work 
opportunities on campus or in the community that would offer you pay similar to or higher than 
what you make now,” while in the low resource dependence conditions it reads, “…there are 
many other work opportunities on campus or in the community that would offer you pay similar 
to or higher than what you make now.”  In the overreward scenarios, the “higher than” 
stipulation was not included – its inclusion in the underreward scenario was necessary to suggest 
that working elsewhere might allow the subject/employee to reduce the inequity by leaving the 
Center: working elsewhere for the same pay could maintain the inequity.     
 The manipulations from the vignette were summarized immediately before the measures.  
Though there was some concern that this might make the nature of the manipulations too clear 
and thereby result in demand effects – that is, in subjects attempting to answer in such a way as 
to support (or contradict) my hypotheses – it was decided that such a summary was necessary 
due to the length and complexity of the vignette: I wanted to avoid leaving the subjects confused 
about what information was important, or having them focus on one manipulation at the expense 
of the others. 
4.2.3  Action Measures Used for Vignette 1 
The main goal of the action measures – the independent variables – was to address the likelihood 
that the subject/employee would take action against the FO, the Center.  For that reason, the 
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vignette was followed by a set of questions regarding the likelihood that the subject/employee 
would engage in such activities. 
 The potential stakeholder actions identified in the vignette and the measures 
corresponding to it needed to be representative of the variety of possible actions that the 
subject/employee might take in the situation described in the vignette and the variety of possible 
responses to inequity described in the literature, while at the same time remaining practical and 
in accordance with common sense.  The “list” of possible actions was developed in consultation 
with a variety of individuals.  I developed a preliminary list.  I then consulted with two faculty 
members and three PhD students who were familiar with the vignette, and adapted the list in 
accordance with their suggestions concerning amendments and additions.  Finally, I consulted 
with five of the subjects employed in a preliminary test of my instrument (to be discussed later); 
however, no adaptations to the list were made based on this consultation.  Actions included 
correspond to responses to inequity in work settings, such as complaints, manipulation of effort, 
acquiescence (i.e., doing nothing), turnover, sabotage, shirking, absenteeism, strike, 
unionization, and cognitive readjustment.  The differences between the costs of undertaking the 
various actions were a concern, because responses to inequity are likely to vary with their cost.  
Therefore, for those actions which could not be undertaken at a negligible cost, the cost of the 
action in time and/or money was stated in order to control perceptions of this variable.  The 
actual measures employ seven-point Likert scales anchored with “extremely unlikely” and 
“extremely likely” to denote the propensity for the subject/employee to take the corresponding 
action.  These measures are reproduced in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Action Measures for Vignette 1 
In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would:  
                
                 Extremely                     Extremely 
                  Unlikely         Likely 
1.  Complain to your supervisor at the Center in an 
attempt to get a pay raise for yourself and other 
employees at the Center? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.  Complain to administrators at the Student Employee 
Office in an attempt to get a pay raise for yourself and 
other employees at the Center? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.  Do nothing about the situation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.  Put more effort into your work at the Center? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.  Put less effort into your work at the Center? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.  Purposely commit coding errors in your work at the 
Center? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7.  Call in sick to the Center the next time you want a day 
off? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8.  Attempt to organize a strike by student employees at 
the Center?  (This will take about 12 hours & will cost 
you a day’s pay.  There are no other costs associated with 
this action.) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
9.  Participate in a strike organized by other student 
employees at the Center?  (This will take 6 hours & will 
cost you a day’s pay.  There are no other costs associated 
with this action.) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
10.  Try to reduce your workload at the Center (while 
working the same number of hours)? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11.  Start trying to find another job? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12.  Quit your job at the Center? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13.  Accept the idea that your work at the Center is only 
worth $9.00 per hour? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14.  Attempt to organize a union drive by student 
employees at the Center?  (This will take about 12 hours.  
There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
15.  Vote in favor of joining an existing union of student 
employees? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
16.  Advise others to seek employment at the Center? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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4.2.4  Prosocial Action Measure for Vignette 1 
I hypothesized that prosocial, or “helping” activities on the part of the stakeholder should vary 
with the degree to which overreward is perceived in the stakeholder’s relationship with the FO.  
For this reason, I needed to include a measure of the propensity of the stakeholder to engage in 
such an activity.  Since the main purpose of my study was to investigate stakeholder action 
directed against the FO in order to sanction it rather than support it, I restricted myself to a single 
item for this measure.  For the employee-employer vignette, I created a situation where the 
subject/employee was asked to work late at the Center one night as a favor to his supervisors: the 
likelihood of the subject/employee doing so was assessed using a seven-point Likert anchored 
with “extremely unlikely” and “extremely likely.”  For Vignette 1, then, the prosocial measure 
was as follows: 
 
Your supervisors have asked you to work a few extra hours at the Center one day next week to 
complete the coding of a specific batch of questionnaires that they need finished soon.  Under the 
Guidelines of the Student Employment Office, you are only allowed to be paid for a certain 
number of hours of work at the Center every week, so you would not make any additional money 
by complying – you would essentially be volunteering in order to help out your supervisors and 
the Center.  The Guidelines of the Student Employment Office also stipulate that you are not 
required to comply with requests like this and your supervisors assure you that there will be no 
repercussions if you choose not to. 
   
                                   Extremely                      Extremely 
                                            Unlikely         Likely 
21.  What is the likelihood that you will agree to work extended hours at 
the Center one day next week, as your supervisors have asked? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4.2.5  Manipulation Checks for Vignette 1 
For Vignette 1, four manipulation checks were employed to ensure that the manipulations used 
in the vignette were effective.  The purpose of these questions was to assess whether or not the 
subject understood her position in the scenario.  Put another way, these manipulation checks 
permitted me to identify the accuracy of the subject’s perceptions of my independent variables: 
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type of inequity, expectancy, and resource dependence.  Given that an outcome reasonably high 
in valence is an important factor in motivation according to expectancy theory, in addition to 
questions concerning the manipulations of the independent variables, I included a question to 
assess the extent to which the subject found the outcome (wage, in this case) to be a high-valence 
outcome.  If subjects responded in ways that were not in accordance with my hypotheses, I could 
use evidence from these manipulation checks to rule out (or in) the idea that their responses were 
due to a misperception of the independent variables.  
4.2.5.1  Valence Check.  For Vignette 1, a single-item measure was used to assess subjects’ 
perceptions of the valence of their hourly wage.  The valence check was as follows:  
 
17.  In the above situation, how important to you is your hourly wage? 
(1= not at all, 7= very important) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
In the expectancy literature, valences are usually operationalized as “important-unimportant,” 
“attractive-unattractive,” or “desirable-undesirable” (Mitchell, 1974).  Thus, my 
operationalization of valence as “importance” is in accordance with the approaches typically 
used in expectancy research.  If subjects’ responses to this question were low, my study would be 
severely jeopardized.  In expectancy theory, outcome valence is a critical determinant of 
motivation: a zero-valence outcome is not likely to result in any motivation.  A subject/employee 
for whom the hourly wage is not at all important can be seen as regarding hourly wage as a zero-
valence outcome, and therefore would not be expected to take any action against the FO in order 
to increase receipt of that outcome.  In equity theory, motivation comes from a comparison of 
O/I ratios.  A zero-valence outcome would presumably not be regarded as a relevant outcome, 
and so would not be included in the O/I ratio: again one would not expect the subject/employee 
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to take any action against the FO.  Responses to this question were not expected to vary across 
conditions.   
4.2.5.2  Type of Inequity Manipulation Check.  For Vignette 1, the type of inequity 
manipulation check was: 
20.  In the above situation, do you feel under-rewarded or overrewarded 
compared to Person B? 
                 1=very under-rewarded, 7=very overrewarded 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
The purpose of this check was to assess whether or not subjects actually perceived themselves to 
be in the inequity situation corresponding to their experimental condition.  Mean responses to 
this question were expected to differ across the two “type of inequity” conditions.  Specifically, 
those subjects in the underreward condition were expected to evince a mean response 
significantly lower than that of the subjects in the overreward condition.  A non-significant 
difference would indicate that my type of inequity manipulation was ineffective.  The mean 
response for subjects in the underreward condition was expected to be less than 4, while for 
subjects in the overreward condition, the mean was expected to be greater than 4.   
4.2.5.3  Expectancy Manipulation Check.  For Vignette 1, the expectancy manipulation check 
was:   
                               Extremely                     Extremely 
                                 Unlikely                         Likely 
18.  In the above situation, what is the likelihood that taking action in an 
attempt to bring about a pay increase where you currently work will, in 
fact, result in a pay increase? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
This check was used to determine whether or not subjects perceived the likelihood of successful 
action against the Center in a way consistent with the expectancy condition to which they were 
exposed.  Mean responses to this question were expected to differ across the two expectancy 
conditions.  Specifically, those subjects in the low expectancy condition were expected to 
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manifest a mean response significantly lower than that of the subjects in the high expectancy 
condition.  A non-significant difference would indicate that my expectancy manipulation was 
ineffective.   
4.2.5.4  Resource Dependence Manipulation Check.  For Vignette 1, the resource dependence 
manipulation check was:  
                                          Extremely                 Extremely 
                                  Unlikely                      Likely 
19.  In the above situation, if you tried to, what would be the likelihood 
of you finding a different job that pays as much as your current job at the 
Center? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
The purpose of this check was to assess whether or not subjects actually perceived themselves to 
be dependent on the Center for an income, a critical resource.  Mean responses to this question 
were expected to differ across the two resource dependence conditions: those subjects in the low 
resource dependence condition were expected to exhibit a mean response significantly higher 
than that of the subjects in the overreward condition.  A non-significant difference would 
indicate that my resource dependence manipulation was ineffective.   
4.2.6  Vignette 2:  Customer-Retailer Relationship 
4.2.6.1  Vignette Summary.  Vignette 2 concerns a customer’s relationship with a retailer.  The 
reasons for my choice of this relationship were essentially the same as my reasons for using the 
employee-employer scenario: customers are without exception regarded as a critical stakeholder 
(at least, of those organizations that have customers), and I expected that virtually every one of 
my potential subjects has been in a customer-retailer relationship, so this situation represented 
another relationship with which my subjects would be familiar.   
 In Vignette 2, both the subject/customer and a comparison other, Person C, are freelance 
consultants who have been hired to do some work for a particular business.  As in Vignette 1, I 
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provided very little information concerning the comparison other, since some variables 
associated with a comparison other have been found to influence perceptions of equity.  For the 
same reason, I stipulated that the two are not associated with each other in any way except that 
they share a small office space, and I indicated that they are working on different parts of the 
same project; thus, they are not threatened by one another.  The reason for these stipulations is, 
again, that responses to inequity may vary depending on the nature of type of association 
between the person and the comparison other: for example, overreward compared to a friend 
might lead to greater dissonance than overreward compared to a stranger, and thereby increase 
the likelihood of a behavioral response to the inequity.   
 In the vignette, both the subject/customer and Person C buy new laptop computers from 
Blu-Chip, a local electronics retailer.  The computers are “house” models, built by Blu-Chip.  
The reason for this is that I wanted the source of the inequity to be clear: if the computer was 
from another company, the underreward (which, as will be explained later, involves the laptop 
ceasing to function) might be attributed by subjects to the manufacturer of the computer rather 
that to Blu-Chip.  Since the action measures (to be discussed below) all relate to Blu-Chip, this 
would compromise my results substantially.  Both the subject/customer’s laptop and Person C’s 
laptop are heavily customized.  This allowed me to create a situation of resource dependence for 
the high resource dependence condition.   
 Both the subject/customer and Person C purchase a “Service Agreement” that offers 
repair or replacement of the computers (at no charge) if there are problems due to normal wear 
and tear, or certain other reasons.  As will be explained, I needed to be slightly ambiguous 
concerning exactly what is covered by the service agreement in order for my type of inequity 
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manipulation to be effective.  The laptop is identified as a critical resource for the 
subject/customer. 
In the vignette, several months after the purchases, both the subject/customer’s computer 
and Person C’s computer are accidentally damaged when their office sprinkler system is 
activated.  Since the two are independent contractors, their employer’s insurance will not cover 
the repair or replacement of the computers.  This stipulation was made to ensure that the 
subject/customer had to turn to Blu-Chip for help in this situation.  The subject/customer and 
Person C take their computers back to Blu-Chip on separate occasions to have them assessed and 
ask if, by chance, Blu-Chip will cover the repairs.  Each is told that their computer’s CPU is 
“fried” and will need to be replaced.  In each condition, only one person – either the 
subject/customer or Person C – has his CPU replaced at no charge.  In the overreward conditions 
only, Blu-Chip offers to replace the subject/customer’s CPU, but nonetheless the 
subject/customer wants a faster CPU (a “B6”) put in at no charge.  This stipulation was 
necessary because, given that I assert that “aggrandizing” behavior is a possible response to 
overreward, I needed to create a situation in which an overrewarded subject could place 
additional demands on Blu-Chip. 
Next, the vignette describes how, in the past, Blu-Chip customers have taken a variety of 
actions in attempts to have their desires met by Blu-Chip.  It then stipulates whether or not such 
attempts are typically successful.  Finally, the vignette states whether or not the necessary CPU 
is available anywhere other than Blu-Chip.    
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4.2.7  Manipulation of Independent Variables in Vignette 2 
This section describes the manipulations of independent variables employed in Vignette 2.  
These manipulations are summarized in Table 4.3.  Once again, for the sake of simplicity, the 
table explains each manipulation rather than presenting the actual vignette text used for it.  The 
relevant text is highlighted in the vignettes reproduced in Appendix D.   
 
Table 4.3: Manipulations Used in Vignette 2 
Variable Condition Situation Depicted 
Type of 
Inequity Underreward 
Blu-Chip repairs Person C’s computer at no charge, but does 
not repair the subject/customer’s computer.   
 Overreward Blu-Chip repairs the subject/customer’s computer at no charge, but does not repair Person C’s. 
Expectancy High 
Actions by Blu-Chip customers aimed at getting Blu-Chip to 
meet their desires have very often resulted in Blu-Chip doing 
so. 
 Low Actions by Blu-Chip customers aimed at getting Blu-Chip to meet their desires have never resulted in Blu-Chip doing so. 
Resource 
Dependence High 
The CPU the subject/customer needs is not available anywhere 
except Blu-Chip.  
 Low The CPU the subject/customer needs is readily available from a variety of other retailers. 
 
4.2.7.1  Type of Inequity Manipulation.  As noted, manipulation of outcomes may affect 
perceptions of equity more than manipulation of inputs (King et al., 1993).  Accordingly, I 
manipulated an outcome in Vignette 2.  The specific tangible outcome in this vignette is a CPU, 
the central processing unit of a laptop computer; however, in more general terms, the 
manipulated outcome is “service recovery,” the extent to which a retailer attempts to change a 
negative situation into a positive one.  This is, of course, a universal concern in customer-retailer 
relationships, and an effective service recovery should be a high-valence outcome to the 
customer.  I attempted to emphasize the valence of this outcome by emphasizing the importance 
of the product relevant to the service recovery episode, the subject/customer’s laptop computer.  
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To this end, I included the statement, “…your new laptop is a critical resource to you.”  As with 
Vignette 1, I included a manipulation check (discussed later) to verify that the subject/customer 
viewed the repair of their computer as a high-valence outcome.     
 I manipulated the type of inequity (underreward/overreward) in Vignette 2 by varying the 
service recovery practices of the retailer.  In the underreward conditions, Blu-Chip offers to 
repair Person C’s laptop at no charge, but refuses to do the same for the subject/customer.  In the 
overreward conditions the situation is reversed: Blu-Chip refuses to repair Person C’s laptop but 
repairs the subject/customer’s at no charge. 
4.2.7.2  Expectancy Manipulation.  As noted earlier, for both vignettes I collapsed the two 
types of expectancy into one “effort-reward” connection.  Vignette 2 identifies a variety of 
actions that Blu-Chip customers have taken in the past to attempt to have their desires met by 
Blu-Chip.  It states,  
“In the past, customers have taken a variety of actions to attempt to get their desires met 
by Blu-Chip.  Among other things, they have complained to Blu-Chip management, sued 
Blu-Chip in small claims court or taken other legal action, posted the story of their 
concerns with Blu-Chip on the internet, filed complaints about Blu-Chip with the Better 
Business Bureau, and attempted to organize boycotts of Blu-Chip among their friends or 
the general public.”   
 
The expectancy manipulation follows immediately.  In the low expectancy conditions, the 
vignette states, “However, without exception, these actions have failed to convince Blu-Chip to 
fulfill the customer’s desires.”  This was expected to result in the subject/customer perceiving 
that taking action against Blu-Chip is likely to be fruitless, and lower expectancy.  In the high 
expectancy conditions, the vignette states, “Very often, these actions have convinced Blu-Chip to 
fulfill the customers’ desires,” which was expected to result in the subject/customer having high 
expectancy concerning the effort-reward relationship.      
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4.2.7.3  Resource Dependence Manipulation.  In Vignette 2, I attempted to manipulate the 
subject/employee’s perception of his resource dependence on the FO by adjusting the number of 
other retailers from which he could obtain the desired CPU.  As noted, Vignette 2 induces the 
perception that a working computer (and thus, a CPU) is a high-valence outcome for the 
subject/employee.  If there are no other retailers that sell the required CPU, the subject/customer 
will be highly dependent on Blu-Chip for this resource.  On the other hand, if many other 
retailers sell the required CPU, resource dependence is low.  Accordingly,  for the underreward 
situations, in the high resource dependence conditions, the final sentence in the vignette reads, 
“Due to the highly customized nature of your computer, and the fact that its CPU is a component 
manufactured especially for Blu-Chip, you would not be able to find a replacement CPU from 
another retailer,” while in the low resource dependence condition it reads, “It would be easy for 
you to find another retailer that can provide you with a suitable CPU for about the same price 
that Blu-Chip will charge you.”  In the overreward situations, (where Blu-Chip has offered to 
replace the subject/customer’s CPU, but the subject/customer asks for a better CPU, the “B6”), 
the final sentence in the high resource dependence conditions reads, “Blu-Chip manufactures the 
B6, so it is the only place you will be able to purchase one,” while in the low resource 
dependence conditions, it reads, “The B6 is readily available from a wide variety of computer 
retailers.” 
 As with those of Vignette 1, the manipulations from Vignette 2 were summarized 
immediately before the measures.  The explanation for this approach was given in the section 
concerning the manipulations used in Vignette 1.   
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4.2.8  Action Measures Used for Vignette 2 
The measures following Vignette 2 were used to assess the likelihood that the subject/customer 
would take action against the FO, in this case, Blu-Chip.  The “list” of possible stakeholder 
actions in this scenario was developed in the same manner as the list of actions corresponding to 
Vignette 1, which is discussed in the section concerning the measures associated with that 
vignette.  As with the actions associated with Vignette 1, where appropriate I stated the costs in 
time and/or money associated with the actions.  The measures for Vignette 2 employ seven-point 
Likert scales anchored with “extremely unlikely” and “extremely likely.”  The measures 
associated with Vignette 2 are reproduced in Table 4.4. 
4.2.8.1  Prosocial Action Measure for Vignette 2.  As noted earlier, I hypothesized that a 
stakeholder might engage in “helping” activities to in response to overreward in its relationship 
with the FO.  As in Vignette 1, a single-item measure was employed to assess the 
subject/customer’s propensity to engage in such activities.  For Vignette 2, I employed a 
situation where the subject/customer had the option of providing a positive testimonial about his 
interaction with Blu-Chip for use in an advertisement.  The prosocial measure for Vignette 2 
reads: 
 
In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
        Extremely             Extremely 
 Unlikely                             Likely 
5.  Provide a positive testimonial about your experience at  
     Blu-Chip for use in a Blu-Chip advertisement?   
     (You would not be paid for your testimonial.) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
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Table 4.4: Action Measures Associated with Vignette 2 
 
In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would:   
 
                                   Extremely                                              Extremely 
                                Unlikely                    Likely 
1.  Buy more products from Blu-Chip? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.  Make a point of shopping at Blu-Chip in the future? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.  Advise others to shop at Blu-Chip? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.  Advise others not to shop at Blu-Chip?  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.  Provide a positive testimonial about your experience at 
     Blu-Chip for use in a Blu-Chip advertisement?   
     You would not be paid for your testimonial.) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
6.  Refuse to shop at Blu-Chip in the future? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7.  Post negative information concerning Blu-Chip on 
the internet? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
8.  Make false negative statements condemning Blu-Chip 
on the internet? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
9.  Attempt to organize a boycott of Blu-Chip among 
your friends and associates?  (This will take 3 hours of 
your time.  There are no other costs associated with this 
action.) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
10.  Attempt to organize a boycott of Blu-Chip among 
the general public?  (This will take 8 hours of your time.  
There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11.  Participate in a boycott of Blu-Chip organized by 
others? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12.  Steal or vandalize Blu-Chip property if you knew 
you wouldn’t get caught? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
13.  Complain about Blu-Chip to the Better Business 
Bureau? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14.  Take legal action against Blu-Chip?  (This will take 
5 hours of your time and will cost $40.  There are no 
other costs associated with this action.) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
15.  Complain to Blu-Chip management (e.g., in person, 
or by phone, mail, or email)? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
16.  Sue Blu-Chip in small claims court?  (This will take 
5 hours of your time and will cost $40.  There are no 
other costs associated with this action.) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
17.  Do nothing about the situation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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4.2.9  Manipulation Checks for Vignette 2 
As for Vignette 1, four manipulation checks were employed to ensure that the manipulations 
used in Vignette 2 were effective.  The reasons for the manipulation checks were presented in the 
section concerning the manipulation checks for Vignette 1.   
4.2.9.1  Valence Check.  For Vignette 2, a single-item valence check was used to ensure that 
having a working computer was seen as a high-valence outcome by the subject/customer.  The 
valence check read:   
18.  In the above situation, how important is it for you to have a working 
computer?  (1=not at all, 7=very important) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
As noted earlier, the operationalization of valence as “importance” is common in the literature 
concerning expectancy theory.  The reasons why the perception of the outcome as high in 
valence is important were outlined in the section concerning the valence check for Vignette 1.  
Mean responses to this question were not expected to vary across conditions. 
4.2.9.2  Type of Inequity Manipulation Check.  For Vignette 2, the inequity type manipulation 
check was: 
21.  In the above situation, do you feel under-
rewarded or overrewarded when you compare yourself 
with Person C? 
        1=very under-rewarded, 7=very overrewarded 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
This check was used to asses the extent to which subjects perceived underreward or overreward 
relative to Person C in their relationship with Blu-Chip.  Subjects in the overreward condition 
were expected to evince a significantly higher mean than subjects in the underreward condition.  
A non-significant difference would indicate that my type of inequity manipulation check was 
inadequate. 
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4.2.9.3  Expectancy Manipulation Check.  For Vignette 2, the expectancy manipulation check 
was: 
               Extremely                                      Extremely 
            Unlikely          Likely  
19.  In the above situation, what is the likelihood that 
taking action (e.g., complaining, organizing a boycott, 
etc.) in an attempt to get Blu-Chip to fix your computer 
at no cost would, in fact, result in Blu-Chip doing so? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
The purpose of this check was to ensure that subjects did indeed perceive the likelihood that 
action taken against Blu-Chip would result in their desires being met to an extent appropriate for 
their experimental condition.  Mean responses to this question were expected to differ across the 
two expectancy conditions.  Specifically, those in the low expectancy condition were expected to 
manifest a mean response significantly lower than that of subject in the high expectancy 
condition.  As with the type of inequity manipulation check, a non-significant difference would 
indicate that my manipulation was unsuccessful. 
4.2.9.4  Resource Dependence Manipulation Check.  For Vignette 2, the resource dependence 
manipulation check was: 
 
    Extremely                                      Extremely 
     Unlikely       Likely 
20.  In the above situation, what is the likelihood of 
you being able to obtain a replacement CPU from a 
retailer other than Blu-Chip?  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
This question was used to assess the extent to which the subject/customer perceived herself as 
dependent on Blu-Chip for a critical resource: a new CPU.  Subjects in the low resource 
dependence condition were expected to evince a significantly lower mean than those in the high 
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resource dependence condition.  Again, a non-significant difference would indicate an 
ineffective manipulation. 
 
4.3  OTHER MEASURES 
4.3.1  Demographic Variables 
Another set of questions asked for basic information about the subject.  It was not expected that 
most of these variables would be included in my statistical tests.  However, there is at least some 
evidence that responses to inequity can be moderated by gender (Reis & Jackson, 1981) and 
culture (Van Yperen & Buunk, 1991; Scheer et al., 2003) in some circumstances, so I considered 
it important to acquire data considering those variables.  The questions concerning demographic 
variables are presented below.   
1.  What is your sex? ___ Female ___ Male 
2.  How old are you? 
 
 ___ Under 18 ___ 18-19 ___20-22 ___23-25 ___26-30     ___over 30 
 
3.  In what country were you raised?  If you were raised in more than one country,  
    please name the country whose culture you identify with most.  _________________ 
 
4.  If you are a student, what is your major and/or concentration?  __________________ 
 
5.   With what race or ethnicity do you most identify?  (Check only one.) 
 
      ___Asian    ___White/Caucasian    ___Black/African-American  ___Hispanic/Latino 
      ___Native American/First Nations             ___Other (Please specify) _______________ 
 
6.  How many years of part-time or full-time work experience do you have?  _________ 
 
7.  Are you a graduate student or an undergraduate student? 
 
 ___Undergraduate  ___Graduate  ___Not a student 
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4.3.2  Equity Sensitivity   
Given recent work on equity theory and variations in individuals’ sensitivities to it, I decided to 
measure equity sensitivity and use it as a covariate in my statistical tests.  Using equity 
sensitivity in my model allowed me to acknowledge a large number of potential individual-level 
moderators of subjects’ responses to inequity in a single measure, since the influence of such 
variables should manifest itself in subjects’ responses to the equity sensitivity measure.   
 Subjects’ equity sensitivity was measured using an adaptation of the Equity Sensitivity 
Index (ESI), which was developed by Huseman, Hatfield, and Miles (1985) to assess the 
differences in individuals’ sensitivities to inequity. The ESI comprises five forced-distribution 
items.  For each item, subjects distribute ten points between a “benevolent” response and an 
“entitled” response.  Points given to benevolent responses are summed to give a total from 0-50.   
The ESI was originally developed to assess equity sensitivity only in employee-employer 
relationships.  Therefore, I adapted the instrument of Huseman et al. (1985) to make it more 
general and therefore more applicable to a wide variety of stakeholder-FO relationships.  
Whereas the original ESI only measured equity sensitivity in employees’ relationships with their 
employers, the adapted instrument relates to equity sensitivity in individuals’ relationships with 
other persons, or with groups or organizations.  In general, I broadened the possible “comparison 
others” from the organization for which the subject is employed to any entity with which the 
subject has a relationship.   
For example, the first sentence of the ESI reads, “The questions below ask what you’d 
like for your relationship to be with any organization for which you might work,” while the first 
sentence of my adaptation of the ESI reads, “The questions below ask you about your 
preferences with respect to relationships that you have with other people, or with groups or 
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organizations (like businesses).”  Similarly, the first item in the original ESI has subjects divide 
ten points between the two statements, “In any organization I might work for it would be more 
important for me to get from the organization,” and, “In any organization I might work for it 
would be more important for me to give to the organization,” while in my adaptation the two 
statements read, “In any relationship that I might have with another person, or with a group or an 
organization, it is more important for me to get from the relationship,” and, “In any relationship 
that I might have with another person, or with a group or organization, it is more important for 
me to give to the relationship.  Both the original ESI and my adaptation of it are presented in 
Appendix C.  The critical alterations of the instrument are highlighted in my adaptation of the 
ESI.   
4.3.2.1  Reliability and Validity of the ESI.  King and Miles (1994) assessed the reliability and 
validity of the ESI using samples of students, teachers, utility workers, bank workers, and 
volunteers.  With regard to internal consistency reliability, Cronbach’s Alphas ranged from .79 to 
.88 across the five samples.  Regarding convergent validity, the ESI exhibited the predicted 
correlations with exchange ideology, perceived distributive justice, altruism, social desirability, 
locus of control, Machiavellianism, and the non-Protestant work ethic.  Mixed results were found 
when compared to pro-Protestant work ethic, and the expected relationship with input vs. 
outcome orientation was not found.  Correlations indicated no consistent substantial overlap 
between ESI and demographic variables, self-esteem, satisfaction, organizational commitment, 
or turnover propensity, indicating discriminant validity.  Factor analysis of each sample 
suggested that equity sensitivity is a unidimensional construct, further supporting construct 
validity.  In another study, Miles, Hatfield, and Huseman (1989) found test-retest reliability of 
.80 for the ESI.  While I did not undertake extensive attempts to validate my adaptation of the 
 179
ESI, it did evince acceptable levels of internal consistency reliability.  Results of these reliability 
tests are reported in the section concerning my pilot studies.  
4.3.2.2  Use of the ESI.  As originally conceived, scoring of the ESI is sample-specific, with 
subjects -0.5 standard deviations or further from the mean categorized as “entitleds”, while 
subjects +0.5 SD or further from the mean categorized as “benevolents.”  Subjects within ±0.5 
SD from the mean are ascribed to the “equity sensitive” category.  The sample-specific scoring 
and trichotomous categorization of subjects has led to criticism of the ESI, particularly from 
Sauley and Bedeian (2000).  In particular, sample-specific scoring means that an individual 
could be classified as a benevolent in one study, but an entitled in another.  This contradicts the 
idea that equity sensitivity is a relatively stable trait.  The trichotomous categorization of subjects 
implies that very similar subjects might be categorized differently, exaggerating the differences 
between them.  In order to overcome these shortfalls associated with the instrument, I employed 
the technique of researchers such as Mueller & Clarke (1998) and O’Neill & Mone (1998), who 
used the ESI as a continuous measure.       
 
4.4  SUBJECTS AND DATA COLLECTION 
4.4.1  Rationale for the Choice of Subjects 
All subjects (except those in my first pilot study) were undergraduate business administration 
students at various North American universities.  There were a few reasons for this choice.  The 
first reason was the relatively easy access I have to students.  It was anticipated that I would have 
little difficulty recruiting subjects from classes taught by myself or my colleagues: furthermore, I 
believed that students would be more likely to be willing to undertake an instrument 
approximately twenty minutes in length than would other potential subjects.  A second, related 
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reason was the large number of subjects necessary.  Due to the fact that I employed eight 
different conditions, I required over two hundred subjects: students represent a relatively 
plentiful source of data.  Lastly, because of the nature of the relationships depicted in the 
vignettes – employee-employer and customer-retailer – I thought students represented a valid 
source of data: the vast majority of subjects had some work experience, and so could relate to the 
employee-employer scenario.  Likewise, all were consumers of some sort of products (and, it 
was expected, a great many had been consumers of computers or other electronic goods), so it 
was thought that they could also reasonably see themselves in a situation like that depicted in the 
customer-retailer vignette.  Thus, the vignettes present relationships with which my student 
subjects would have had some experience, which reduces the extent to which the use of students 
represents a threat to the external validity of my study.   
4.4.2  A Note on Individuals as Stakeholders 
As noted earlier, the term “stakeholder” crosses levels: a stakeholder can be an individual, a 
group, or an organization.  Thus, one might argue that by using individual students as 
stakeholders I was limiting the generalizability of my findings to other situations where the 
stakeholder is an individual.  However, there are a few reasons (aside from the obvious reason 
that many stakeholders are, in fact, individuals) why the use of individuals as subjects was 
reasonable.     
First, existing accounts of stakeholder action explicitly focus on well-defined stakeholder 
groups, while eschewing investigation of individual-level variables that influence stakeholder 
action.  For example, the theory of Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003), as they note, is specific to 
groups or “collectives of individuals,” where individuals are conscious of their membership in 
the collective; thus, the major existing approach to understanding stakeholder action is focused 
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on collective action rather than the conditions that precipitate an individual being willing to take 
part in such action: in the end, though, any stakeholder group or organization engaging in action 
against a FO is made up of individuals who are motivated by individual-level variables to take 
part in a collective action.  By looking at the motivations of individuals, I address the underlying 
reasons why an individual might take part in the action of a stakeholder group or organization 
while augmenting the work on stakeholder action by addressing it at the individual level. 
As Cordano, Frieze, and Ellis (2004: 35) state, “research at the individual level of 
stakeholder behavior could fulfill critical needs addressed in some of the recent developments in 
stakeholder theory.”  They assert that “One important element in developing a more complete 
stakeholder theory is an improved understanding of what motivates individuals to act on an 
emergent issue…” (Cordano et al., 2004: 27).  They argue that understanding individual-level 
motivation would facilitate an understanding of stakeholder intentions and behaviors, and by 
gaining a better understanding of the effects of individuals’ attitudes on their behavioral 
intentions we can increase our understanding of stakeholder relations: even where the 
stakeholder is a group or organization that undertakes action as a collective, it is critical to 
understand how individuals become motivated to engage in these collective actions.   
Cordano et al. (2004) suggest, therefore, that individual level variables can and should be 
used to investigate and predict stakeholder action.  Key (1999), likewise, acknowledges the value 
of engaging in analysis of stakeholders and their interests at the individual level rather than 
focusing exclusively on “stakeholder groups.”  My study, interpreted in the simplest way, is an 
account of individual level variables that influence stakeholders to take action against a FO, and 
so begins to fill the void in the literature identified by Cordano et al. (2004).      
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Furthermore, the decisions of many stakeholder groups or organizations are not the result 
of the inclinations of an entire collective; rather, they often stem from the opinions of one or a 
few key decisionmakers or authority figures.  Frooman (2000) acknowledged this idea when he 
used individual leaders and “influencers” (members who interact with policy makers and other 
organizations) within organizations to represent stakeholder organizations in his study.  Simply 
put, most people in a stakeholder group or organization will not be directly involved in the 
decision to take action against a FO; rather, it is the motivation of these key leaders and 
influencers to undertake action that is critical in determining a wide variety of the actions of 
these stakeholders.  Thus, much action by stakeholder groups or organizations is best understood 
if it is reduced to the motivations of key individuals within those groups or organizations.  
Finally, as noted earlier, some stakeholder researchers argue that definitions of 
stakeholder groups are socially constructed and/or subjective (McLarney, 2001; Winn, 2001), 
and that “generic” stakeholder groups are not, in fact, homogenous (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 
2003): within a stakeholder group, there are differences among stakeholder types due to 
variations in culture, values, and a myriad of other individual-level variables that differ across 
key members of the group.  Gibson (2000: 251) states, “…stakeholder names are just a 
convenient shorthand way of describing many particular individuals.”  Thus, for example, it may 
not be appropriate to think of “customers” as a meaningful stakeholder group – a finer grained 
analysis may be necessary.  If this is the case, it is reasonable to investigate members of these 
groups at the individual level rather than the group level, since individuals within the group 
might exhibit important differences in their attitudes or behaviors, or goals (Klandermans, 1984).  
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4.4.3  Data Collection   
Data were collected at five universities in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Halifax, Nova Scotia, and 
Cedar Falls, Iowa.  In addition to using my own students, I solicited other faculty members, 
including dissertation committee members, in order to use students from their classes as subjects.  
Potential subjects were asked by their instructor if they were willing to participate in an 
experiment.  They were then read an informed consent document and a set of instructions 
concerning how to undertake the exercise.  Each subject was administered an instrument 
corresponding to one of the eight experimental conditions.  All administrations were pencil-and-
paper tasks except for the second pilot study, in which instruments were emailed to subjects.  In 
producing the physical documents to be used, the experimental conditions were printed 
sequentially.  By doing this, the person administering the instrument could approximate random 
assignments of subjects to conditions by merely handing the instruments out one after the other.   
 
4.5  PILOT STUDIES AND INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT 
In the process of developing my instrument, I undertook a number of pilot studies in order to 
ensure that it was comprehensible and made sense to subjects, and that my manipulations were 
effective.  A few refinements to the instrument were made based on these pilot events.   
4.5.1  Pilot 1   
For the first pilot, I administered a preliminary version of my instrument to seventeen MBA 
students in a predominantly women’s college in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  The subjects were all 
students in a class that I was teaching at the time, and I administered the instrument to willing 
participants at the end of an evening class.  The main goal of this pilot was to see if subjects 
could understand the instrument and found the vignettes to be reasonable: since the subjects were 
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all female (with the exception of one male subject), and responses to inequity may vary across 
gender, I was less concerned with these subjects’ actual responses.  Students indicated that the 
instrument was easy to understand and the vignettes made sense; however, in addition to 
correction of minor errors and minor rewording of the vignettes, some modifications were made 
based on their input.   
First, it became clear that the relationship between the subject/customer and the 
comparison other in Vignette 2 was influencing subjects’ perceptions of that situation.  In this 
preliminary instrument, Person C was “a friend” of the subject/customer.  The result of this 
situation was that some respondents were irritated by Blu-Chip’s behavior irrespective of the 
type of inequity condition.  As noted in Chapter 3, one stakeholder’s interests may be an 
important outcome in another stakeholder’s perception of equity/inequity in his relationship with 
the FO.  In the case of Vignette 2, it appeared that because Person C was a friend, subjects were 
incorporating Blu-Chip’s treatment of him into their own equity calculations: something like 
“good treatment of my friends” was seen as a relevant outcome in the subject’s relationship with 
Blu-Chip, so, in the overreward condition, where Blu-Chip does not satisfy Person C’s wishes, 
the underreward of this friend partially offset the positive effects of the overreward experienced 
by the subject/customer. 
To address this problem, I downplayed the relationship between the subject/customer and 
Person C in Vignette 2.  Rather than having Person C be a friend of the subject/customer, I 
stated, “You are not associated with Person C in any way except that you both have recently 
been hired to do some consulting work for a local business.”  It was hoped that this would reduce 
the extent to which Person C’s treatment by Blu-Chip was incorporated into subjects’ 
perceptions of equity/inequity in their own relationships with Blu-Chip.  
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A second modification was the alteration of the wages earned by the subject/employee 
and Person B in Vignette 1.  For this pilot, the wages were $7.00/hr. and $10.00/hr. as opposed to 
$9.00/hr. and $15.00/hr.  It appeared that some subjects felt underrewarded irrespective of the 
type of inequity condition; that is, those subjects earning $10.00/hr. felt underrewarded even 
though that wage was associated with the subject/employee in the overreward condition.  I 
expected that this was due, at least in part, to the fact that I was using MBA students as opposed 
to undergraduates for this pilot: $10.00/hr. is likely to be an unsatisfying wage to many MBA 
students; however, in response to this concern, I raised the wages of all parties in all conditions 
of Vignette 1.  I also increased the difference between the wages in order to exaggerate inequity 
perceptions, though I attempted to apply reasonable limits to the wage differential. 
4.5.2  Pilot 2 
For the second pilot, I administered the revised instrument to five undergraduate business 
administration students from a second university in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (in one case, the 
subject had recently graduated).  These subjects were former students of mine: I contacted them 
by email and asked if they would do me a favor by filling out a questionnaire that I was using in 
my dissertation.  After eliciting their agreement, I emailed each a copy of the instrument in 
Microsoft Word format.  Each of these subjects was subjected to two experimental conditions.  
They indicated their responses by highlighting them in the Word document (or, in the case of the 
equity sensitivity measure, typing the appropriate numbers into the document).  Subjects then 
emailed the document back to me upon completion.   
My major goals with this administration were to assess the adequacy of the vignettes and 
how they and the questions associated with them were worded, to assess the adequacy of the sets 
of potential stakeholder actions identified in the instrument, and to get a general impression of 
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how members of the population from which I was going to derive my final subjects responded to 
it.  Accordingly, after receiving their responses to the instrument, I contacted each subject by 
telephone, asked for their general impressions, and went over their responses with them one at a 
time while asking questions about the reasoning behind them.  These subjects indicated that the 
vignettes made sense and the stakeholder actions identified represented a fairly exhaustive list of 
what they perceived as reasonable actions in the situations presented.  This pilot led to no major 
changes, though I did correct some minor errors and alter the wording of a number of questions 
in accordance with subjects’ suggestions. 
4.5.3  Pilot 3 
For the third pilot, the twice revised instrument was administered to forty-six undergraduate 
Business Administration students at a third university in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  This 
administration was done through a colleague, who printed out copies of the instrument and 
administered it two classes he taught at the university.  Completed instruments were mailed to 
me in Halifax, Nova Scotia.  This pilot allowed me to see how subjects responded to a “final” 
instrument and to verify statistically that the manipulations employed in my vignettes induced 
perceptions appropriate to the various conditions in my experiment.  All data from this pilot was 
entered into a data file in SPSS for Windows.  I used t-tests to test the experimental 
manipulations: statistical tests were run using SPSS.  No changes to the instrument were made 
based on this pilot.  I report on the manipulation checks and the reliability of my adaptation of 
the ESI below.     
4.5.3.1  Type of Inequity Manipulation.  Results of the t-tests for “type of inequity” are 
summarized in Table 4.5.  The t-test for the type of inequity manipulation checks associated with 
both vignettes indicated that, as desired, there were significant differences between subjects in 
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the underreward condition and those in the overreward condition in terms of their responses to 
the manipulation check question. 
 
Table 4.5: Pilot Study Manipulation Check for Type of Inequity 
  Condition n Mean Std. Deviation p 
Vignette 1:  
Employee-Employer Underreward 25 2.04 .790 .000 
  Overreward 21 5.10 1.411  
Vignette 2:  
Customer-Retailer Underreward 24 1.38 .647 .000 
  Overreward 21 5.19 1.289  
 
 
4.5.3.2  Expectancy Manipulation.  Results of the t-test for “expectancy” are summarized in 
Table 4.6.  The t-tests for the expectancy manipulation checks associated with both vignettes 
indicated that, as expected, there were significant differences between subjects in the high 
expectancy condition and those in the low expectancy condition in terms of their responses to the 
manipulation check question. 
 
Table 4.6: Pilot Study Manipulation Check for Expectancy 
 
Expectancy 
Condition n Mean Std. Deviation p 
Vignette 1:  
Employee-Employer Low 23 2.57 1.199 .001 
  High 23 4.13 1.604  
Vignette 2:  
Customer-Retailer Low 23 2.78 1.757 .000 
  High 22 4.95 1.430  
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4.5.3.3  Resource Dependence Manipulation.  Results of the t-test for “resource dependence” 
are summarized in Table 4.7.   
 
Table 4.7: Pilot Study Manipulation Check for Resource Dependence 
 
Resource 
Dependence 
Condition 
n Mean Std. Deviation p 
Vignette 1: 
Employee-Employer Low 24 4.83 1.880 .018 
 High 22 3.55 1.654  
Vignette 2: 
Customer-Retailer Low 23 5.78 1.445 .000 
 High 22 2.91 1.770  
 
The t-tests for the resource dependence manipulation checks associated with both vignettes 
indicated that, as desired, there were significant differences between subjects in the high resource 
dependence condition and those in the low resource dependence condition in terms of their 
responses to the manipulation check question. 
4.5.4  Reliability of ESI Adaptation 
Since I made some adaptations to the ESI, I used pilot data to compute the internal consistency 
reliability of my version of it.  Each set of two items was treated as a bipolar adjective scale.  
Accordingly, I assessed internal consistency by calculating Cronbach’s Alpha for the benevolent 
items.  Alpha was .78, which indicates satisfactory internal consistency reliability (Nunnaly, 
1978).  Item-to-total correlations ranged from .47 to .61, and Alpha would have been reduced if 
any item were removed from the scale.  A factor analysis was run to confirm the 
unidimensionality of the scale.  This analysis led to the extraction of only one factor, indicating 
that the scale is indeed unidimensional.  Overall, the adapted ESI seems to be adequate in terms 
of internal consistency reliability. 
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4.6  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter I presented the hypotheses to be tested in my study, and described the study, 
including the instrument, the manipulations and measures to be employed, and the results of pilot 
projects.  In the next chapter, I report on the results of my tests of the hypotheses. 
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5.0  RESULTS 
  
In this chapter I present the results of my various statistical analyses.  I begin with checks on my 
experimental manipulations.  I then describe factor analyses conducted to identify the factors 
underlying the various stakeholder actions associated with each vignette.  Finally, the results of 
tests of each hypothesis are presented, one hypothesis at a time. 
 
5.1  MANIPULATION CHECKS FOR FINAL DATA 
In order to assess the efficacy of the experimental manipulations associated with my final data 
collection, I used t-tests to identify differences in the mean responses of subjects across the 
various experimental conditions.  Results of these manipulation checks are presented in the 
following sections.   
5.1.1  Type of Inequity Manipulation Check 
Results of the t-tests for the “type of inequity” manipulations are summarized in Table 5.1. For 
the employer-employee vignette, the question associated with the type of inequity manipulation 
check was, “In the above situation, do you feel under-rewarded or overrewarded compared to 
Person B?” For the customer-retailer vignette, the question was “In the above situation, do you 
feel under-rewarded or overrewarded compared to Person C?”  The t-tests associated with both 
the employee-employer and the customer-retailer vignettes indicated that there were significant 
differences between subjects in the underreward condition and those in the overreward condition 
in terms of their responses to the type of inequity manipulation check questions.  The mean 
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response for those in the employer-employee overreward conditions was significantly different 
from that of subjects in the underreward conditions (t = -33.66; p = .000).  Similarly, in the 
customer-retailer vignette, there was a significant difference across type of inequity conditions (t 
= -40.98; p = .000).  These results suggest that the manipulation for type of inequity was 
successful.   
 
Table 5.1: Manipulation Check for Type of Inequity 
 Condition N Mean Std. Deviation t p 
Vignette 1: 
Employee-Employer Underreward 189 1.97 0.841 -33.66 .000
 Overreward 184 5.38 1.100   
Vignette 2: 
Customer-Retailer Underreward 188 1.45 0.783 -40.98 .000
 Overreward 184 5.69 1.177   
 
 
5.1.2  Expectancy Manipulation Check 
Results of the t-tests for the “expectancy” manipulation checks are summarized in Table 5.2.  For 
the employee-employer vignette, the expectancy manipulation check read, “In the above 
situation, what is the likelihood that taking action in an attempt to bring about a pay increase 
where you currently work will, in fact, result in a pay increase?”  For the customer-retailer 
vignette, the expectancy manipulation check read, “In the above situation, what is the likelihood 
that taking action (e.g., complaining, organizing a boycott, etc.) in an attempt to get Blu-Chip to 
fix your computer at no cost would, in fact, result in Blu-Chip doing so?”  As expected, there 
were significant differences across expectancy conditions.  For the employee-employer vignette 
there was a significant difference between the mean responses of those in the low expectancy 
condition and those in the high expectancy condition (t=-7.952; p = .000).  Likewise, in the 
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customer-retailer vignette, there was a significant difference between the mean response of 
subjects in the low expectancy condition and that of subjects in the high expectancy condition (t 
= -9.503; p = .000).  These results suggest that the expectancy manipulation was successful.   
 
Table 5.2: Manipulation Check for Expectancy 
 Expectancy Condition n Mean
Std. 
Deviation t p 
Vignette 1: 
Employee-Employer Low 189 2.87 1.432 -33.66 .000
 High 182 4.13 1.626   
Vignette 2: 
Customer-Retailer Low 189 3.32 1.803 -40.98 .000
 High 182 4.95 1.473   
 
 
5.1.3  Resource Dependence Manipulation Check 
Results of the t-test for the “resource dependence” manipulation checks are summarized in Table 
5.3.  The t-tests indicated that there were significant differences between subjects in the high 
resource dependence condition and those in the low resource dependence condition in terms of 
their responses to the manipulation check questions associated with both vignettes.  For the 
employee-employer vignette, the question read, “In the above situation, if you tried to, what 
would be the likelihood of you finding a different job that pays as much as your current job at the 
Center?”  There was a significant difference between the mean of the high resource dependence 
subjects and that of the low resource dependence subjects (t = 9.171; p = .000).  Similarly, for 
the customer-employee vignette, the manipulation check question, which read, “In the above 
situation, what is the likelihood of you being able to obtain a replacement CPU from a retailer 
other than Blu-Chip?” elicited significantly different means between the low high resource 
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dependence conditions and the low resource dependence conditions (t = 17.217; p = .000).  Thus, 
it appears that the resource dependence manipulation was successful.  
 
Table 5.3: Manipulation Check for Resource Dependence 
 
Resource 
Dependence 
Condition 
n Mean Std. Deviation t p 
Vignette 1: 
Employee-Employer Low 196 4.70 1.758 9.171 .000
 High 177 3.11 1.573   
Vignette 2: 
Customer-Retailer Low 196 5.42 1.623 17.217 .000
 High 176 2.49 1.649   
 
 
5.1.4  Assessment of Outcome Valence 
As noted in Chapter 3, my framework for stakeholder action is based on the assumption that a 
high valence outcome is at stake.  An outcome of very low valence will lead to a low 
“motivational force” score in expectancy theory, and will have little impact on the outcome/input 
ratios in equity theory (and so will have very little impact on perceptions of equity); therefore, a 
very low valence outcome will have little impact on motivation and behavior.  For this reason, I 
assessed the valences of the outcomes associated with the two vignettes to ensure that they were 
high.  The valence check item for the employee-employer vignette read, “In the above situation, 
how important to you is your hourly wage?”  The mean response to this item was 6.08, (with a 
standard deviation of 1.03).  While this mean was lower than expected, it did appear to indicate 
that hourly wage was indeed seen by subjects as a high-valence outcome.  For the customer-
retailer vignette, the valence check item read, “In the above situation, how important is it for you 
to have a working computer?”  The mean response to this question was 6.85 (with a standard 
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deviation of .38).  I took this result as a clear indication that having a working computer was also 
seen by subjects as a high valence outcome.   
 
5.2  FACTOR ANALYSES OF STAKEHOLDER ACTION ITEMS 
Because there were seventeen “stakeholder action” items associated with each of the two 
vignettes, the items associated with each were subjected to principal components factor analysis 
before further statistical analyses were carried out.  This allowed me to assess whether the 
various action measures associated with each of the two vignettes “hung together” in ways which 
would allow me to reduce the number of independent variables to be assessed.  Due to a problem 
in data collection (the item in the overreward condition was different for the subjects in Iowa 
from how it was for all other subjects), the item reading “Accept the idea that your work at the 
Center is worth $15.00 per hour” (which read, “Accept the idea that your work at the Center is 
worth $9.00 per hour” for the Iowa subjects) and the corresponding question for the underreward 
condition were not included in the factor analysis for the employee-employer vignette.  All factor 
analyses were undertaken using Varimax rotation to facilitate interpretation of the results.  
Factors with eigenvalues higher than one were extracted.  The items associated with each factor 
were then subjected to reliability analyses to determine their internal consistencies.  The results 
of these factor analyses and the associated reliability analyses are summarized in the following 
sections.    
5.2.1  Factor Analysis for Employee-Employer Vignette 
The factor analysis for the employee-employer vignette is summarized in Table 5.4.  Four factors 
were identified in this factor analysis, all of which exhibited internal consistency reliability (as 
measured by Cronbach’s Alpha) above the acceptable limit of 0.6 suggested by Hair et al. 
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(1995).  The first factor included the actions “complain to your supervisor at the Center in an 
attempt to get a pay raise for yourself and other employees at the Center,” “complain to 
administrators at the Student Employee Office in an attempt to get a pay raise for yourself and 
other employees at the Center,” “do nothing about the situation” (which was reverse-scored), 
“start trying to find another job,” and “advise others to seek employment at the Center.”  This 
factor was named “voice/job-related action,” because its constituent items generally concerned 
complaining and employment-related actions.  The subsequent reliability analysis indicated that 
the Cronbach’s Alpha associated with this factor was .812.   
The second factor included the actions “attempt to organize a strike by student employees 
at the Center,” “participate in a strike organized by other student employees at the Center,” 
“attempt to organize a union drive by employees at the Center,” and “vote in favor of joining an 
existing union of student employees.”  This factor was labeled “Job Action,” as the items it 
included all concerned collective action by employees.  The Cronbach’s Alpha for this factor 
was .774.   
The third factor included the items “purposely commit coding errors in your work at the 
Center,” “quit your job at the Center,” “call in sick to the Center the next time you want a day 
off,” and “try to reduce your workload at the center (while working the same number of hours).”  
The Cronbach’s Alpha for this factor, which was named “shirking/sabotage” due to its items’ 
focus on avoiding work or purposely compromising the quality of work, was .635.   
Finally, the fourth factor included, “put more effort into your work at the Center,” “put 
less effort into your work at the Center,” and “work extended hours at the Center one day next 
week, as your supervisor has asked.”  This factor, which I labeled “manipulation of effort” 
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because its constituent items concerned alterations of effort, exhibited a Cronbach’s Alpha of 
.620.     
 
Table 5.4: Factor Analysis for Employee-Employer Vignette 
 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
 Voice/Job-
related 
Job 
Action 
Sabotage/
Shirking 
Manipulation 
Of Effort 
Complain to administrators at the 
Student Employee Office .821    
Complain to your supervisor .806    
Do nothing -.786    
Start looking for another job .638    
Advise others to seek 
employment at the Center .518    
Participate in a strike  .794   
Vote in favor of joining an 
existing union  .763   
Attempt to organize a union drive  .751   
Attempt to organize a strike  .701   
Purposely commit coding errors   .714  
Quit your job   .706  
Call in sick the next time you 
want a day off   .552  
Try to reduce your workload   .546  
Put more effort into your work    .814 
Put less effort into your work    -.663 
Agree to work extended hours    .618 
% of Variance Explained 18.11 15.63 12.88 12.45 
Cronbach’s Alpha .812 .774 .635 .620 
 
5.2.2  Factor Analysis for Customer-Retailer Vignette 
 
The factor analysis for the customer-employer vignette is summarized in Table 5.5.  This factor 
analysis resulted in the extraction of three factors.  Two items loaded almost equally on more 
than one factor: the item “do nothing” had loadings of .510 and .540 on Factors 1 and 2 
respectively, while the item “post negative information concerning Blu-Chip on the internet” had 
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loadings of .402, .499, and .440 on Factors 1, 2 and 3 respectively.  Therefore these two items 
were excluded from further analyses. 
 The first factor included the items “advise others to shop at Blu-Chip,” “make a point of 
shopping at Blu-Chip in the future,” “buy more products from Blu-Chip,” and “provide a 
positive testimonial about your experience at Blu-Chip” (all of which were reverse-scored), as 
well as “advise others not to shop at Blu-Chip,” “refuse to shop at Blu-Chip in the future,” and 
“complain to Blu-Chip management.”  This item was labeled “shopping-related” action, since 
most of its constituent items concerned actions that influenced shopping habits.  The resulting 
Cronbach’s Alpha for this factor was .929.   
 The second factor included the items “attempt to organize a boycott of Blu-Chip among 
the general public,” “attempt to organize a boycott among your friends and associates,” “take 
legal action against Blu-Chip,” “sue Blu-Chip in small claims court,” “participate in a boycott of 
Blu-Chip organized by others,” and “complain about Blu-Chip to the Better Business Bureau.”  
This factor was named “external” action because most of the items required involving other 
constituents in order to influence Blu-Chip.  The Cronbach’s Alpha for this factor was .905.   
 The third factor included the items “make false negative statements condemning Blu-
Chip on the internet” and “steal or vandalize Blu-Chip property if you knew you wouldn’t get 
caught.”  This factor was named “unethical retribution” because both items involved engaging in 
morally questionable actions to “get back” at Blu-Chip.  Unfortunately, the reliability analysis 
for this factor produced a Cronbach’s Alpha of only .448, substantially below the recommended 
reliability threshold. However, with only two items, a low level of reliability is not unexpected. 
Though I retained this factor out of interest, one must be cautious about drawing any conclusions 
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from analyses concerning this factor. In particular, low reliability will produce a variable with 
less power, so tests of significance involving this factor will be conservative. 
 
Table 5.5: Factor Analysis for Customer-Retailer Vignette 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
 Shopping-
related External 
Unethical 
Retribution 
Advise others to shop at Blu-Chip -.892   
Make a point of shopping at Blu-Chip -.887   
Buy more products from Blu-Chip -.853   
Advise others not to shop at Blu-Chip .820   
Provide a positive testimonial -.714   
Refuse to shop at Blu-Chip .666   
Complain to Blu-Chip management .666   
Organize a boycott among public  .800  
Organize a boycott among friends  .798  
Take legal action against Blu-Chip  .787  
Sue Blu-Chip in small claims court  .766  
Participate in a boycott  .739  
Complain to the Better Business Bureau  .671  
Lie about Blu-Chip on web   .788 
Steal or vandalize Blu-Chip property   .719 
% of Variance Explained 32.26 27.56 9.26 
Cronbach’s Alpha .931 .905 .448 
 
 
 
5.3  TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
Several of my hypotheses were tested using multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA).  
Johnson (1998) suggests that using MANCOVA to test for differences between various group 
means is preferable to using a separate ANCOVA for each dependent variable, as the latter 
method does not sufficiently protect against Type I errors: as the researcher tests more and more 
variables, the likelihood that one of the variables will exhibit statistical significance approaches 
one.  Accordingly, Johnson (1998) submits that multivariate analyses should be performed 
whenever two or more different groups are being compared to one another on a large number of 
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independent variables.  Other hypotheses were tested using dummy variable regression.  The 
following sections summarize the results of the statistical tests of my various hypotheses.   
5.3.1  Test of Hypothesis 1 
 
H1:  A stakeholder’s propensity to act against a FO is positively related to the degree to 
which it perceives underreward inequity in its relationship with that organization. 
 
Hypothesis 1 was tested in a MANCOVA that included all factors as dependent variables, 
with the type of inequity, expectancy, and resource dependence conditions as independent 
variables, and equity sensitivity included as a covariate.  Overall results of the MANCOVA 
indicated that each of the stakeholder action factors was predicted by type of inequity condition, 
expectancy condition, resource dependence condition, and equity sensitivity, taken together.  The 
results of this overall analysis are presented in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6: Results of Overall MANCOVA   
Vignette Dependent Variable SS d.f. MS F p 
Employee-
Employer 
Factor 1 
Voice/Job-related 34.43 8 4.309 10.75 .000 
 Factor 2 
Job Action 33.02 8 4.128 2.75 .006 
 Factor 3 
Sabotage/Shirking 57.47 8 7.184 8.248 .000 
 Factor 4 
Manipulation of Effort 18.18 8 2.273 3.139 .002 
Customer-
Retailer 
Factor 1 
Shopping-related 6.272 8 .784 2.977 .003 
 Factor 2 
External 263.90 8 32.988 20.06 .000 
 Factor 3 
Unethical Retribution 30.20 8 3.775 3.34 .001 
 
The MANCOVA results pertaining to Hypothesis 1 are summarized in Table 5.7 and Table 
5.8.  For the employer-employee vignette, the factor “voice/job related” action, was significantly 
related to the type of inequity condition (F = 77.91; p = .000), as were “job action” (F = 10.57; p = 
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.001), “sabotage/shirking” (F = 56.32; p = .000), and “manipulation of effort” (F = 17.42; p = 
.000).  Thus, for the employee-employer vignette, all stakeholder action factors were significantly 
related to the equity condition.  These results represent strong support for H1.   
 
Table 5.7: MANCOVA Results for Type of Inequity – Employee-Employer Vignette 
 
Dependent Variable SS d.f. MS F p 
Factor 1 
Voice/Job-related 31.25 1 31.25 77.91 .000 
Factor 2 
Job Action 15.88 1 15.88 10.57 .001 
Factor 3 
Sabotage/Shirking 49.05 1 49.05 56.32 .000 
Factor 4 
Manipulation of Effort 12.61 1 12.61 17.42 .000 
 
Likewise, all of the stakeholder action factors associated with the customer-retailer 
vignette – “shopping-related” action (F = 7.181; p = .008), “external” action (F = 152.94; p = 
.000), and “unethical retribution” (F = 17.21; p = .000) – were significantly related to type of 
inequity.  These results, too, provide strong support for H1.  
 
Table 5.8: MANCOVA Results for Type of Inequity – Customer-Retailer Vignette 
 
Dependent Variable SS d.f. MS F p 
Factor 1 
Shopping-related 1.891 1 1.891 7.181 .008 
Factor 2 
External 251.49 1 251.49 152.94 .000 
Factor 3 
Unethical Retribution 19.48 1 19.48 17.21 .000 
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5.3.2  Test of Hypothesis 2 
 
H2: A stakeholder’s propensity to act against a FO is positively related to its expectancy 
that it can successfully undertake the proposed action and the action is likely to 
substantially promote attainment of some valued outcome. 
 
 Hypothesis 2 was also tested in the overall MANCOVA that included all factors as dependent 
variables, with the equity, expectancy, and resource dependence conditions as independent 
variables, and equity sensitivity included as a covariate.  The results concerning H2 associated 
with the employee-employer vignette are presented in Table 5.9. 
 
Table 5.9: MANCOVA Results for Expectancy – Employee-Employer Vignette 
Dependent Variable SS d.f. MS F p 
Factor 1 
Voice/Job-related .088 1 .088 .220 .640 
Factor 2 
Job Action 1.184 1 1.184 .788 .375 
Factor 3 
Sabotage/Shirking .132 1 .132 .152 .697 
Factor 4 
Manipulation of Effort .906 1 .906 1.251 .264 
 
Results indicated that, for this vignette, expectancy condition was not significantly related to any 
of the action factors.   
The results pertaining to the customer-retailer vignette are presented in Table 5.10.  For 
this vignette, expectancy condition was only found to be marginally significantly related to the 
“external” action factor (F = 3.632; p = .058).  Expectancy condition was not significantly 
related to the other two stakeholder action factors.  Taken together, these results provide only 
very limited support for Hypothesis 2.  
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Table 5.10: MANCOVA Results for Expectancy – Customer-Retailer Vignette 
 
Dependent Variable SS d.f. MS F p 
Factor 1 
Shopping-related .258 1 .258 .978 .323 
Factor 2 
External 5.973 1 5.973 3.632 .058 
Factor 3 
Unethical Retribution .620 1 .620 .548 .460 
 
 
While the t-tests concerning the manipulation check for expectancy indicated that there 
was a significant difference between the low and high expectancy conditions with respect to 
subjects’ perceptions of expectancy, I speculated that the general lack of significant relationships 
between expectancy condition and the various stakeholder action factors, in contrast to the 
overwhelmingly significant relationships between type of inequity and the various action factors, 
might be due to the fact that the manipulation of type of inequity seemed to produce a greater 
contrast across conditions than did the manipulation of expectancy.  Accordingly, I conducted a 
supplementary analysis in which, rather than assuming the success of the experimental 
manipulation of expectancy, I used the expectancy manipulation check questions as measures of 
subjects’ perceptions of expectancy.   
The expectancy manipulation check for the employee-employer vignette read, “In the 
above situation, what is the likelihood that taking action in an attempt to bring about a pay 
increase where you currently work will, in fact, result in a pay increase,” while the expectancy 
manipulation check for the customer-retailer vignette read, “In the above situation, what is the 
likelihood that taking action (e.g., complaining, organizing a boycott, etc.) in an attempt to get 
Blu-Chip to fix your computer at no cost would, in fact result in Blu-Chip doing so.”  I used 
median splits to divide respondents into “high” and “low” expectancy groups for each vignette 
based on their responses to these questions, and employed MANCOVA to assess the difference 
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between these groups with respect to their means on the stakeholder action factor indices.  The 
results of these analyses are presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.12. 
 
Table 5.11:  Results of Test of Hypothesis 2 Using Median Splits of Manipulation Checks: 
Employee-Employer Vignette 
Dependent Variable SS d.f. MS F p 
Factor 1 
Voice/Job-related 2.569 1 2.569 6.623 .011 
Factor 2 
Job Action 11.851 1 11.851 8.263 .005 
Factor 3 
Sabotage/Shirking .574 1 .574 .660 .418 
Factor 4 
Manipulation of Effort .002 1 .002 .003 .956 
 
The results using median splits of the expectancy manipulation check question to divide 
subjects into high and low expectancy groups were somewhat more supportive of H2 than those of 
the analysis relying on the expectancy manipulation.  Using this approach to differentiate between 
subjects in terms of perceptions of expectancy, for the employee-employer vignette, the “voice/job-
related” action factor (F = 6.623; p = .011) and the “job action” factor (F = 8.263; p = .005) 
exhibited significant relationships with expectancy, while the “sabotage/shirking” factor (F = .660; p 
= .418) and the “manipulation of effort” factor    (F = .003; p = .956) did not.  For the customer-
retailer vignette, the “shopping-related” action (F = 7.913; p = .005) and “external” action (F = 
22.985; p = .000) factors were significantly related to expectancy, while the “unethical retaliation” 
factor (F = .167; p = .683) was not.   
Thus, the results of the analysis using a median split on the expectancy manipulation check 
question provide some support for H2.  However, the validity of these results is compromised 
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somewhat by both the use of a single-item expectancy measure and the use of median splits to 
separate subjects into “high” and “low” expectancy groups.    
 
Table 5.12:  Results of Test of Hypothesis 2 Using Median Splits of Manipulation Checks: 
Customer-Retailer Vignette 
Dependent Variable SS d.f. MS F p 
Factor 1 
Shopping-related 1.936 1 1.936 7.913 .005 
Factor 2 
External 36.958 1 36.958 22.985 .000 
Factor 3 
Unethical Retaliation .213 1 .213 .167 .683 
 
 
5.3.3  Test of Hypothesis 3 
 
H3: A stakeholder’s propensity to engage in prosocial activities with respect to the FO is 
positively related to the degree to which it perceives overreward inequity in its 
relationship with that organization. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 was tested by comparing the average responses regarding prosocial action 
items across type of inequity conditions.  Results are summarized in Table 5.13.  This hypothesis 
was initially tested using dummy variable regression of single-item prosocial measures 
associated with each of the two vignettes on the type of inequity condition, with equity 
sensitivity included in the regressions to control for its influence.  However, it was noted that, for 
both vignettes, other items could also be seen as representing prosocial behaviors by the 
stakeholder.  Accordingly, these items were combined into scales representing prosocial action 
by the stakeholder (one scale corresponding to each vignette), and these scales were also 
regressed (in separate regressions) on type of inequity and the equity sensitivity variable.  
For the employee-employer vignette, the single item read “what is the likelihood that you 
will agree to work extended hours at the Center one day next week, as your supervisors have 
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asked?”  The regression indicated that type of inequity had a significant effect on responses to 
this question.  The overall regression was significant (F = 43.67; p = .000), with an R2 of .21.  
The regression coefficient for type of inequity was also significant (t = 8.69; p = .000) indicating 
that type of inequity had a significant effect on this single-item measure of prosocial action.  This 
result supports H3.   
The prosocial action scale for this vignette included the aforementioned single item as 
well as two other items, “what is the likelihood that you would put more effort into your work at 
the Center” and “what is the likelihood that you would advise others to seek employment at the 
Center.”  Reliability analysis indicated that the Cronbach’s Alpha for this scale was .63.  This 
scale was regressed on type of inequity and equity sensitivity.  The overall model exhibited 
significance (F = 77.85; p = .000), with an R2 of .32.  Type of inequity was found to be a 
significant predictor of prosocial action as measured by the three-item scale (t = 12.13; p = .000), 
supporting H3. 
 
Table 5.13: Results of Regressions Testing Hypothesis 3 
 Prosocial Measure Beta t p 
Vignette 1: 
Employee-Employer Single-item .426 8.69 .000 
 Multiple-item .551 12.13 .000 
Vignette 2: 
Customer-Retailer Single-item .508 10.69 .000 
 Multiple-item .652 15.58 .000 
 
For the customer-retailer vignette, the single item prosocial action measure read, “what is 
the likelihood that you would provide a positive testimonial about your experience at Blu-Chip 
for use in a Blu-Chip advertisement?  (You would not be paid for your testimonial.).”  
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Regression indicated that type of inequity also had a significant effect on responses to this 
question.  The overall regression was significant (F = 58.05; p = .000), with an R2 of .26.  The 
regression coefficient for type of inequity was also significant (t = 10.69; p = .000) indicating 
that type of inequity had a significant effect on this single-item measure.  This result also 
supports H3.   
The prosocial action scale for the customer-retailer vignette included the aforementioned 
single item and two additional items, “what is the likelihood that you would make a point of 
shopping at Blu-Chip in the future” and “what is the likelihood that you would advise others to 
shop at Blu-Chip.”  Reliability analysis indicated that the Cronbach’s Alpha for this scale was 
.87.  This scale was regressed on type of inequity and equity sensitivity.  Again, the overall 
model exhibited significance (F = 122.14; p = .000), with an R2 of .42.  Type of inequity was 
found to be a significant predictor of prosocial action as measured by the three-item scale (t = 
15.58; p = .000), providing further support for H3. 
5.3.4  Test of Hypothesis 4 
 
H4: The propensity of an underrewarded stakeholder to terminate its relationship with the 
FO will be negatively related to the degree of resource dependence the stakeholder 
exhibits with respect to the FO. 
 
Hypothesis 4 was tested using data from the underreward condition only in dummy 
variable regressions.  For each vignette, there was a single action item representing termination, 
or “severance,” of the stakeholder-FO relationship.  This item was regressed on resource 
dependence condition.  Equity sensitivity and expectancy condition were included in the 
regressions to control for their effects.    
For the employee-employer vignette, the single item representing severance read, “what 
is the likelihood that you would quit your job at the Center?”  For the under-reward condition, 
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when this item was regressed on resource dependence condition, expectancy condition, and 
equity sensitivity, the overall model exhibited significance (F = 6.631; p = .000) with an R2 of 
.09.  Resource dependence condition was found to be a significant predictor of responses to this 
item (t = -4.431; p = .000).   This result supports H4.  
For the customer-retailer vignette, the single item representing relationship severance 
read, “what is the likelihood that you would refuse to shop at Blu-Chip in the future?”  When this 
item was regressed on resource dependence condition, expectancy condition, and equity 
sensitivity, the overall model did not exhibit significance (F = .958; p = .414), indicating that 
these three variables, taken together, did not predict responses to the severance item.  This result 
does not support H4. 
5.3.5  Test of Hypothesis 5 
H5: The propensity of an overrewarded stakeholder to act against the FO is positively 
related to its tolerance for overreward.  
 
Hypothesis 5 was tested using the data for subjects in the overreward condition in several 
separate regressions, one associated with each stakeholder action factor.  In each, equity 
sensitivity was included as the independent variable, while expectancy condition and resource 
dependence condition were included as control variables.  Stakeholder action factors were 
included as dependent variables.  The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 5.14 and 
Table 5.15.  Results provide only limited support for H5.   
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Table 5.14:  Results of Regressions Testing Hypothesis 5 – Employee-Employer Vignette 
 
Dependent Variable Beta t p 
Factor 1 
Voice/Job-related .050 .634 .527 
Factor 2 
Job Action .187 2.417 .017 
Factor 3 
Sabotage/Shirking .028 .360 .719 
Factor 4 
Manipulation of Effort .044 .561 .575 
 
 
Regarding the employee-employer vignette, for the regressions regarding the factors 
“voice/job-related” actions (F =.628; p = .598), “sabotage/shirking” (F = .511; p = .675), and 
“manipulation of effort” (F = .476; p = .707), the overall regressions were non-significant.  Only 
for the “job action” factor did the overall regression exhibit significance (F = 2.630; p = .052; R2 
= .03).  The regression coefficient for equity sensitivity was significant (t = 2.417; p = .017), 
indicating that equity sensitivity was a significant predictor of the job action factor.  However, 
taken together, results associated with the employee-employer vignette provide only very modest 
support for H5.   
 
Table 5.15:  Results of Regressions Testing Hypothesis 5 – Customer-Retailer Vignette 
 
Dependent Variable Beta t p 
Factor 1 
Shopping-related 2.464 2.625 .008 
Factor 2 
External 7.285 2.507 .014 
Factor 3 
Unethical Retribution .068 -.308 .742 
 
 
With respect to the factors associated with the customer-retailer vignette, two factors 
exhibited significant relationships with equity sensitivity, providing some additional support for 
H5.  For the first factor, “shopping-related” action, the overall regression was significant (F = 
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3.655; p = .014; R2 = .047), as was the regression coefficient for equity sensitivity (t = 2.625; p = 
.010), indicating that equity sensitivity was significantly related to this stakeholder action factor.  
For the second factor, “external” action, the overall regression was also significant (F = 3.208; p 
= .025; R2 = .039), and the regression coefficient for equity sensitivity again exhibited 
significance (t = 2.507; p = .013), indicating that equity sensitivity was also significantly related 
to this stakeholder action factor.   The third factor, “unethical retribution” was not significantly 
related to equity sensitivity (F = .341; p = .796); however, as noted earlier, the low reliability of 
this factor suggests that one must use caution in interpreting this result.  Overall, results 
concerning H5 were mixed, and only partially support the hypothesis. 
5.3.6  Test of Hypothesis 6 
H6: The propensity of a stakeholder to exhibit prosocial behaviors with respect to the FO 
is negatively related to its tolerance for overreward. 
 
Hypothesis 6 was tested by regressing the single-item prosocial action measures and the 
prosocial action scales on equity sensitivity.  Type of inequity, expectancy, and resource 
dependence were included in the models in order to control for their effects. 
For the employee-employer vignette, equity sensitivity was found to be a significant 
predictor of responses to the single-item prosocial measure, “what is the likelihood that you will 
agree to work extended hours at the Center one day next week, as your supervisors have asked?” 
(t = 8.673; p = .000).  In a separate regression, equity sensitivity was also found to be a 
significant predictor of the prosocial action scale (t = 2.463; p = .014), which included the 
aforementioned item as well as the items, “what is the likelihood that you would put more effort 
into your work at the Center,” and “what is the likelihood that you would advise others to seek 
employment at the Center.”  Both of these results support H6.   
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For the customer-retailer vignette, however, equity sensitivity was not found to be a 
significant predictor of the single-item prosocial measure, “what is the likelihood that you would 
provide a positive testimonial about your experience at Blu-Chip for use in a Blu-Chip 
advertisement?  (You would not be paid for your testimonial.)” (t = .915; p = .361).  Likewise, 
equity sensitivity was not found to be a significant predictor of the prosocial index, which 
included the above item and the item “what is the likelihood that you would advise others to 
shop at Blu-Chip” (t = .722; p = .471).  Thus, subject responses to the customer-retailer vignette 
provided no additional support for H6. 
 
5.4  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has summarized the results of statistical tests of my various hypotheses.  My 
final chapter will discuss these results and their implications, and make suggestions for future 
research in this area.  
 
 211
 
 
6.0  DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
In this final chapter, I begin by discussing the results of my study and its various limitations.  
Next, I discuss the theoretical implications of this work – primarily in terms of the existing 
literature on stakeholder theory – as well as the practical implications, and conclude the 
dissertation. 
 
6.1  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the results of my study, though they must be tempered 
with acknowledgment of the study’s various limitations, which will be discussed later.   
6.1.1  The Role of Equity Perceptions in Stakeholder Action   
Since, in the equity theory literature, underreward has consistently been linked to dissatisfaction, 
I hypothesized that stakeholder action should be related to perceptions of equity in the 
stakeholder-FO relationship: specifically, underreward should be likely to lead to stakeholder 
action.  Results provided support for the position that stakeholders take equity into account in 
their decisions concerning the appropriateness of action against the FO.  For both vignettes, all 
the stakeholder action factors derived from subjects’ responses were significantly related to the 
type of inequity condition: subjects in the underreward condition provided responses that 
indicated that they were significantly more likely to take action against the FO than were 
subjects in the underreward condition.  The pervasiveness of this relationship across all 
stakeholder action factors indicates that perceptions of equity are a very important component in 
determining the likelihood of stakeholder action against the FO. 
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 A stakeholder’s perceptions of equity also appear to influence its propensity to engage in 
prosocial actions; that is, actions that promote the FO’s interests.  For both vignettes, both the 
single-item and multiple-item prosocial action measures were positively associated with the type 
of inequity: overrewarded subjects were more likely to engage in such actions than were 
underrewarded subjects.    
6.1.2  The Role of Expectancy Perceptions in Stakeholder Action   
Based on the premise from expectancy theory that motivation to engage in an action is 
contingent upon perception of the likelihood of success and the perception that successful action 
will lead to valued outcomes, I hypothesized that stakeholder action should be positively related 
to expectancies that an action can, in fact, be undertaken, and that that action, if undertaken, will 
lead to valued outcomes.  The initial analysis indicated that none of the stakeholder action factors 
associated with the employee-employer vignette and only one of the stakeholder action factors 
associated with the customer-retailer vignette was significantly related to expectancy.   
This was an unexpected result.  One possible reason for this eventuality is the nature of 
the vignettes themselves.  Each vignette was written in such a way that the “plot” tended to 
center around the equity manipulation rather than the expectancy manipulation.  For each, the 
expectancy manipulation occurred in a short paragraph toward the end of the vignette.  Thus, it 
may be that the expectancy manipulation was simply less apparent to subjects than the equity 
manipulation.  The results of the manipulation checks for type of inequity and expectancy 
support this position: for the type of inequity manipulation the differences between group means 
on the seven-point Likert scales were 3.41 for the employee-employer vignette and 4.24 for the 
customer-retailer vignette, while for the expectancy manipulation, the differences between group 
means were considerably smaller – 1.26 for the employee-employer vignette and 1.63 for the 
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customer-retailer vignette.  While the t-tests for the expectancy manipulation checks indicated 
that the differences between group means were significant, it appears that the expectancy 
manipulation was substantially less “successful” than the type of inequity manipulation.  In 
short, the type of inequity manipulation may have “dominated” the expectancy manipulation in 
the minds of my subjects, due to the form of the vignettes. 
 To further investigate the role of expectancy, I also employed a median split on the 
expectancy manipulation check questions to divide subjects into “high” and “low” expectancy 
conditions irrespective of experimental condition.  Results from this analysis indicated that two 
of the four stakeholder action factors associated with the employee-employer vignette, 
“voice/job-related,” and “job action” were significantly related to expectancy, which provides 
some evidence that perceptions of expectancy are determinants of stakeholder action.  However, 
the factors “sabotage/shirking” and “manipulation of effort” were not related to expectancy.   
At first, I found the latter results confusing; however, upon further reflection, they made 
considerable sense.  The expectancy manipulation statement for the employee-employer vignette 
was preceded by the statement,  
“On occasion, student employees at various research centers throughout the University 
have used various means to try to obtain pay increases from their respective employers.  
They have, among other things, 1) complained to their superiors and the Student 
Employment Office, 2) attempted to organize a union or attempted to join existing 
unions, and 3) organized impromptu “strikes,” wherein they temporarily stop reporting 
for work.”            
 
It is readily apparent that the specific actions mentioned in this paragraph are most 
closely related to the factors “voice/job-related” and “job action,” and the stakeholder action 
items associated with them.  Indeed, there is no mention in the preface to the expectancy 
manipulation of the efficacy of “manipulation of effort” or “sabotage/shirking” behaviors in 
bringing about a favorable response from the employer.  Furthermore, while the proposition that 
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manipulation of effort (specifically, putting in more effort) might in fact result in a pay raise can 
be derived from expectancy theory, it is substantially less clear that shirking or sabotage 
activities should lead to such an eventuality.   
Thus, the lack of a significant relationship between expectancy and the “manipulation of 
effort” stakeholder action factor may be due to the fact that actions related to the latter were not 
explicitly mentioned in the preface to the expectancy manipulation, while the lack of a 
significant relationship between expectancy and the “sabotage/shirking” stakeholder action 
factor may be due to the same fact and/or the lack of an obvious theoretical connection between 
engaging in such actions and the receipt of a pay raise.  When one considers these possibilities, 
the results concerning the relationship between expectancy and the propensity of stakeholders to 
take action against the FO are not as mixed as they might at first appear: those action factors that 
were most closely related to the specific actions mentioned in the expectancy manipulation were 
found to be significantly related to expectancy.  
A similar analysis could explain why, for the customer-retailer vignette, in the initial 
analysis only the “external” action factor was significantly associated with the likelihood of 
stakeholder action.  The expectancy manipulation in this vignette was preceded by the statement: 
“In the past, customers have taken a variety of actions to attempt to get their desires met 
by Blu-Chip.  Among other things, they have complained to Blu-Chip management, sued 
Blu-Chip in small claims court or taken other legal action, posted the story of their 
concerns with Blu-Chip on the internet, filed complaints about Blu-Chip with the Better 
Business Bureau, and attempted to organize boycotts of Blu-Chip among their friends or 
the general public.” 
 
 The specific actions mentioned in this statement correspond almost exactly with the 
various items associated with the “external” action factor, but exhibit very little correspondence 
with the “shopping-related” action factor (though this factor includes one item concerning 
complaining to Blu-Chip management, and includes items that could conceivably be seen as 
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being loosely related to the concept of a boycott), and exhibit no correspondence whatsoever 
with the third factor, “unethical retribution.”  Once again, the stakeholder action factor closely 
related to those actions explicitly noted in the preface to the expectancy manipulation was found 
to be closely related to expectancy, while those factors consisting primarily of items not 
explicitly mentioned in the preface to the expectancy manipulation were not.   
 A similar situation ensued when I employed median splits on the expectancy 
manipulation for this vignette.  Results from this analysis indicated that the “shopping-related” 
action factor, in addition to the “external” action factor, was related to expectancy.  The 
“unethical retribution” factor was once again unrelated to expectancy.  In this case, both the 
factors that could reasonably be related to the stakeholder actions stated in the preface to the 
expectancy manipulation were significantly related to expectancy, while the factor unrelated to 
those actions was not.  Taken together, these results, like those associated with the employee-
employer vignette, suggest that the relationship between expectancy and the likelihood of 
stakeholder action is not as ambiguous as it might have first appeared. 
6.1.3  The Role of Resource Dependence in Stakeholder Action   
According to Adams (1965), severance of a relationship is an act of last resort for those who 
perceive underreward in their relationships.  This is due in large part to the fact that severance of 
a relationship can be a very costly prospect: severance cuts off all the positive outcomes, both 
intrinsic and extrinsic, that were previously derived from the relationship.  I expected that the 
cost of severance of the stakeholder-FO relationship would be closely associated with the degree 
of resource dependence exhibited by the stakeholder with respect to the FO, and so hypothesized 
that an underrewarded stakeholder’s propensity to sever its relationship with the FO would be 
related to the extent to which it depended on the FO for critical resources.  Results from the 
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employee-employer vignette supported this hypothesis; however, results from the customer-
retailer vignette did not.     
It was somewhat surprising to find that relationship severance should be related to resource 
dependence for one stakeholder-FO relationship but not for the other.  One possible explanation of 
these results is that the effect of resource dependence on the tendency for an underrewarded 
stakeholder to sever its relationship with the FO varies with the type of stakeholder-FO relationship.  
However, I believe it is more likely that the lack of a significant result for the customer-retailer 
vignette is due to what might be considered a deficiency in the wording of the vignette itself.  In the 
customer-retailer vignette, the retailer refuses to repair the customer’s malfunctioning laptop.  A 
functioning laptop (customized for the specific purposes of the customer) was meant to represent a 
critical resource.  In the high resource dependence condition, the vignette states that,  
“Due to the highly customized nature of your computer, and the fact that its CPU is a 
component manufactured especially for Blu-Chip, you would not be able to find a 
replacement CPU from another retailer.”   
 
It is possible that subjects did not find this situation to represent a real manifestation of 
resource dependence.  For example, though it is stipulated in the vignette that the computer is highly 
customized and a replacement CPU cannot be found anywhere except Blu-Chip, I did not stipulate 
that a similarly customized computer could not be found at another retailer.  Therefore, the fact that 
the CPU could not be purchased elsewhere may not have been seen by subjects as evidence of 
resource dependence.  The resource dependence manipulation check for this vignette was not 
sufficient to detect this possibility, as it only asked subjects for their perception of the likelihood that 
they could find a replacement CPU from a retailer other than Blu-Chip: it did not assess the 
possibility that the subject might find a replacement computer at a different retailer.    
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6.1.4  The Role of Equity Sensitivity in Stakeholder Action 
Two of my hypotheses concerned the relationship between equity sensitivity and stakeholder 
propensities to act against the FO.  Results concerning the impact of this variable were mixed.  I 
hypothesized that even overrewarded stakeholders might be inclined to take action against the FO, 
given that overreward is more likely to be tolerated than underreward.  Work concerning equity 
sensitivity suggests that such tolerance for overreward will vary across individuals, with “entitleds” 
exhibiting substantial tolerance, while “equity sensitives” and “benevolents” will be made 
uncomfortable by overreward (Huseman et al., 1987).  Therefore, I posited that the likelihood of 
stakeholder action against the FO by an overrewarded stakeholder should be related to the equity 
sensitivity exhibited by the stakeholder.  Furthermore, I hypothesized that prosocial behaviors by the 
stakeholder should also be related to equity sensitivity, given that benevolents are often 
conceptualized as altruists (Huseman et al., 1987).   
Results provided partial support for the first hypothesis: though only one stakeholder 
action factor associated with the employee-employer vignette, “job action,” exhibited a 
significant relationship with equity sensitivity, two of the three action factors associated with the 
customer-retailer vignette, “shopping-related” action and “external” action, were significantly 
related to equity sensitivity.  The second hypothesis was only supported with respect to the 
employee-employer vignette: for the customer retailer vignette, prosocial stakeholder actions 
were not found to be significantly related to equity sensitivity.  This unexpected result may have 
been due to variability in the influence of equity sensitivity across relationships: Huseman et al., 
(1987) suggested that individuals might exhibit different equity sensitivities in different types of 
relationships.   
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6.1.5  Revisiting the Equity/Expectancy Framework 
In Figures 6.1 and 6.2, I fit mean responses to questions concerning the likelihood of stakeholder 
action into the equity expectancy framework outlined in Chapter 3.  In each cell I have summed 
the means for action factors for subjects in the experimental condition corresponding to that cell.  
As noted above, not all of the action factors (e.g., sabotage) would be correlated by a rational 
individual to the outcome at stake in the vignette: for example, in the employee-employer 
vignette, a rational subject would probably not assume that engaging in sabotage or shirking 
behaviors would lead to a pay increase.  Accordingly, only means concerned with stakeholder 
action factors associated with items explicitly identified in the vignettes as activities that could 
increase the likelihood of the desired outcome have been included in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Results Applied to the Equity/Expectancy Framework: 
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 The framework suggests that sanctions directed at the FO by stakeholders are most likely 
in the underreward/high expectancy condition and least likely in the overreward/low expectancy 
condition.  These postulates are borne out by the cell means associated with both the employee-
employer vignette and the customer-retailer vignette.  The fact that, for the employee-employer 
vignette, the cell mean for the overreward/low expectancy condition is greater than that for the 
overreward/high expectancy condition was unexpected, as the implications of the framework 
suggest that the cell mean for the latter condition should have been greater than that of the 
former, as was the case for the customer-retailer vignette.  Late in the research process, though, it 
was speculated that the expectancy condition might be more important in determining the 
likelihood of stakeholder action in underreward situations than in overreward situations, since an 
overrewarded stakeholder is more likely to be content with the situation and to view action 
against the FO as unnecessary: accordingly, expectancy considerations may be less salient to 
such stakeholders.  Such an interaction effect between type of inequity and expectancy was not 
found in the overall MANCOVA, but the direction of the difference between the overreward/low 
expectancy and overreward/high expectancy cell for means in Figure 6.1 would fit with such a 
hypothesis.  Finally, as expected, for both vignettes, the cell means for the underreward/low 
expectancy condition fall between those of the underreward/high expectancy condition and those 
of the overreward conditions.  
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Figure 6.2: Results Applied to the Equity/Expectancy Framework: 
Customer-Retailer Vignette 
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types of relationships I was able to study once it was determined that I would use a student 
sample: I needed to choose stakeholders that my student subjects could relate to (the majority of 
students have been employees, while all have certainly been consumers).  Furthermore, 
employees and customers are two of the “generic” stakeholders identified throughout the 
stakeholder literature (e.g., Freeman, 1984), and they are certainly two of the most important 
stakeholders in any business organization.  Nonetheless, given the extraordinary variety of 
possible stakeholder-FO relationships, the fact that I have only addressed two types of 
relationship in this dissertation clearly limits the generalizability of my results, and so represents 
a threat to the external validity of my study.  This concern is tempered if one accepts a narrow 
definition of the term stakeholder; however, in any case, further work in this vein should expand 
the stable of stakeholders addressed. 
A related issue concerns what could be considered “indirect” exchange relationships 
between the stakeholder and the FO.  I have asserted that stakeholders may view the treatment of 
other stakeholders, or non-stakeholders, as relevant outputs that will be considered in the 
development of perceptions of equity in stakeholder-FO relationships.  While a stakeholder may 
have very strong concerns about the treatment of another, some might argue that in such 
relationships the “exchange” nature of the stakeholder-FO relationship is diminished, such that 
stakeholder action against the FO is less likely.  The two stakeholder-FO relationships addressed 
in this study are both “direct” in nature – the treatment of other stakeholders is not expected to be 
a major concern to the subject in either of the vignettes used.  Thus, this work does not assess the 
implications of situations where the stakeholder is concerned about the interests of another 
stakeholder or a non-stakeholder.   
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6.2.1.2  The Use of Student Samples.  The use of student samples in the collection of both my 
pilot and final data also represents a limitation of my study.  As noted, I attempted to reduce the 
degree to which this limitation compromised the external validity of my findings by choosing 
two stakeholder-FO relationships in which all or most undergraduate business students are likely 
to have taken part: most have been employees, and all have been consumers.  Nonetheless, it is 
possible that undergraduate business students respond differently to inequities in such 
relationships, or in relationships in general, than do others.  Such a situation would have affected 
my instrument development during pilot studies as well as my data gathered in the collection of 
final data, reducing the external validity of my study. 
6.2.1.3  Intention Versus Behavior.  Another critical limitation of my study is its apparent focus 
on intention rather than behavior.  While the goal of my dissertation has been to establish some 
of the key determinants of stakeholder action, none of my dependent measures truly measures 
action (beyond expression of an intention).  Measures of actual behavior were, of course, 
impossible due to my experimental design, particularly my reliance on vignettes as proxies for 
real-life situations.   
Intention is the cognitive representation of a person's readiness to perform a given 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991).  In his theory of planned behavior, Ajzen (1991) asserts that intentions 
are the immediate antecedents of and the best predictors of behavior; however, there is certainly 
a substantial divide between the two.  Because they are hypothetical, measures of intention often 
overestimate subjects’ propensities to engage in behaviors; thus, it is likely that my subjects were 
more inclined to express an intention to engage in a stakeholder action than they would be to 
actually engage in that action, since expression of intent is very low-cost, and behavior is often 
very costly.  Furthermore, any number of intervening variables might mitigate the relationship 
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between intentions and behavior.  Though one might argue that, since I measured perceptions of 
the “likelihood” that subjects would take particular actions, subjects might have taken such 
intervening variables into account in their responses (which might lead to the conclusion that I 
was measuring something closer to behavior than mere intention), the more conservative position 
is that my dependent measures assessed intention only.  Therefore, while my study seems to have 
identified some of the variables that determine a stakeholder’s intention to take action against a 
FO, it has not determined that these variables predict actual stakeholder action.    
6.2.1.4  Temporal Limitations.  As noted earlier, my framework represents a “snapshot” of 
stakeholder propensities to take action against a FO: a depiction of those propensities at a 
particular point in time.  I made no attempt to describe changes in stakeholder perceptions of 
equity and expectancy, though such dynamism has important implications for my results. 
Arguments from researchers such as Vecchio (1982), Cosier and Dalton (1983), and 
Carrell and Dittrich (1978) suggest that the perceptions of inequity and the dissonance associated 
with it can decrease over time: such perceptions may be transitory phenomena, or may recur 
intermittently.  This may particularly be the case in situations of overreward (Cosier & Dalton, 
1983; Greenberg, 1988; Pritchard et al., 1972).  Perceptions of expectancy will vary across time 
as well.  Clearly, stakeholder intentions to act against a FO will vary in accordance with 
variations in their perceptions of equity and expectancy.  Furthermore, the longer the time period 
between intention and behavior, the greater the likelihood that unforeseen events will produce 
changes in perceptions and, therefore, intentions (Ajzen, 1991).  As Weick (1966: 432-433) puts 
it, “if inequity is not reduced as soon as it occurs, there will be continuing circumstances, 
possibly more advantageous than the present one, in which ratios can be aligned.”   
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As noted earlier, the potential for temporal moderation of perceptions of equity and 
expectancy introduces an important caveat to my framework and the results of my study: the 
propensity for stakeholder action resulting from certain perceptions of equity and/or expectancy 
may be a very dynamic variable, depending on the dynamism of the stakeholder’s perceptions, 
which, of course, may be influenced by a vast array of variables.   
6.2.1.5  The Formation of Stakeholder Groups.  Throughout this dissertation I have taken the 
point of view that the individual is an important unit of analysis for understanding stakeholder 
action.  I have made note of Winn’s (2001) assertion that stakeholder groups are socially 
constructed, Gibson’s (2000) position that referring to stakeholder “groups” is a convenient way 
to describe many individuals, and the fact that individuals within stakeholder groups may differ 
widely in terms of their interests, attitudes, and inclinations (Klandermans, 1984).  However, it is 
undeniable that stakeholders often operate in groups in their relationships with FOs, and 
stakeholders, when they take action, often do so as collectives of individual stakeholders.   
My approach should be applicable to stakeholder groups as well as individuals.  The 
actual decision for a stakeholder group to take action is likely not the result of the inclinations all 
the individuals comprising that group; rather, it hinges on the perceptions of one or a few key 
decisionmakers or authority figures.  I have asserted that what are most important in 
understanding stakeholder behavior are the motivations of what Frooman (2000) calls key 
“influencers” or decisionmakers within the stakeholder group or organization.  I believe that the 
opinions of these influencers and decisionmakers have a substantial impact on the behaviors of 
other individuals within the stakeholder group; therefore, if the influencer is motivated to have 
the stakeholder group or organization take action against the FO, she will be able to use her 
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influence or authority to attempt to convince other individuals within the stakeholder group or 
organization to take part in such action.   
Thus, I have asserted that much action by stakeholder groups or organizations is best 
understood if it is reduced to the motivations of key individuals within those groups or 
organizations.  However, I have not attempted to describe how groups, or “collectives” are 
formed in the first place, though the formation of a group is obviously a critical precursor to 
action by that group.  For example, how does a consumer group come into being?  While I have 
included in my instrument some items, such as “what is the likelihood that you would attempt to 
organize a union drive by student employees…” and “what is the likelihood that you would try to 
organize a boycott among the general public,” these items, as measures of intentions, overlook 
many of the difficulties in organizing a diversity of individuals into a collective.  Without this 
initial organization into collectives, or course, stakeholder groups will not exist, and so cannot 
act.  
The organization of people into collectives is difficult, however.  The lack of resources is 
often a substantial impediment to organization (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977).  Furthermore, free-
rider issues may lower the likelihood of individuals’ participation in a group: if individuals act in 
their economic self-interest, and they realize that they can obtain the same benefits as active 
participants in the collective without participating themselves, the propensity to become actively 
involved will be reduced (Olson, 1965).  These problems may be overcome if the proper 
resources are available – material resources for coordinating and organizing, and nonmaterial 
resources, such as leadership (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003) – but I have eschewed discussion 
of these issues.  In short, throughout this dissertation, when I have addressed the idea of action 
by stakeholder groups, I have essentially assumed the existence of those groups.  While I appear 
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to have identified some of the issues that would lead an individual to be interested in taking part 
in the action of a stakeholder group and some of the factors that would motivate “influencers” to 
advocate action by their stakeholder groups, I have not attempted to address the conditions under 
which organizing disparate individuals into entities that can be meaningfully termed “stakeholder 
groups” can occur. 
6.2.2  Limitations Concerning Internal Validity 
6.2.2.1  Use of Between-Subjects Design.  Strictly speaking, both equity and expectancy theory 
are best tested using within-subjects designs, since the effects they posit are within-subjects.  
Despite this, I conducted my experiment using a between-subjects design.  Though the use of 
between-subjects design is commonplace in empirical work on equity theory, and is by far the 
dominant design in studies of expectancy theory (Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996), a between-
subjects design is technically at odds with precise tests of these theories.   
Both equity theory and expectancy theory are models of individual decision-making; 
therefore, their effects should ideally be viewed as within-subjects phenomena.  Analyzing 
scores of different individuals as a group only gives information about the amount of variation in 
the group, rather than information about variation within individuals.  Use of a between-subjects 
approach may mask variations within individuals (Campbell and Stanley, 1963) and cause the 
amount of explained to be lower than it would be with a within-subjects design (Mitchell, 1974).  
In expectancy theory, for example, within-subjects analyses have usually yielded stronger 
correlations than between-subjects analyses (Mitchell, 1982).  If these phenomena occurred in 
my study, the internal validity would be reduced.   
Despite its shortcomings, however, I felt that it would have been very difficult to conduct 
my study without relying on a between-subjects design.  As noted earlier, I used such a design 
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because to subject one individual to all eight of my experimental conditions would have been 
extraordinarily difficult.  Since responding to one condition of my instrument took about 20 
minutes for each subject, it was expected that conducting a within-subjects study would have 
made recruitment of subjects extremely problematic.  Furthermore, a within-subjects design 
would most likely have resulted in significant respondent fatigue, which would have introduced 
substantial measurement error and diminished the validity of my results.  A within-subjects 
design might also have elicited demand effects, as subjects would likely have been able to 
determine the nature of my manipulations after being exposed to several of them.   
6.2.2.2  Action Factor Reliabilities.  The internal reliabilities of some of the stakeholder action 
factors was a concern in this study.  In particular, the “unethical retribution” factor associated 
with the customer-retailer vignette exhibited a Cronbach’s alpha of only .448.  While I retained 
this factor out of interest, the reliability of this factor is clearly a substantial issue (though, as 
noted earlier, low reliability is to be expected for a two-item scale).  As a result, one must use 
caution in interpreting my results concerning this factor.   
The internal consistency reliabilities of two other factors could also be questioned.  One 
widely-accepted standard concerning the threshold for acceptability in terms of internal 
consistency (as measured by Cronbach’s Alpha) is .70 (Nunnaly, 1978), though others are as 
lenient as .60 (Hair et al., 1995), and the standard of reliability varies across fields within 
disciplines such as psychology.  Two of the stakeholder action factors associated with the 
employee-employer vignette, “sabotage/shirking” action and “manipulation of effort” fall within 
.60 and .70 in terms of their Cronbach’s alphas.  Neither of these factors could be improved in 
terms of their reliabilities by deleting items.  Thus, these two stakeholder action factors exhibit 
what some would regard as “marginal” acceptability in terms of their internal consistency.  One 
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might argue that results concerning these factors, too, should be regarded with caution, since 
their somewhat low reliabilities limit their validities.  
6.2.2.3  The Use of Single-Item Measures.  I employed single-item measures for the testing of 
some hypotheses.  While for the hypotheses concerning prosocial stakeholder action the initial 
single-item measure was augmented by using it in a multiple-item scale as well, in testing H4 I 
used single-item measures (one for each vignette) as the only dependent variables.  I employed 
these measures primarily in an effort to avoid lengthening the instrument, which was very long, 
and thereby avoid exacerbating the possibility of respondent fatigue influencing my results.  
Furthermore, the items I chose (“quit your job” for the employee-employer vignette, and “refuse 
to shop at Blu-Chip in the future” for the customer-retailer vignette) seemed representative of the 
most obvious forms of severance of the stakeholder-FO relationships of concern.    
While single-item measures are popular due to the possibility of their quick and easy 
administration, they are often seen as less appropriate than multiple-item measures for the 
measurement of complex constructs (Loo, 2002).  Recently, though, some have challenged the 
necessity of multiple-item measures, arguing that, in some cases, one item can be as reliable and 
valid as a multiple-item scale (Gardner et al., 1998; Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997).  My 
impression is that relationship severance does not represent an overly complex construct (as 
opposed to, for example, job satisfaction), and I believe that the items I used effectively reflect 
the idea of severance of the stakeholder-FO relationships of concern.  Nonetheless, the use of 
single-item measures does represent a limitation of my study, as the severance measures and the 
single-item prosocial action measures may be limited in their reliability, which, in turn, places 
limits on their validity.    
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6.3  CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
6.3.1  Understanding Stakeholder Action 
The most important contribution of this work concerns its explanation of the precursors of 
stakeholder action against FOs.  As noted, a critical force underlying the stakeholder approach 
concerns conflict between stakeholders and FOs, and the fact that the FO can be faced with 
stakeholder attempts to sanction it for its actions.  However, the conditions that lead to 
stakeholder action have not been well described in the literature to date.  The exception to this 
statement is work by Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003), which focuses on stakeholder action 
based on attempts to establish, enhance, or maintain social identity.  My work provides an 
alternative view to that of Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) by identifying the connection 
between stakeholder interests, stakeholder motivation, and stakeholder action.        
While Rowley and Berman (2000) also explicitly address the conditions that promote 
action by stakeholders against the FO by positing that particular characteristics of the firm, the 
industry, the stakeholder environment, the institutional environment, and the issue at hand affect 
the likelihood that stakeholders will act against the FO, their assertions do not appear to have 
been derived from any particular theoretical base.  My work provides a coherent theoretical basis 
for propositions concerning the likelihood of stakeholder action, underlain by two extremely 
well-researched theories of behavior: furthermore, I submit that the majority of the relationships 
between various factors and stakeholder action suggested by Rowley and Berman (2000) can be 
derived by applying equity and expectancy theories to understand stakeholder action.   
For example, as noted in Chapter 1, Rowley and Berman (2000) posit that previous 
successful actions by stakeholders against an organization increase the propensity of 
stakeholders to act against the FO.  This position can be understood with reference to expectancy 
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theory.  Lawler (1973) pointed out that one important influence on expectancies is past 
experience in similar situations.  Thus, past successful action by stakeholders against an 
organization will increase their and other stakeholders’ perceptions that 1) future actions can also 
be successfully undertaken (i.e., stakeholders’ E-P expectancies will be elevated) and 2) such 
action will lead to the desired outcomes (i.e., P-O expectancies will be elevated).  These 
conditions will increase stakeholder motivation to act.  Other conditions proposed by Rowley 
and Berman (2000), such as low costs of action, the importance of the industry to the larger 
social system, and the existence of a collective consciousness of action will similarly enhance 
stakeholder expectancies, and so also affect stakeholders’ propensities to act. 
Thus, this work contributes to the stakeholder literature by augmenting the meager body 
of work explaining stakeholder action.  Furthermore, it explains the latter phenomenon using a 
theoretical underpinning that is not based on social identification (which Rowley and 
Moldoveanu (2003) acknowledge is not the basis for most stakeholder action), and which 
incorporates well-established theories of behavior. 
6.3.2  Delineation of an Interest-Based View of Stakeholder Action 
As noted earlier, there is an underlying assumption in stakeholder research that stakeholder 
action is interest-driven (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003): stakeholders, when they take action 
against a FO, tend to do so to promote or protect the things they value.  However, this interest-
based view, while acting as the foundation for much thought in stakeholder theory, has remained 
largely unarticulated.   
This work provides an articulation of the interest-based view through its incorporation of 
stakeholder interests in the form of outcomes that are valued by the stakeholder.  In this work, 
stakeholder interests (i.e., outcomes) provide the impetus for stakeholder action through their 
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impacts on stakeholders’ motivations to act against the FO.  Stakeholder outcomes are taken into 
account through the outcome/input ratio that drives motivation in equity theory: higher outcomes 
increase the stakeholder’s ratio, and generally will reduce the stakeholder’s propensity to take 
action against the FO by leading to either reduced perceptions of underreward or increased 
perceptions of overreward.  Though my results concerning the effects of equity sensitivity on 
stakeholder action were mixed, equity sensitivity may also play a role: “entitled” stakeholders 
will have a greater tendency to focus on outcomes and may prefer overreward, such that they are 
more likely to act against the FO in order to forward their interests than are other stakeholders.   
Stakeholder interests are also taken into account in expectancy theory.  In particular, high 
valence outcomes (i.e., important interests) will motivate stakeholders to take action against the 
FO if stakeholder expectancies that such action will promote or preserve those interests are 
sufficiently high.  Thus, this work provides articulation of the interest-based view of stakeholder 
action, particularly by articulating the processes through which FO actions that affect stakeholder 
interests are translated into stakeholder motivation and the propensity of the stakeholder to act 
against the FO.     
6.3.3  The Acknowledgement of Prosocial Actions by Stakeholders 
Students of stakeholders tend to focus on the potential for conflict in stakeholder-FO 
relationships, and the related potential for the imposition of sanctions on the FO by stakeholders.  
They typically do not acknowledge the potential for stakeholders to act in the interests of the FO, 
despite the fact that this potential clearly exists.  This work has taken some preliminary steps 
toward investigating stakeholders’ propensities to act in the interests of the FO by engaging in 
prosocial actions.  Results indicated that prosocial activities by stakeholders are more likely if 
the stakeholder perceives overreward in its relationship with the FO.   
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6.3.4  Equity/Expectancy as an Augmentation of Instrumental Stakeholder Theory 
This work also serves to augment instrumental stakeholder theory as conceptualized by Jones 
(1995).  Jones (1995), in his explication of instrumental stakeholder theory, makes propositions 
concerning the effects of particular firm behaviors on firm performance.  His focus is on the 
“contracts,” or relationships, that exist between the firm and its various stakeholders.  He refers 
to agency theory (Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mitnick, 1982), transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1975), and team production (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) to develop 
propositions based on the idea of opportunism on the part of the managers, who are “contracting 
agents” for the firm, forging and managing the various relationships between the firm and its 
stakeholders.   
The essence of Jones’ (1995) argument is that opportunistic behaviors on the part of a 
firm’s managers lead to contracting inefficiencies (i.e., difficulties in forging or maintaining 
stable, cooperative, and, especially, trusting relationships with stakeholders), such that the firm’s 
performance will suffer relative to that of non-opportunistic firms (Jones, 1995).  Jones’ 
propositions articulate how firm behaviors such as the use of shark repellant, poison pills, or 
greenmail, the payment of disproportionately high levels of compensation to executives, the use 
of many suppliers, the contracting out of work, and the use of external rather than internal labor 
markets may be seen as opportunistic behaviors, and may generate negative effects on firm 
reputation and erode trust between stakeholders and the FO which, in turn, can have a negative 
impact on firm performance.  
While Jones’ argument concerning the performance effects of the negative firm 
reputation that can result from opportunism is compelling on its own, it is noteworthy that the 
majority of Jones’ (1995) propositions are also consistent with an equity/expectancy approach to 
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understanding stakeholder reactivity in stakeholder-FO relationships.  For example, Jones (1995) 
proposes that disproportionately high executive compensation, contracting out of work formerly 
done by employees, and reliance on external labor markets represent opportunism and a lack of 
trustworthiness on the part of managers, which can lead to sub-optimal performance due to its 
detraction from firm relationships with key stakeholders.  Such performance effects can be 
predicted from an equity/expectancy perspective.  Disproportionately high executive 
compensation is likely to lead to perceptions of underreward inequity on the part of key 
stakeholders such as employees, stockholders, and the like, who are likely to compare their 
outcome/input ratios to those of highly visible executives.  Similarly, contracting out work 
formerly done by employees and reliance on external labor markets will likely result in 
employees feeling underreward inequity.  If these stakeholders possess non-zero expectancies 
that they can successfully act against the firm and that such action will lead to positive outcomes, 
they will be motivated to take action against the firm, which may be detrimental to firm 
performance.   
Thus, an equity/expectancy approach to stakeholder action can be seen as reinforcing 
Jones’ (1995) instrumental stakeholder theory.  In general, it seems that opportunistic behavior 
by firms can lead to difficulty in maintaining relationships with stakeholders because: 1) it 
produces a lack of trust that has negative effects on firm reputation (as posited by Jones, 1995), 
2) it leads to perceptions of inequity between the firm (or its managers) and other stakeholders, 
and 3) it may have negative effects on outcomes that have high valences to stakeholders.  These 
conditions can precipitate a lack of willingness on the part of the stakeholders concerned to 
continue to deal with the FO (i.e., severance of the relationship) or a retaliatory reaction by those 
stakeholders against the firm, both of which are likely to detract from firm performance.   
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While Jones’ (1995) theory relies on the transmission between stakeholders of 
information concerning opportunism, such that negative effects on firm reputation occur and 
negative performance effects result, an equity/expectancy position accounts for additional 
negative performance effects of opportunism that do not rest on the assumption that information 
relevant to firm reputation will be transmitted across stakeholders: stakeholder action can result 
from stakeholders’ own observations of opportunism and the perceptions of inequity that result.  
The additional benefit of an equity/expectancy approach as an augmentation of Jones’ (1995) 
position is that it provides insight into when opportunistic behavior by a firm is likely to lead to 
action by stakeholders and when, on the other hand, such opportunism is unlikely to elicit a 
reaction from stakeholders (because of, for example, low expectancies). 
6.3.5  The Combination of Equity Theory and Expectancy Theory 
While some researchers have applied equity and expectancy theories simultaneously (e.g., 
Harder, 1991; 1992), others assert that equity theory and expectancy theory are competing 
explanations of motivation.  This seems to be the result of the fact that much early work on 
equity theory compared the implications of underreward and overreward for motivation under 
piece rate and hourly rate compensation systems.  Expectancy theorists such as Lawler (1961) 
noted that equity theory and expectancy theory make different predictions concerning motivation 
and productivity in piece rate situations.  Equity theory, in Adams’ (1963, 1965) conception, 
asserts that an overrewarded person will reduce output in terms of quantity (while increasing 
quality) in order to reduce the overreward, while expectancy theory suggests that he or she will 
increase output as much as possible, as P-O expectancy is very high under a piece-rate system 
and pay is a valued outcome.  Indeed, Lawler (1971) appears to have seen equity theory as a 
direct threat to the viability of expectancy theory.   
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 The critical distinction between my work and most equity and expectancy research that 
facilitates the combination of the two theories is that, whereas these theories are generally 
applied to explain one’s motivation to do something that would be regarded as positive (e.g., 
work harder) by the other in the relationship, my work concerns motivation to engage in action 
that is detrimental to the other relationship participant.  My research thus contributes to work on 
equity and expectancy by indicating that equity and expectancy considerations can combine to 
motivate individuals, particularly to engage in behaviors that have a negative impact on 
relationship partners. 
 
6.4  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
An equity/expectancy approach to understanding stakeholder action represents a model that can 
assist managers in determining when an action taken by their organization is likely or unlikely to 
elicit a reaction from the stakeholders affected by it.  Specifically, assuming a high-valence 
outcome is at stake, reaction is most likely to occur in response to firm actions that indicate or 
create underreward (from the stakeholder’s perspective) in the stakeholder-FO relationship if the 
expectancies that 1) a reaction (i.e., effort) will lead to the successful performance of activities or 
establishment of conditions that may lead to a positive outcome for the stakeholder and 2) the 
performance of such activities or establishment of such conditions will, in fact, lead to a positive 
outcome for the stakeholder, are high. 
The ramifications of this are manifold, and suggest several directions for managerial 
attention.  Expectancy considerations require that managerial attention be directed toward the 
determination of what stakeholders really value; that is, the outcomes that are particularly high in 
valence to them.  Typically, expectancy theorists assert that identifying what individuals value is 
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important so that they can be rewarded with high-valence outcomes for successful performance.  
The intention underlying clear identification of what stakeholders value highly is somewhat 
different.  Since an objective of the FO should be to inhibit stakeholder motivation to act against 
it, those outcomes that are high in valence to a stakeholder are those that should not be 
“interfered with” by firm actions – if such non-interference is possible – since impeding a 
stakeholder’s attainment of high-valence outcomes may motivate action against the firm by that 
stakeholder.  By explicitly identifying the outcomes that are high in valence to its stakeholders, 
managers can gain insight into which outcomes should not be jeopardized by firm activities.   
 Equity considerations imply that managers of a FO should find ways to make sure that 
stakeholders are fairly treated or, at least, perceive that they are being fairly treated.  That is, 
stakeholders must perceive that the ratio of their inputs into the FO to the outcomes they derive 
from the FO is reasonably close to the O/I ratios of the firm and comparison-other stakeholders.  
Becoming informed of stakeholders’ perceptions of the degree of equity in the relationship 
becomes an important managerial task, as does attempting to make sure that those perceptions 
are positive ones.  Extrapolation from studies in the procedural justice literature (e.g., Conlon, 
1993; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) suggests that giving stakeholders a voice in the decision process 
can positively affect their perceptions of fairness.  While this is not likely to be feasible in all 
situations, it is possible in some, and could help promote perceptions of equity on the part of the 
stakeholder, and so help the FO avoid having action directed against it by that stakeholder.  
Providing an explanation of outcomes can also promote perceptions of equity (Williams, 1999) 
and reduce the dissonance associated with underreward (O’Malley & Becker, 1984), which 
suggests that managers would do well to make sure that important stakeholders are given 
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reasonable explanations for any negative outcomes they may experience due to the firm’s 
activities.   
Furthermore, managers of the FO would be wise to undertake to understand which other 
stakeholders in its network a given stakeholder is likely to use for purposes of comparison.  
Stakeholders in a similar industry or possessing a similar relationship to the FO (e.g., 
“suppliers”) may be likely candidates for comparison, as may stakeholders whose inputs to or 
outcomes from the FO are widely known.  Knowledge of the referents a stakeholder is likely to 
use for comparison purposes in assessments of equity is important, because the choice of 
comparison other can have an impact on whether one perceives equity or inequity in her 
relationships (Griffeth et al., 1989).   
 In addition, equity theory posits that what is an input into a relationship is determined by 
the contributor’s opinion concerning its relevance to the exchange (Adams, 1965).  Inequity may 
be perceived by one party in the relationship if things it considers are relevant inputs are not seen 
to be relevant inputs by the other party.  Thus, a stakeholder may perceive inequity in its 
relations with the FO if things it considers to be relevant inputs into the relationship are not 
considered to be such by the FO.  For example, a supplier to an organization might regard 
reliability as a relevant input to its relationship with the FO, while the FO regards the resource 
supplied as the only relevant input.  The supplier, who would not be being compensated in any 
form for such reliability might feel underreward inequity, and such inequity might motivate the 
supplier to act against the FO – by seeking alternative customers or refusing to supply the 
resource, for example.  Therefore, if one adopts an equity/expectancy-based approach to 
understanding stakeholder-FO relationships, it becomes clear that the firm, if it wishes to avoid 
having  stakeholder action directed against it, must make an effort to understand what its 
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stakeholders consider to be inputs into their relationships with the firm – what they perceive that 
they contribute to the firm’s well-being.  By doing so, the FO can have a better understanding of 
its stakeholders’ perceptions of the degree of equity in their relationships with the firm, and 
perceptions of inequity that could lead to a stakeholder sanctioning the FO might be avoided. 
Adoption of equity/expectancy point of view also leads to the conclusion that it may be in 
the interests of managers to pay attention to stakeholder perceptions of expectancies concerning 
potential actions against the FO.  Generally speaking, stakeholder action against the FO may be 
less likely when expectancies are low, that is, when the stakeholder perceives that it would be 
very difficult to engage in the proposed action and/or it perceives that the proposed action is 
unlikely to lead to desired outcomes.  It may be possible for FOs to take actions that reduce the 
perceived likelihood that stakeholder actions can be undertaken successfully (and so lower E-P 
expectancies) or that reduce perceptions of the connection between successful stakeholder action 
and outcomes valued by that stakeholder (and so lower P-O expectancies).   
For example, six months after the workers at a Wal-Mart store in Jonquiere, Quebec won 
union certification, Wal-Mart announced that it would close the store.  Though Wal-Mart 
asserted that it was unable to reach an agreement with the union that would allow it to operate 
the store profitably, due to the fact that union demands would have required increased hiring and 
additional hours for workers, this contention was disputed by the United Food and Commercial 
Workers union (UFCW).  Wal-Mart’s actions in this case can be regarded as an attempt to 
reduce employees’ expectancies concerning the efficacy of union certification.  Essentially, Wal-
Mart was signaling that, even if unionization is possible, it will not lead to better outcomes for 
employees: in essence, Wal-Mart was acting to reduce P-O expectancies concerning the 
likelihood that unionization will lead to valued outcomes for employees.  Such actions could 
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reduce the likelihood of unionization by employees at other Wal-Mart stores.  Indeed, after the 
announcement of the store closure, the spokesperson for the UFCW acknowledged that Wal-
Mart’s action would make other Wal-Mart employees think twice before voting for union 
accreditation. 
 On the other hand, actions or inactions of the FO could also raise stakeholder 
expectancies concerning the efficacy of action against the FO in some situations.  For example, 
if, in the above case, Wal-Mart had acquiesced to the demands of the UFCW, this would have 
signaled to Wal-Mart employees at other stores that unionization could lead to valued outcomes 
for them as well; that is, it would have raised P-O expectancies concerning unionization for those 
employees.  Thus, it appears that it is possible for FOs to take actions that influence stakeholder 
expectancies, and managers seeking to avoid stakeholder action directed at their organizations 
would be wise to concern themselves with this possibility. 
Finally, O’Malley and Becker (1984) found that the dissonance of underrewarded 
subjects could be ameliorated by explaining to them that the overrewarded referent was 
distressed by the situation as well.  This suggests that managers, when they are forced to make 
decisions that could lead to perceptions of inequity by stakeholders, should express their 
commiseration with the latter. 
An equity/expectancy approach to thinking about stakeholder action also suggests 
particular behaviors by those hoping to involve stakeholder groups in undertaking sanctions 
against a FO.  For example, a leader or “influencer” of a stakeholder group could facilitate 
support for action by reinforcing among others in the stakeholder group the notion that they are 
underrewarded, and by taking actions designed to bolster expectancies that successful action can 
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be undertaken and will lead to desired outcomes.  Likewise, one stakeholder might use a similar 
approach to convince other stakeholders to support its action against the FO.  Stakeholders might 
also promote equitable treatment by the FO by clearly expressing to decisionmakers in the latter 
organization which outcomes it values highly, what entities it is using as comparison others, and 
what it considers to be its key inputs into its relationship with the FO.   
6.5  AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This work suggests a wide variety of avenues for future research concerning stakeholder action.  
Some of these research opportunities are presented in the following sections. 
6.5.1 The Nature of the Exchange Relationship and Stakeholder Responses to Inequity 
Several potential areas of future work pertain to the effects of the nature of the stakeholder-FO 
relationship on stakeholder propensities to take action against the FO.  The type of relationship 
between the individual and the other in the exchange relationship appears to influence reactions 
to inequity: it may be the case that a similar effect exists in stakeholder-FO relationships.  Key 
relationship characteristics that might be investigated include history (Cosier & Dalton, 1986), 
duration (Folger & Martin, 1986; Greenberg, 1986; Weick, 1966), attraction (Weick, 1966; 
Griffith, Vecchio, & Logan, 1989), and intimacy (Wagstaff, 1998; Alexander, 2002). 
Whether the stakeholder-FO interaction is a “one-shot” interaction or a longer-term 
relationship could affect the likelihood of stakeholder action.  Folger and Martin (1986) showed 
that subjects are most likely to react to injustice when the perpetrator of that injustice is expected 
to be able to continue to do so in the future.  This corresponds with Greenberg’s (1986) finding 
that people were more likely to take action to redress injustice when the injustice was the result 
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of an organizational policy (a relatively stable and permanent attribute) than when it resulted 
from an individual’s decision (and therefore may be temporary).   
Other work indicates that longer-term relationships are in general less likely to adhere to 
norms of equity than short-term ones.  This position is consistent with work by Shapiro (1975).  
In his study, subjects who contributed more inputs than their partner and anticipated future 
interaction with the exchange partner tended to allocate rewards equally, whereas others tended 
to allocate using norms of equity.  Shapiro (1975) attributes the result to subjects’ concern that 
their exchange partner would evaluate them negatively: this consideration led subjects to 
downplay equity.  A similar result was derived by Kahn, Lamm, and Nelson (1977) using an 
observer to allocate the rewards: equal outcomes were preferred if the relationship was expected 
to continue, perhaps because there was an opportunity to make up any inequity in future 
interactions.  These works suggest that inequity in one-shot exchange relationships and inequity 
resulting from an individual’s decision may not generate the same type of response to inequities 
as longer-term relationships or decisions based on a specific policy.   
In a related area, relationship history may also moderate stakeholder responses to 
inequity.  Cosier and Dalton (1983) argue that past levels of inequity-based tension influence the 
tension felt in the current inequitable situation: historical inequities are not forgotten.  
Furthermore, the resolution of a current inequity (for example, an underrewarded individual 
receiving a pay raise) may not completely negate the effects of past inequities: dissonance may 
persist.  Thus, the perception of a history of inequity in the relationship could increase the 
dissonance associated with a current inequity.  The idea that both past and present inequities are 
considered is consistent with the idea of “the straw that broke the camel’s back”:  a relatively 
minor degree of current underreward (i.e., one that would normally be tolerated), for example, 
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could lead to a violent reaction when combined with a lengthy history of underreward (Cosier & 
Dalton, 1983). 
It is also possible that parties in a relationship of great duration may be able to tolerate a 
higher degree of inequity without being motivated to act (Weick, 1966).  Equality signals that the 
parties to the relationship value each other, which encourages solidarity, and thereby promotes 
the maintenance of the relationship.   
Future work could also investigate how the degree of closeness, or “intimacy” in the 
stakeholder-FO relationship might also affect the likelihood of stakeholder action.  As noted by 
Wagstaff (1998), it is often asserted that norms of equity apply only in relationships where there 
is no intimacy or affection in the relationship; however when intimacy is present in the 
relationship, an equality or need-based norm may be favored.  For example, Boldero & 
Rosenthal (1984) submit that in stable (i.e., “friendly”) relationships, or those involving 
substantial personal contact, equity may not be the focus: rather, the needs of the exchange 
partners may be given more consideration in the allocation of rewards in the relationship.  These 
authors state that the departure from equity in such situations is possible because in stable 
relationships such departures are less likely to result in negative evaluations of one partner by the 
other.  Similarly, in the marketing literature, Hoffman & Kelley (2000) suggest that high 
proximity relationships, characterized by feelings of attachment and personal involvement, may 
develop into “boundary open transactions” (Price, Arnould, & Tierney, 1995), which are like 
“meetings between friends,” and are indicative of a service provider’s interest in the customer as 
a person.  They argue that low proximity relationships will be more likely to be evaluated based 
on distributive justice (i.e., equity) than high proximity relationships, which may be evaluated 
based on other criteria. 
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Clark and Mills (1979) also suggested that normal exchange principles do not apply in 
intimate relationships, because such relationships are communal relationships rather than 
exchange relationships: each party cares about the welfare of the other and responds to his or her 
needs.  Similar ideas have been expressed regarding interorganizational relationships.  Scheer, 
Kumar, and Steenkamp (2003) assert that distribution norms might vary across inter-
organizational relationships.  For example, a firm might follow a norm such as equality with its 
closest partners while favoring equity in its interaction with other, less close firms.  Thus, 
“friendly” stakeholder-FO relationships may not be evaluated based on perceptions of equity, 
which implies that inequity in such relationships may not increase the possibility of stakeholder 
action: stakeholders with strong attachments to an organization may be willing to overlook 
inequities to a greater extent than those with weaker attachments.  Similarly, overreward 
inequities perceived by stakeholders might be more likely to be compensated for if the 
stakeholder has a strong attachment to the firm.   
On the other hand, Campbell and Pritchard (1976) and Pritchard (1969) assert that in 
intimate relationships the parties are more likely to be able to assess the levels of each other’s 
inputs and outcomes, and these inputs and outcomes will be more salient to both parties.  
Furthermore, they state that cognitive distortions of inputs and outcomes should be more difficult 
in intimate relationships.  They therefore suggest that perceptions of inequity are more likely in 
intimate relationships than in very impersonal ones.  Furthermore, due to the increased difficulty 
in cognitively distorting inputs and outcomes in intimate relationships, behavioral responses to 
inequity should be more likely in intimate relationships compared to impersonal ones.  Likewise, 
Weick (1966) argues that substantial contact between the parties in an inequitable relationship 
would consistently remind the parties of the inequity, and would result in “cumulative” tension 
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or, at least, the perpetual salience of the inequity, thus hastening attempts to rectify it.  Thus, the 
increased ability to detect inequities in intimate relationships may act as a countervailing 
influence to the increased tolerance for inequity that characterizes such relationships.  Following 
from Campell and Pritchard’s (1976) argument, stakeholders in high proximity relationships with 
the FO might be more likely to detect inequities, and, as Weick (1966) suggests, might be 
constantly reminded of the inequity, such that the likelihood of action would be increased. 
 A related topic for investigation is how the effects of equity and expectancy 
considerations in stakeholder-FO relationships change as the relationship progresses.  Vogl-
Bauer et al. (1999) suggest that equity considerations may have different effects on a parent-
child relationship and its maintenance as the relationship matures.  An analogous position 
relating to stakeholder-FO relationships would be that equity and expectancy considerations have 
a greater or lesser impact on those relationships depending on the stage of the relationships.  For 
example, underreward inequities might be more likely to be tolerated by a stakeholder early in a 
relationship than when the relationship has matured, or a stakeholder might be less likely to 
accept overreward inequities in a well-established relationship.  This idea coincides with the 
previous idea that stakeholder propensities to act might vary in accordance with the depth or 
intimacy of the relationship, as one would expect relationship depth to increase over time. 
6.5.2  Attribution of the Inequity 
Future work could also investigate the effects of attribution of the cause of inequity on a 
stakeholder’s response to inequity in its relationship with the FO.  Some researchers argue that 
causal attributions affect responses to inequity (Alexander, 2002; Greenberg, 1987; Holmes & 
Levinger, 1994; Hunt et al., 1983; Kuijer, Buunk, & Ybema, 2001; Utne & Kidd, 1980; 
Wagstaff, 1998).  Hunt et al. (1983) posit that a person experiencing inequity may attribute the 
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inequity to a “harmdoing entity” (such as a business in an employee-employer relationship, or a 
seller in a buyer-seller relationship).  On the other hand, the person might attribute the inequity to 
other causes, external to the harmdoing entity, which may or may not be within that entity’s 
control.  Hunt et al. (1983) argue that in the latter case, the entity’s causal role is “discounted” 
and the individual’s response to the inequity will be moderated accordingly.   
Thus, stakeholders may assign cause or place blame in relationships, and such assignation 
may influence both the dissonance associated with and the responses to inequity.  For example, if 
an employee perceives underreward in her relationship with her employer, say, due to a wage 
reduction, she will attempt to determine the reasons for that inequity.  If she perceives that the 
source of the inequity lies in the “disposition” of her employer, she will experience greater 
distress than if she perceives that the inequity is the result of causes beyond her employer’s 
control – for example, a floundering economy.  In the latter case, she might feel less distress than 
she would if she attributed the inequity to malevolent intentions of her employer, and might be 
less motivated to take part in action against her employer to restore equity.    
6.5.3  Culture and Stakeholder Assessments of Equity 
Cultural standards may limit the applicability of norms of equity (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; 
Scheer, Kumar, & Steenkamp (2003).  Laufer (2002) asserts that cultures may differ in a variety 
of ways that may influence reactions to inequity.  Specifically, there may be cross-cultural 
differences in 1) the priority given to equity over other distribution norms, 2) the tolerance of 
overreward and underreward, 3) the means used to reduce inequity in relationships, 4) 
perceptions of what constitutes an input or outcome, and 5) the means to measure those inputs 
and outcomes.  Thus, responses to inequity may vary with culture.  Another avenue for future 
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research, then, concerns the degree to which culture affects perceptions of or responses to 
inequity in stakeholder-FO relationships.   
6.5.4  Prosocial Stakeholder Actions 
As noted, researchers in stakeholder theory typically eschew investigation of the idea that 
stakeholders may act in the interests of the FO.  While I, in this work, have taken some small 
steps toward identifying precursors of prosocial activities by stakeholders, future investigations 
of “helping” behaviors by stakeholders are warranted. 
 In a similar vein is the idea of coincidence of the interests of the stakeholder and the FO.  
As noted, this work has been founded mainly in an assumption, prevalent in the stakeholder 
literature, that conflict exists between the interests of the stakeholder and those of the FO.  Thus, 
the stakeholder that perceives underreward and the possibility of correcting it may act against the 
FO to forward its own interests.  However, some stakeholder-FO relationships may not be best 
characterized as exhibiting conflict between the interests of the two parties.  For example, 
employees may be involved in profit-sharing, or may own the business that employs them.  
Clearly, such relationships, where the interests of stakeholders and the FO coincide to a 
substantial degree, would be characterized by different stakeholder propensities for action 
against the FO.  Future work in stakeholder theory should address such situations, where the 
coincidence of stakeholder and FO interests is likely to make action against the FO less 
desirable.     
6.5.5  Other Sources of Stakeholder Motivation 
Finally, it may be that other motivation theories can also offer insights into a stakeholder’s 
propensity to take action against the FO.  For example, stakeholders may set particular goals that 
they strive to achieve; hence, goal-setting theory may also help us understand how stakeholders 
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will act with respect to the FO.  Addressing the needs and drives of key members of stakeholder 
organizations could also shed light on the issue of stakeholder action. 
 
6.6  CONCLUSION 
My primary goal in conducting this study was to address the general research question, “What 
are the conditions under which stakeholders will take action against a FO?”  My approach to 
responding to this question involved acknowledging that a stakeholder is likely to act when it is 
motivated to do so: accordingly I adopted two of the most well-established motivation theories, 
equity theory and expectancy theory, based on which I developed a framework for understanding 
when a stakeholder is likely to take action against the FO.  I asserted that stakeholders are likely 
to take action against the FO when they perceive underreward inequity in their relationship with 
the FO, and when they have high expectancies that they can successfully take action in order to 
remedy that inequity.   
 To test hypotheses derived from this framework I developed an experiment wherein 
subjects perused two vignettes, each concerning a specific stakeholder-FO relationship, and 
responded to various questions concerning the likelihood that they would engage in various 
actions.  Results provided support for the idea that both stakeholder perceptions of the degree of 
equity (or inequity) in their relationship with the FO and their expectancies that they can 
successfully engage in action that will result in valued outcomes affect stakeholders’ propensities 
to take action against the FO.  Other results indicated that overrewarded stakeholders may be 
more likely than others to engage in behaviors that help the FO.  Results concerning the impact 
of equity sensitivity on stakeholder propensities to engage in action either detrimental to or 
supportive of the FO were mixed.   
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I believe that this work makes an important contribution to the limited literature 
concerning stakeholder action: however, much work remains to be done in this area.  
Investigation of the research question using methods other than vignette-based experiments 
would be particularly welcome.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
MODERATORS OF RESPONSES TO EQUITY/INEQUITY 
 
Moderator Theoretical Statement Empirical Evidence 
   
 
Ability and Need 
- Less able partners may be “given 
the benefit of the doubt” in 
allocation decisions (Reis & 
Jackson, 1981). 
 
- Similar outcomes may be assessed 
differently due to consideration of 
one’s limitations and abilities 
(Leventhal & Michaels, 1971). 
 
- A firm’s ability to pay is an 
important consideration in 
assessment of equity when the 
comparison other is external to the 
organization (Konopaske & 
Werner, 2002). 
 
- Environmental munificence 
moderates responses to inequity in 
interorganizational relationships.  
When resources are scarce, equity 
norms may be replaced by more 
self-serving norms (Scheer et al., 
2003). 
- Reis and Jackson 
(1981) found that 
women with a male 
partner in a “female-
oriented” task and 
men with a female 
partner in a “male-
oriented” task favored 
equality norms.  When 
the task was “sex-
appropriate” both men 
and women favored 
equity norms. 
 
- Kuijer et al. (2001) 
found that in couples 
where one person had 
cancer, relationship 
inequities did not lead 
to distress if the 
patient suffered from 
serious physical 
impairment, but did 
lead to distress if the 
patient was not 
seriously impaired 
physically. 
 
Self-esteem 
- Need for equity is higher for those 
high in self-esteem than for those 
low in self-esteem (Brockner et 
al., 1987). 
- Brockner et al. (1987) 
found that subjects 
high in self-esteem 
used a performance-
based equity standard 
more than those low 
in self-esteem. 
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Attachment Style 
- High attachment anxiety biases 
perceptions of the exchange 
partner’s inputs and one’s own 
outcomes such that perception of 
underreward is more likely.  High 
attachment avoidance biases 
perceptions of one’s own inputs 
and the exchange partner’s 
outcomes such that perception of 
overreward is more likely (Grau & 
Doll, 2003).  
- Grau & Doll (2003) 
found (in one of three 
studies) that 
individuals low in 
attachment anxiety and 
attachment avoidance 
were most likely to be 
in equitable 
relationships and 
perceive them as 
equitable. 
 
Mood and 
Disposition 
- Mood influences a person’s degree 
of selfishness or generosity, and so 
mediates self-serving or altruistic 
responses (O’Malley & Davies, 
1984). 
 
- Feelings of inequity may be a 
relatively stable predisposition 
(Staw & Ross, 1985). 
 
- People high in negative affectivity 
feel distress and dissatisfaction 
even when no objective source of 
stress is apparent, so negative 
affectivity should affect responses 
to inequity (Hochwarter et al., 
1996). 
- O’Malley and Davies 
(1984) found that 
mood influenced 
reward allocation 
decisions. 
 
- Hochwarter et al. 
(1996) found that 
negative affectivity 
was negatively related 
to perceptions of job 
characteristic, 
supervisor, and 
compensation equity.  
Those high in negative 
affectivity reported 
feeling underrewarded 
with respect to 
intrinsic rewards, 
supervision, and 
extrinsic rewards such 
as pay and benefits. 
 
Gender 
- Gender moderates the relationship 
between equity and satisfaction 
(Boldero & Rosenthal, 1984; 
Bylsma & Major, 1992, 1994; 
Carrell & Dittrich, 1978; 
Greenberg & McCarty, 1990; 
Major and Deaux, 1982). 
- Reis & Jackson (1981) 
found that, in group 
settings, men favored 
equity while women 
favored equality 
- Lamm and Schwinger 
(1980) found that 
women in “extended 
contact” relationships 
with limited rewards 
considered need more 
in their allocation 
decisions than did 
men. 
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Culture 
- Preference for equity may vary 
with across cultures (Ring & Van 
de Ven, 1994; Scheer, et al., 
2003).  
 
- Prioritization of equity with 
respect to other distribution 
norms, tolerance for inequity, 
perceptions of what constitutes an 
input or outcome, means to reduce 
inequity, and means of measuring 
inputs and outcomes vary across 
cultures (Laufer, 2002). 
 
- Collectivist societies may favor 
communal as opposed to equity-
based relationships (Clark & 
Mills, 1979). 
- VanYperen and 
Buunk (1991) found 
that American subjects 
were more sensitive to 
equity than Dutch 
subjects, who had a 
more communal 
orientation. 
 
- Scheer et al. (2003) 
found that, in 
interorganizational 
relationships, Dutch 
firms were intolerant 
of both underreward 
and overreward, while 
American firms 
tolerated overreward. 
 
Attribution of the 
Cause of the 
Inequity 
- If the party perceiving the 
inequity attributes it to causes 
outside the control of the other 
party, responses to the inequity 
will be moderated. 
 
- If the underreward is attributed to 
the other party and is seen as 
“intentional,” a response is more 
likely (Brounstein et al, 1980). 
 
- Underreward is more likely to be 
tolerated if it is not due to a 
decision made by the reward 
allocator (Wagstaff, 1988) 
- Greenberg (1986) 
found that victims of 
unfair procedures 
were more likely to 
take action to rectify 
the injustice when 
they perceived that it 
was the result of an 
organizational policy. 
 
- Cropanzano and 
Folger (1989) found 
that the highest degree 
of resentment and 
feelings of unfair 
treatment occurred 
when the outcomes 
were based on a 
decision of the 
experimenter rather 
than one made by the 
subject himself. 
- Folkes (1984) found 
that when a product 
failure was 
controllable by the 
seller, consumers 
exhibited anger and a 
desire to retaliate. 
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Similarity of the 
Comparison Other 
- The degree of similarity between 
the individual and the referent 
should moderate the tension 
experienced when the person is 
faced with inequity (Weick, 
1966). 
 
 
Attraction to the 
Comparison Other 
- Attractiveness of the comparison 
other moderates responses to 
inequity: underreward in 
comparison to a disliked referent 
results in greater attempts to 
restore equity than underreward in 
comparison to a liked referent.  
Overreward in comparison to a 
disliked referent may result in 
satisfaction rather than guilt, 
while overreward in comparison 
to a liked other could amplify 
such guilt (Griffeth et al., 1989).  
- Griffeth et al., (1989) 
found that subjects 
experienced more 
dissonance when 
overrewarded with 
respect to an attractive 
referent.  Attraction 
resulted in heightened 
attempts at equity 
restoration.  
Underreward was 
more tolerable if the 
referent was 
unattractive. 
 
 
Reaction of the 
Exchange Partner 
- Underreward may be tolerated 
better if the exchange partner does 
not enjoy its overreward 
excessively (O’Malley & Davies, 
1984). 
- O’Malley and Davies 
(1984) found that the 
dissonance of 
underrewarded 
subjects could be 
ameliorated by 
explaining that the 
overrewarded party 
was distressed by the 
situation. 
 
 
Relationship 
History and Trust 
- Perception of a history of inequity 
may increase the dissonance 
created by current inequity and 
reduce the effectiveness of 
attempts by others to compensate 
for the current inequity (Cosier & 
Dalton, 1983). 
 
- Trust reduces the likelihood of 
relationship severance in the face 
of inequity (Ring & Van de Ven, 
1994). 
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Attraction to the 
Exchange Partner  
- Inequity is less likely to be 
perceived in relationships 
characterized by mutual attraction, 
but, when it is perceived, the 
dissonance will be greater than it 
would have otherwise been 
(Weick, 1966). 
 
- Responses to overreward may 
depend on attraction.  Overreward 
relative to an attractive referent 
might result in more dissonance, 
while overreward relative to an 
unattractive other might result in 
satisfaction rather than guilt 
(Griffeth et al., 1989). 
- Griffeth et al. (1989) 
found that overreward 
resulted in more 
dissonance when the 
referent was attractive 
than when he was 
unattractive. 
 
Attraction to the 
Comparison Other 
- Attractiveness of the comparison 
other moderates responses to 
inequity: underreward in 
comparison to a disliked referent 
results in greater attempts to 
restore equity than underreward in 
comparison to a liked referent.  
Overreward in comparison to a 
disliked referent may result in 
satisfaction rather than guilt, 
while overreward in comparison 
to a liked other could amplify 
such guilt (Griffeth et al., 1989).  
- Griffeth et al., (1989) 
found that subjects 
experienced more 
dissonance when 
overrewarded with 
respect to an attractive 
referent.  Attraction 
resulted in heightened 
attempts at equity 
restoration.  
Underreward was 
more tolerable if the 
referent was 
unattractive. 
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Resource 
Dependence and 
the Cost of 
Reaction 
- Responses to inequity should be 
moderated by the costs involved 
(Cosier & Dalton, 1983). 
 
- High dependence implies that 
severance of the relationship is 
very costly (Watson et al. (1996).  
Likelihood of a behavioral 
response to inequity varies 
inversely with cost (Adams, 
1965). 
 
 
- Resource dependence is inversely 
related to power.  The “weak” 
party in an exchange relationship 
(i.e., the one that exhibits resource 
dependence) is less likely to see 
“objective” violations of equity by 
the stronger party as such.  
Furthermore, the powerful party 
may be in a favorable position to 
justify the inequity.  Overt conflict 
is unlikely to occur in such 
situations (Kabanoff, 1991).   
 
- The propensity to sever a 
relationship negatively related to 
the amount of transaction-specific 
investments involved in it (Ring 
& Van de Ven, 1994). 
 
- Behavioral responses to inequity 
(especially relationship severance) 
are less likely in customer-
supplier relationships where 
customization and/or switching 
costs are high: both increase 
resource dependence (Alexander, 
2002).  Customization may also 
reduce behavioral responses 
because can increase the social 
aspects of the relationship 
(Hoffman & Kelley, 2000).   
 
- Watson et al. (1996) 
found that managers 
who were likely to be 
at their current jobs 
for another two years 
expressed less 
dissatisfaction when 
faced with 
underreward than did 
those that were not 
likely to be at their job 
for another two years.  
The former may have 
used cognitive rather 
than behavioral means 
to remedy inequity. 
  
- Hurley (1998) and 
Heide and John (1988) 
found that relationship 
commitment was 
positively related to 
switching costs. 
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Relationship 
Duration 
- In longer-term relationships, a 
present inequity may be able to be 
rectified sometime in the future, 
which negates the need for a 
response (Weick, 1966). 
 
- Those in longer-term relationships 
may focus on norms that facilitate 
relationship maintenance (e.g., 
equality) as opposed to equity 
(Kabanoff, 1991).  
  
- A short duration service encounter 
will be more likely to be evaluated 
based on equity than a long-term 
encounter, because in the latter, 
the relational aspect of the 
encounter becomes the focus 
(Hoffman & Kelley, 2000). 
- Shapiro (1975) found 
that subjects who 
contributed more 
inputs than their 
partner but anticipated 
future interactions 
allocated rewards 
equally, whereas 
others allocated using 
equity norms. 
 
- Kahn, Lamm, and 
Nelson (1977) found 
that an allocator used 
equality norms when 
the relationship was 
expected to continue. 
 
- Folger and Martin 
(1986) found that 
subjects were more 
likely to react to 
injustice when the 
party that caused it is 
likely to be able to 
continue to do so. 
 
- Darke and Dahl 
(2003) found that 
consumers who 
received worse 
outcomes from a seller 
than did another 
customer were less 
dissatisfied when the 
other customer was a 
regular customer. 
 
 256
APPENDIX A: MODERATORS OF RESPONSES TO EQUITY/INEQUITY (CONT’D) 
 
 
 
Intimacy of the 
Relationship 
- Norms of equality, rather than 
equity, may be used in 
intimate relationships 
(Wagstaff, 1998). 
 
- Severance of a relationship is 
less likely when there is a 
strong social aspect to it 
(Alexander, 2002). 
 
- In intimate relationships, 
underreward with respect to 
intrinsic outcomes may be 
more important than 
underreward with respect to 
extrinsic outcomes (Wilke et 
al., 2000). 
 
- “Low proximity relationships” 
will be more likely to be 
judged based on equity than 
will “high proximity 
relationships” (Hoffman & 
Kelley, 2000). 
 
- Intimate relationships may be 
characterized by need-based 
norms rather than by equity 
norms (Leventhal, 1980; 
Kuijer et al., 2001). 
 
- Equity sought in intimate 
relationships may be “long-
term” as opposed to “short-
term” (Kuijer et al., 2001). 
 
- Intimate relationships may not 
be characterized by normal 
exchange principles, because 
parties care about one another 
and the relationship is more 
communal (Clark & Mills, 
1979). 
 
- VanYperen and Buunk 
(1991) found that communal 
orientation moderated the 
relationship between equity 
and satisfaction.  Equity 
principles only to those low 
in communal orientation.  
Those high in communal 
orientation were more 
satisfied with overreward 
than with underreward or 
equity. 
 
- Boldero & Rosenthal (1984) 
found that personal contact 
influenced allocation 
decisions where reward 
were finite, but not where 
rewards were not finite. 
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING EQUITY SENSITIVITY 
 
 
Study 
 
Sample 
 
Findings 
Huseman et al. (1985) 859 managers - Curvilinear relationship between type of 
inequity and job satisfaction (in accordance 
with equity theory) 
- Both Bs and Es preferred overreward to 
underreward* 
- Underrewarded Bs were more satisfied than 
underrewarded ESs 
- Equitably rewarded Es were less satisfied 
than equitably rewarded ESs or Bs 
Miles et al. (1989) 519 undergraduate 
students 
- Bs preferred higher inputs than ESs and Es 
- Es did not exhibit a significantly different 
preference for outcomes* 
- Bs preferred lower O/I ratios than did ESs 
and Es 
- Anger thresholds differed in on of two 
scenarios; No significant difference in guilt 
thresholds 
- No significant differences between ESs and 
Es in seven of ten scenarios* 
- Bs worked harder for less pay 
King et al. (1993) 279 undergraduate 
students 
- Bs were more satisfied than Es in 
underreward conditions 
- Es were less satisfied than Bs or ESs in 
underreward conditions  
- Es were more satisfied than ESs in 
overreward conditions 
- Es were not significantly more satisfied than 
Bs in overreward conditions* 
- Manipulation of outcomes predicted 
dissatisfaction better than manipulation of 
inputs 
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King et al. (1993) 395 bank 
employees 
- Bs placed more emphasis on work (an 
input) than Es 
- Es placed more emphasis on pay (an 
outcome) than Bs 
- Bs were more input-focused than ESs and 
Es 
- No significant difference between exchange 
orientation of ESs and Es* 
 
King and Hinson (1994) 
 
266 business 
students 
 
- Equity sensitivity was not significantly related to 
satisfaction with negotiation outcomes.*  
Researchers suggested that situational factors may 
have overwhelmed the effects of equity sensitivity. 
- Bs were more relationship-oriented 
 
King and Miles (1994) five samples - Equity sensitivity was positively related to 
perceptions of distributive justice, altruism, 
and social desirability (i.e., more 
benevolence corresponded with increases in 
these variables) 
- Equity sensitivity was negatively related to 
locus of control, non-Protestant work ethic, 
and Machiavellianism 
- No relationship between equity sensitivity 
and input versus outcome orientation.*  The 
authors suggest the possibility that the 
exchange orientation measure was faulty. 
- Equity sensitivity was not related to age or 
education 
Miles et al. (1994) 2617 banking and 
public utility 
employees 
- Extrinsic, tangible outcomes were most 
important to Es and least important to Bs 
- Es found intrinsic outcomes less important 
than ESs and Bs 
- Pay was the most important outcome to Es 
- A sense of accomplishment was the most 
important outcome to Bs 
- Equity sensitivity was not related to ratings 
of the importance of extrinsic, intangible 
(i.e., relationship based) outcomes* 
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Konovsky and Organ 
(1996) 
630 hospital 
employees 
- Equity sensitivity was not related to 
organizational citizenship.*  The 
researchers suggested this result may be due 
to range restriction on the equity sensitivity 
measure or the blurring of the distinction 
between job and citizenship behavior due to 
the hospital setting. 
Renard et al. (1997)  - Korean subjects evinced greater entitlement 
than did U.S. subjects 
- Public-sector employees were more 
benevolent than private-sector employees 
- White and Black Americans did not differ 
in terms of equity sensitivity 
O’Neill and Mone (1998) 242 health care 
employees 
- Equity sensitivity was positively related to 
job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment, and negatively related to 
intent to leave 
Mueller and Clarke (1998) Undergraduate 
students in six 
nations 
- Subjects in transitional economies exhibited 
heightened entitlement and diminished 
benevolence compared to subjects in the 
U.S. 
- Men exhibited entitled tendencies more than 
did women 
 
Mudrack et al. (1999)  - Es exhibited higher Machiavellianism than 
others 
- Es regarded ethically questionable 
behaviors as more acceptable than did Bs 
- Bs were more likely than Es to disagree 
with Friedmanesqe view of corporate social 
responsibility 
- Equity sensitivity was significantly related 
to locus of control 
- Some evidence that benevolence was 
positively related to the Protestant work 
ethic 
Fok et al. (2000) 85 accounting 
professionals 
- Benevolence was positively related to 
growth need strength, willingness to engage 
in organizational citizenship behaviors, and 
satisfaction with the organization 
Sauley and Bedeian (2000)  - Entitlement was associated with an external 
locus of control 
- Benevolence was associated with pay 
satisfaction and overall satisfaction 
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Wheeler (2001) 244 management 
students 
- Subjects in collectivist, feminine, high uncertainty 
avoidance, and high power distance cultures had 
benevolent tendencies 
- Women tended toward benevolence, while men 
tended toward entitlement  
Kickul and Lester (2001) 183 MBA stsudents - Results generally supported the hypothesis that Es 
respond more negatively to psychological contract 
breaches than do Bs when the outcome is extrinsic, 
while Bs respond more negatively than Es when the 
breach concerns intrinsic outcomes.   
- The interaction  
Bing and Burroughs 
(2001) 
237 members of the 
National Guard and 
206 camp 
counselors 
- Equity sensitivity was positively related to 
performance, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness 
Allen and White (2002) 240 undergraduate 
students 
- Underrewarded Es evinced greater intent to 
reduce work inputs than did Bs and ESs 
- Underrewarded Es were more likely than Bs 
to make a comparison other work harder 
(Scenario 2 only), and more likely to 
attempt to be transferred 
- Underrewarded Bs were less likely than Es 
and ESs to attempt to lower the outcomes of 
a comparison other, and were less likely to 
leave the organization (Scenario 2 only) 
- Differential responses to underreward 
across types were most apparent when the 
response was behavioral rather than 
cognitive 
Yamaguchi (2003) 253 students - Entitlement was positively related to need 
for power 
- Type of need (self-achievement versus 
affiliation) mediated the relationship 
between dispositions and equity sensitivity 
- Self-achievement and affiliation needs were 
positively related to both entitlement and 
benevolence  
Raja et al. (2004) 197 public- and 
private-sector 
employees 
- Entitleds tended to form transactions rather 
than relationships in their psychological 
contracts 
- Equity sensitivity types did not differ in the 
likelihood of perceiving a psychological 
contract breach 
 
* Result contradicts predictions derived from theory concerning equity sensitivity. 
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EQUITY SENSITIVITY INSTRUMENT AND ADAPTATION 
Equity Sensitivity Instrument (Huseman, Hatfield & Miles, 1993) 
 
The questions below as what you’d like for your relationship to be with any organization for 
which you might work.  On each question, divide 10 points between the two choices (choice A 
and choice B) by giving the most points to the choice that is most like you and the fewest points 
to the choice that is least like you.  You can, if you’d like, give the same number of points to 
both choices (for example, 5 points to choice A and 5 points to choice B).  And you can use 
zeros if you’d like. 
 
In any organization I might work for: 
 
1. It would be more important for me to:  
a. ___ Get from the organization  
b. ___ Give to the organization 
 
2. It would be more important for me to: 
a. ___ Help others 
b. ___ Watch out for my own good 
 
3. I would be more concerned about: 
a. ___ What I received from the organization 
b. ___ What I contributed to the organization 
 
4. The hard work I would do should: 
a. ___ Benefit the organization 
b. ___ Benefit me 
 
5. My personal philosophy in dealing with the organization would be: 
a. ___ If I don’t look out for myself, nobody else will 
b. ___ It’s better for me to give than to receive 
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Adapted Equity Sensitivity Instrument 
 
The questions below ask you about your preferences with respect to relationships that you have 
with other people, or with groups or organizations (like businesses).  For each question, please 
divide 10 points between the two choices (Choice A and Choice B) by giving the most points to 
the choice that is most like you and the fewest points to the choice that is least like you.  For 
example, for one question I might give 7 points to Choice A and 3 points to Choice B if Choice 
A is more like me than Choice B is.  You may use any numbers from zero to 10. 
 
Please be sure to allocate all 10 points per question between each pair of possible responses.   
In any relationship that I might have with another person, or with a group or an 
organization: 
 
1.  It is more important for me to: a.  _____ Get from the relationship 
     b.  _____ Give to the relationship 
 
2.  It is more important for me to: a.  _____ Help others 
     b.  _____ Watch out for my own good 
 
3.  I am more concerned about: a.  _____ What I receive from the relationship 
     b.  _____ What I contribute to the relationship 
 
4.  Any relationship I might have with another person, or with a group or organization,  should: 
     a.  _____ Benefit the other party in the relationship 
     b.  _____ Benefit me 
 
5.  My personal philosophy in dealing with other people, groups or organizations is: 
     a.  _____ If I don’t look out for myself, nobody else will 
     b.  _____ It’s better for me to give than to receive 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this research.  This 
package contains two scenarios describing two different situations.  Please 
read each scenario carefully and answer the questions that follow.   
 
The package also contains a questionnaire that asks you about the type of 
relationships you prefer with other people, or with groups or organizations 
that you deal with.  Finally, it contains a questionnaire that asks you basic 
questions about yourself. 
 
It is expected that the whole process will take you about 20 minutes.   
 
Please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers to any of 
the questions in this package.  I am just looking for your opinions based on 
the scenarios presented.   
 
Please also be assured that your responses will be kept completely 
confidential and only aggregate information will be published.  In order to 
keep your responses anonymous, please do not write your name 
anywhere on this package.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study, please feel free 
to contact me at your convenience: 
 
Sefa Hayibor 
 
Email: sefa.hayibor@smu.ca    Phone: 902-491-6293 
 
 
THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR 
PARTICIPATION! 
IT IS GREATLY APPRECIATED. 
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PART A           1ULL 
 
You and Person B are undergraduate students.  Both of you are juniors, and are excellent 
students.  It is very important to both of you that you earn money to support yourselves while 
attending university, as you can barely afford the tuition.  To that end, both of you have been 
working as student employees, doing jobs at various research centers on campus.  Your jobs 
are found through the University’s Student Employment Office.  This Office helps students find 
work at school and monitors the treatment of student employees.  Though the level of pay 
sometimes varies from job to job, you and Person B are typically paid the same wage, and you 
both perform your duties adequately.   
 
The Center for Research in Organizational Behavior (known as the Center, for short) at your 
university’s Faculty of Business hires both you and Person B to do some coding of 
questionnaires: interpreting responses and inputting codes into a spreadsheet.  There is plenty 
of work for both of you. 
 
You and Person B each code about eight questionnaires per hour.  Your supervisor at the 
Center tells you that you and Person B are both doing well and seem to be equal in terms of 
accuracy and speed.   
 
After a few weeks, Person B is reassigned to the Institute for the Study of Strategic 
Management (also know as the ISSM), another research organization within the Faculty of 
Business.  Person B’s new job responsibilities at the ISSM are the same as her old 
responsibilities at the Center – coding questionnaires.   
 
The next week, you ask Person B how things are at her new job.  “The work is the same,” she 
responds, “but I’m making $15.00 an hour now instead of $9.00.”   
 
You decide to keep an eye on the situation.  The same circumstances persist.  Person B’s pay 
at the ISSM stays at $15.00 per hour, while your pay at the Center remains at $9.00 per hour.  
You confirm that other student employees in your position at the Center also make $9.00 per 
hour.   
 
On occasion, student employees at various research centers throughout the University have 
used various means to try to obtain pay increases from their respective employers.  They have, 
among other things, 1) complained to their superiors and to the Student Employment Office, 2) 
attempted to organize a union or attempted to join existing unions, and 3) organized impromptu 
“strikes,” wherein they temporarily stop reporting for work.  Without exception, these attempts 
have been unsuccessful in bringing about pay raises.   
 
University by-laws prevent supervisors of student employees from retaliating against employees 
who take such actions. 
 
Administrators at the ISSM (where Person B is now employed) have told you that they will not 
be hiring any more student employees this year.  However, there are many other work 
opportunities on campus or in the community that would offer you pay similar to or higher than 
what you make now. 
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The following questions ask you how you would respond to the situation described 
above.  In answering the questions, please keep in mind how you are being treated 
compared to how Person B is being treated.  After considering the above situation, 
please circle the appropriate number to indicate the likelihood that you would engage 
in each of the activities listed.  In each case, ‘1’ indicates you are extremely unlikely 
to undertake the activity, while ‘7’ indicates that you are extremely likely to 
undertake the activity.  You may circle any number from 1 to 7. 
 
Please consider each question independently.  For example, regarding Questions 1 
and 2, the likelihood that you would speak to your supervisor should not be dependent 
on the likelihood that you would speak to administrators.  Put another way, you should 
treat each question as if the action it deals with is the only option available to you 
in this situation. 
 
*** Unless otherwise noted, please assume that all of the actions identified in the 
questions could be undertaken at very little cost to you in terms of money, effort, 
time, or anything else. *** 
 
Important things to remember: 
• Pay is very important to you 
• You now make much less money than Person B 
• Activities aimed at increasing pay where you work have never been 
effective in bringing about pay raises 
• Given the job market, you should easily be able to find a different job that 
pays you at least as much as what you make now 
 
In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you 
would… 
 
1.  Complain to your supervisor at the Center in an attempt to get a pay raise for yourself and 
other employees at the Center? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
2.  Complain to administrators at the Student Employee Office in an attempt to get a pay raise 
for yourself and other employees at the Center?     
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
3.  Do nothing about the situation? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
4.  Put more effort into your work at the Center? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
5.  Put less effort into your work at the Center? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
6.  Purposely commit coding errors in your work at the Center? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
7.  Call in sick to the Center the next time you want a day off? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
8.  Attempt to organize a strike by student employees at the Center?  (This will take about 12 
hours and will cost you a day’s pay.  There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
9.  Participate in a strike organized by other student employees at the Center?  (This will take 6 
hours and will cost you a day’s pay.  There are no other costs associated with this action.)  
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
10.  Try to reduce your workload at the Center (while working the same number of hours)?  
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
11.  Start trying to find another job? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
12.  Quit your job at the Center? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
13.  Accept the idea that your work at the Center is only worth $9.00 per hour? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
14.  Attempt to organize a union drive by student employees at the Center?  (This will take 
about 12 hours.  There are no other costs associated with this action.)    
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
15.  Vote in favor of joining an existing union of student employees? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
16.  Advise others to seek employment at the Center? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
17.  In the above situation, how important to you is your hourly wage? 
Not At All 
Important 
Extremely 
                                    Important 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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18.  In the above situation, what is the likelihood that taking action in an attempt to 
bring about a pay increase where you currently work will, in fact, result in a pay 
increase? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
19.  In the above situation, if you tried to, what would be the likelihood of you finding a 
different job that pays as much as your current job at the Center? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
20.  In the above situation, do you feel under-rewarded or overrewarded compared to 
Person B? 
 
Extremely                                             Fairly 
Under-rewarded                               Rewarded 
                         Extremely  
       Overrewarded 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
Your supervisors have asked you to work a few extra hours at the Center one day next 
week to complete the coding of a specific batch of questionnaires that they need 
finished soon.  Under the Guidelines of the Student Employment Office, you are only 
allowed to be paid for a certain number of hours of work at the Center every week, so 
you would not make any additional money by complying – you would essentially be 
volunteering in order to help out your supervisors and the Center.  The Guidelines of the 
Student Employment Office also stipulate that you are not required to comply with 
requests like this and your supervisors assure you that there will be no repercussions if 
you choose not to.   
 
21.  What is the likelihood that you will agree to work extended hours at the Center one 
day next week, as your supervisors have asked? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
Likely
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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Part B           1ULL 
 
You and Person C are both freelance consultants who take on various contracts with 
small businesses in your community.  You are not associated with Person C in any way 
except that you both have recently been hired to do some consulting work for a local 
business.  The two of you are temporarily sharing a small office space in the building of 
the business you’re working for.  You are working on different parts of the same project, 
so you do not feel competitive with or threatened by Person C in any way.   
 
To aid in your work, you purchase a new laptop computer from Blu-Chip, an electronics 
retailer in your community.  Person C is also in the market for a new computer, and so 
also buys a laptop from Blu-Chip.  They are both “house brand” models, built by Blu-
Chip from Blu-Chip components as well as components manufactured by other 
companies.  Your computer is heavily customized to suit the particular type of work you 
do.  You each pay about $2000 for your new computers.   
 
The Blu-Chip sales associate whom you deal with advises you to purchase a three-year 
Service Agreement to cover maintenance and repair of your laptop.  The Service 
Agreement states that Blu-Chip will repair or replace your computer (at no charge) if it 
has problems due to defective parts, “normal wear and tear,” or certain other reasons.  
The Service Agreement costs $300.   
 
The work you do on the computer is your only source of income; because of this, and its 
heavily customized nature, your new laptop is a critical resource to you.  You therefore 
decide to purchase the Service Agreement.  Person C also sees his laptop as a critical 
resource, so he purchases the same Service Agreement. 
 
Several months after your purchase, you and Person C leave your laptops in your 
shared office overnight, and an unfortunate accident occurs.  The sprinkler system in 
the part of the building where your office is located is triggered during the night, which 
results in both of your computers being showered with water.  The next day you both 
find that your computers will not start up.  Unfortunately, because you and Person C are 
independent contractors, the insurance of the business for which you are both working 
will not cover the repair or replacement of your computers.  Neither you nor Person C 
has any other sort of insurance that will cover repair or replacement.   
 
The next day, Person C takes his laptop Blu-Chip.  He explains the unfortunate incident, 
and asks Blu-Chip service representatives to see what is wrong with his computer.   
 
Soon Person C is contacted by Blu-Chip.  Unfortunately, the water seeped through the 
keyboard and the computer’s CPU (central processing unit) is “fried.”  He will need a 
new CPU.  However, under the terms of his Service Agreement, Blu-Chip will replace 
the CPU without charge.  In fact, because the CPU in his computer is now out of 
production, it will be replaced with a newer, faster CPU.  Person C soon has his 
computer back, in working order. 
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A few days later, you take your computer back to Blu-Chip.  You explain what 
happened, and ask service representatives to see what is wrong with it.  Not 
surprisingly, your laptop has the same problem as Person C’s had – the CPU is “fried.”  
Having heard of Person C’s experience with Blu-Chip, you attempt to confirm that your 
Service Agreement will cover the replacement of your CPU.  To your dismay, you are 
told that Blu-Chip’s Service Agreement will not cover the necessary repairs.  You 
explain how Person C was provided with a replacement processor, but Blu-Chip 
representatives maintain their position. Unfortunately, getting a new CPU will cost you 
close to $500. 
 
In the past, customers have taken a variety of actions to attempt to get their desires met 
by Blu-Chip.  Among other things, they have complained to Blu-Chip management, 
sued Blu-Chip in small claims court or taken other legal action, posted the story of their 
concerns with Blu-Chip on the internet, filed complaints about Blu-Chip with the Better 
Business Bureau, and attempted to organize boycotts of Blu-Chip among their friends or 
the general public.  However, without exception, these actions have failed to convince 
Blu-Chip to fulfill the customer’s desires. 
 
It would be easy for you to find another retailer that can provide you with a suitable CPU 
for about the same price that Blu-Chip will charge you. 
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The following questions ask you how you would respond to the situation described above.  In 
answering the questions, please keep in mind how you are being treated compared to how 
Person C is being treated.  After considering the above situation, please circle the 
appropriate number to indicate the likelihood that you would engage in each of the activities 
listed.  In each case, ‘1’ indicates you are extremely unlikely to undertake the activity, 
while ‘7’ indicates that you are extremely likely to undertake the activity.  You may circle 
any number from 1 to 7. 
 
Please consider each question independently.  For example, your response to Question 2 
should not be based on your response to Question 1.  Put another way, you should treat each 
question as if the action it deals with is the only option available to you in this situation. 
 
*** Unless otherwise noted, please assume that all of the actions identified in the 
questions could be undertaken at very little cost to you in terms of time, money, effort, or 
anything else.*** 
 
Important things to remember: 
• Having your computer work properly is extremely important to you 
• Blu-Chip repaired Person C’s computer at no cost, but did not repair yours 
• Customers’ activities aimed at getting Blu-Chip to meet their desires in situations 
like this (e.g., complaining, organizing a boycott, taking legal action) have never 
been effective 
• You could easily find another retailer from whom you could purchase a new CPU 
 
 
In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
1.  Buy more products from Blu-Chip? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
2.  Make a point of shopping at Blu-Chip in the future? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
3.  Advise others to shop at Blu-Chip? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
4.  Advise others not to shop at Blu-Chip? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
5.  Provide a positive testimonial about your experience at Blu-Chip for use in a Blu-
Chip advertisement?  (You would not be paid for your testimonial.) 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
6.  Refuse to shop at Blu-Chip in the future? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
7.  Post negative information concerning Blu-Chip on the internet? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
8.  Make false negative statements condemning Blu-Chip on the internet? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
9.  Attempt to organize a boycott of Blu-Chip among your friends and associates?  (This 
will take 3 hours of your time.  There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 274
In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
10.  Attempt to organize a boycott of Blu-Chip among the general public?  (This will take 
8 hours of your time.  There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
11.  Participate in a boycott of Blu-Chip organized by others? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
12.  Steal or vandalize Blu-Chip property if you knew you wouldn’t get caught? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
13.  Complain about Blu-Chip to the Better Business Bureau? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
14.  Take legal action against Blu-Chip?  (This will take 5 hours of your time and will 
cost $40.  There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
15.  Complain to Blu-Chip management (e.g., in person, or by phone, mail, or email)? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
16.  Sue Blu-Chip in small claims court?  (This will take 5 hours of your time and will cost $40.  
There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
17.  Do nothing about the situation? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
18.  In the above situation, how important is it for you to have a working computer? 
 
Not At All 
Important  
Extremely 
                                        Important 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
19.  In the above situation, what is the likelihood that taking action (e.g., complaining, 
organizing a boycott, etc.) in an attempt to get Blu-Chip to fix your computer at no cost would, in  
fact, result in Blu-Chip doing so? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
20.  In the above situation, what is the likelihood of you being able to obtain a replacement  
       CPU from a retailer other than Blu-Chip? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
21.  In the above situation, do you feel under-rewarded or overrewarded when you  
       compare yourself with Person C? 
 
Extremely                                                 Fairly 
Under-rewarded                                   Rewarded 
                            Extremely  
       Overrewarded 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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PART A            7OHH 
 
You and Person B are undergraduate students.  Both of you are juniors, and are 
excellent students.  It is very important to both of you that you earn money to support 
yourselves while attending university, as you can barely afford the tuition.  To that end, 
both of you have been working as student employees, doing jobs at various research 
centers on campus.  Your jobs are found through the University’s Student Employment 
Office.  This Office helps students find work at school and monitors the treatment of 
student employees.  Though the level of pay sometimes varies from job to job, you and 
Person B are typically paid the same wage, and you both perform your duties 
adequately.   
 
The Center for Research in Organizational Behavior (known as the Center, for short) at 
your university’s Faculty of Business hires both you and Person B to do some coding of 
questionnaires: interpreting responses and inputting codes into a spreadsheet.  There is 
plenty of work for both of you. 
 
You and Person B each code about eight questionnaires per hour.  Your supervisor at 
the Center tells you that you and Person B are both doing well and seem to be equal in 
terms of accuracy and speed.   
 
After a few weeks, Person B is reassigned to the Institute for the Study of Strategic 
Management (also know as the ISSM), another research organization within the Faculty 
of Business.  Person B’s new job responsibilities at the ISSM are the same as her old 
responsibilities at the Center – coding questionnaires.   
 
The next week, you ask Person B how things are at her new job.  “The work is the 
same,” she responds, “Unfortunately, I’m only making $9.00 an hour now instead of 
$15.00.”   
 
You decide to keep an eye on the situation.  The same circumstances persist.  Person 
B’s pay at the ISSM stays at $9.00 per hour, while your pay at the Center remains at 
$15.00 per hour.   
 
On occasion, student employees at various research centers throughout the University 
have used various means to try to obtain pay increases from their respective employers.  
They have, among other things, 1) complained to their superiors and to the Student 
Employment Office, 2) attempted to organize a union or attempted to join existing 
unions, and 3) organized impromptu “strikes,” wherein they temporarily stop reporting 
for work.  Very often, these attempts have been successful in bringing about pay raises.   
 
University by-laws prevent supervisors of student employees from retaliating against 
employees who take such actions. 
 
There are very few other work opportunities on campus or in the community that would 
offer you pay similar to what you make now. 
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The following questions ask you how you would respond to the situation described 
above.  In answering the questions, please keep in mind how you are being treated 
compared to how Person B is being treated.  After considering the above situation, 
please circle the appropriate number to indicate the likelihood that you would engage 
in each of the activities listed.  In each case, ‘1’ indicates you are extremely unlikely 
to undertake the activity, while ‘7’ indicates that you are extremely likely to 
undertake the activity.  You may circle any number from 1 to 7. 
 
Please consider each question independently.  For example, regarding Questions 1 
and 2, the likelihood that you would speak to your supervisor should not be dependent 
on the likelihood that you would speak to administrators.  Put another way, you should 
treat each question as if the action it deals with is the only option available to you 
in this situation. 
 
*** Unless otherwise noted, please assume that all of the actions identified in the 
questions could be undertaken at very little cost to you in terms of time, money, 
effort, or anything else.*** 
 
Important things to remember: 
• Pay is very important to you 
• You now make much more money than Person B 
• Activities aimed at increasing pay where you work have very often been 
effective in bringing about pay raises 
• Given the job market, it would be extremely difficult for you to find a 
different job that pays you as much as what you make now 
 
In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you 
would… 
 
1.  Complain to your supervisor at the Center in an attempt to get a pay raise for yourself and 
other employees at the Center? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
2.  Complain to administrators at the Student Employee Office in an attempt to get a pay raise 
for yourself and other employees at the Center?     
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
3.  Do nothing about the situation? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
4.  Put more effort into your work at the Center? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
5.  Put less effort into your work at the Center? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
6.  Purposely commit coding errors in your work at the Center? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
7.  Call in sick to the Center the next time you want a day off? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
8.  Attempt to organize a strike by student employees at the Center?  (This will take about 12 
hours and will cost you a day’s pay.  There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
9.  Participate in a strike organized by other student employees at the Center?  (This will take 6 
hours and will cost you a day’s pay.  There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
10.  Try to reduce your workload at the Center (while working the same number of hours)?  
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
 
11.  Start trying to find another job? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
12.  Quit your job at the Center? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
13.  Accept the idea that your work at the Center is worth $15.00 per hour? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
14.  Attempt to organize a union drive by student employees at the Center?  (This will take 
about 12 hours.  There are no other costs associated with this action.)    
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
15.  Vote in favor of joining an existing union of student employees? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
16.  Advise others to seek employment at the Center? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
17.  In the above situation, how important to you is your hourly wage? 
 
Not At All 
Important 
Extremely 
                                    Important 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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18.  In the above situation, what is the likelihood that taking action in an attempt to 
bring about a pay increase where you currently work will, in fact, result in a pay 
increase? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
19.  In the above situation, if you tried to, what would be the likelihood of you finding a 
different job that pays as much as your current job at the Center? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
20.  In the above situation, do you feel under-rewarded or overrewarded compared to 
Person B? 
 
Extremely                                             Fairly 
Under-rewarded                               Rewarded 
                         Extremely  
       Overrewarded 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Your supervisors have asked you to work a few extra hours at the Center one day next 
week to complete the coding of a specific batch of questionnaires that they need 
finished soon.  Under the Guidelines of the Student Employment Office, you are only 
allowed to be paid for a certain number of hours of work at the Center every week, so 
you would not make any additional money by complying – you would essentially be 
volunteering in order to help out your supervisors and the Center.  The Guidelines of the 
Student Employment Office also stipulate that you are not required to comply with 
requests like this and your supervisors assure you that there will be no repercussions if 
you choose not to.   
 
21.  What is the likelihood that you will agree to work extended hours at the Center one 
day next week, as  your supervisors have asked? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
Likely
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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Part B           7OHH 
 
You and Person C are both freelance consultants who take on various contracts with 
small businesses in your community.  You are not associated with Person C in any way 
except that you both have recently been hired to do some consulting work for a local 
business.  The two of you are temporarily sharing a small office space in the building of 
the business you’re working for.  You are working on different parts of the same project, 
so you do not feel competitive with or threatened by Person C in any way.   
 
To aid in your work, you purchase a new laptop computer from Blu-Chip, an electronics 
retailer in your community.  Person C is also in the market for a new computer, and so 
also buys a laptop from Blu-Chip.  They are both “house brand” models, built by Blu-
Chip from Blu-Chip components as well as components manufactured by other 
companies.  Your computer is heavily customized to suit the particular type of work you 
do.  You each pay about $2000 for your new computers.   
 
The Blu-Chip sales associate whom you deal with advises you to purchase a three-year 
Service Agreement to cover maintenance and repair of your laptop.  The Service 
Agreement states that Blu-Chip will repair or replace your computer (at no charge) if it 
has problems due to defective parts, “normal wear and tear,” or certain other reasons.  
The Service Agreement costs $300.   
 
The work you do on the computer is your only source of income; because of this, and its 
heavily customized nature, your new laptop is a critical resource to you.  You therefore 
decide to purchase the Service Agreement.  Person C also sees his laptop as a critical 
resource, so he purchases the same Service Agreement. 
 
Several months after your purchase, you and Person C leave your laptops in your 
shared office overnight, and an unfortunate accident occurs.  The sprinkler system in 
the part of the building where your office is located is triggered during the night, which 
results in both of your computers being showered with water.  The next day you both 
find that your computers will not start up.  Unfortunately, because you and Person C are 
independent contractors, the insurance of the business for which you are both working 
will not cover the repair or replacement of your computers.  Neither you nor Person C 
has any other sort of insurance that will cover repair or replacement.   
 
The next day, Person C takes his laptop Blu-Chip.  He explains the unfortunate incident, 
and asks Blu-Chip service representatives to see what is wrong with his computer.   
 
Soon Person C is contacted by Blu-Chip.  Unfortunately, the water seeped through the 
keyboard and the computer’s CPU (central processing unit) is “fried.”  He will need a 
new CPU.  To his dismay, he is told that Blu-Chip’s Service Agreement will not cover 
the necessary repairs, because the problem is not due to defective parts or normal wear 
and tear.  Getting a new CPU will cost him close to $500.   
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A few days later, you take your computer back to Blu-Chip.  You explain what 
happened, and ask service representatives to see what is wrong with it.  Not 
surprisingly, your laptop has the same problem as Person C’s had – the CPU is “fried.”  
Despite Blu-Chip’s refusal to repair Person C’s computer under the terms of his Service 
Agreement, you ask if, by any chance, your Service Agreement will cover the repair of 
your computer.  You are pleasantly surprised to be told that, though the necessary 
repairs are not technically covered by your Service Agreement, Blu-Chip will make an 
exception in your case, and will make the repairs for free.  Better still, because the CPU 
in your computer is now no longer being produced, it will be replaced with a newer, 
faster CPU.  
 
You ask what type of CPU will be in your new computer.  You are told that it will be a 
B5.  You know that a still faster CPU that you will eventually need - the B6 - is available, 
and so ask if you can have a B6 put in your computer, since it would be ideal for the 
work you do.  Blu-Chip representatives refuse this request.  However, they inform you 
that you could purchase a B6 for about $600.   
 
In the past, customers have taken a variety of actions to attempt to get their desires met 
by Blu-Chip.  Among other things, they have complained to Blu-Chip management, 
sued Blu-Chip in small claims court or taken other legal action, posted the story of their 
concerns with Blu-Chip on the internet, filed complaints about Blu-Chip with the Better 
Business Bureau, and attempted to organize boycotts of Blu-Chip among their friends or 
the general public.  Very often, these actions have convinced Blu-Chip to fulfill the 
customer’s desires. 
 
You are certain that you will eventually upgrade to a B6.  Blu-Chip manufactures the B6, 
so it is the only place you will be able to purchase one. 
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The following questions ask you how you would respond to the situation described above.  
In answering the questions, please keep in mind how you are being treated compared 
to how Person C is being treated.  After considering the above situation, please circle 
the appropriate number to indicate the likelihood that you would engage in each of the 
activities listed.  In each case, ‘1’ indicates you are extremely unlikely to undertake the 
activity, while ‘7’ indicates that you are extremely likely to undertake the activity.  You 
may circle any number from 1 to 7. 
 
Please consider each question independently.  For example, your response to Question 
2 should not be based on your response to Question 1.  Put another way, you should treat 
each question as if the action it deals with is the only option available to you in this 
situation. 
 
*** Unless otherwise noted, please assume that all of the actions identified in the 
questions could be undertaken at very little cost to you in terms of time, money, 
effort, or anything else.*** 
 
Important things to remember: 
• Having your computer work properly is extremely important to you 
• Blu-Chip did not repair Person C’s computer for free, but they did repair yours 
• Customers’ activities aimed at getting Blu-Chip to meet their desires in 
situations like this (e.g., complaining, organizing a boycott, taking legal action) 
have very often been effective 
• You will not be able to buy a B6 anywhere except at Blu-Chip 
 
 
In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
1.  Buy more products from Blu-Chip? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
2.  Make a point of shopping at Blu-Chip in the future? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
3.  Advise others to shop at Blu-Chip? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
4.  Advise others not to shop at Blu-Chip? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
5.  Provide a positive testimonial about your experience at Blu-Chip for use in a Blu-
Chip  
     advertisement?  (You would not be paid for your testimonial.) 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
6.  Refuse to shop at Blu-Chip in the future? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
7.  Post negative information concerning Blu-Chip on the internet? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
8.  Make false negative statements condemning Blu-Chip on the internet? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
9.  Attempt to organize a boycott of Blu-Chip among your friends and associates?  (This 
will take 3 hours of your time.  There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
10.  Attempt to organize a boycott of Blu-Chip among the general public?  (This will take 
8 hours of your time.  There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
11.  Participate in a boycott of Blu-Chip organized by others? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
12.  Steal or vandalize Blu-Chip property if you knew you wouldn’t get caught? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
13.  Complain about Blu-Chip to the Better Business Bureau? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
14.  Take legal action against Blu-Chip?  (This will take 5 hours of your time and will 
cost $40.  There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
15.  Complain to Blu-Chip management (e.g., in person, or by phone, mail, or email)? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
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In the above situation, what is the likelihood that you would… 
 
16.  Sue Blu-Chip in small claims court?  (This will take 5 hours of your time and will cost $40.  
There are no other costs associated with this action.) 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
17.  Do nothing about the situation? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
18.  In the above situation, how important is it for you to have a working computer? 
 
Not At All 
Important  
Extremely 
                                    Important 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
19.  In the above situation, what is the likelihood that taking action (e.g., complaining, 
organizing a boycott, etc.) in an attempt to get Blu-Chip to fix your computer at no cost would, in  
fact, result in Blu-Chip doing so? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
20.  In the above situation, what is the likelihood of you being able to obtain a replacement  
       CPU from a retailer other than Blu-Chip? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
                                       Likely 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
21.  In the above situation, do you feel under-rewarded or overrewarded when you  
       compare yourself with Person C? 
 
Extremely                                                  Fairly 
Under-rewarded                                    Rewarded 
                            Extremely  
       Overrewarded 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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